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Ipargazdasági Szemle (Review of Industrial Economics) is a quarterly publication of 
the Research Institute of Industrial Economics of the Hungarian Academy of 
Sciences. The copy the reader now holds is a special English issue of this periodical, 
carrying articles by the fellows of the Institute. We intend to publish such special 
issues in English in the future regularly. Here we are going to present the Institute 
briefly. 
The Hungarian Academy of Sciences has two aspects and functions. On the one 
hand, it is the elected body of outstanding Hungarian and foreign scholars (the latter 
as honorary members). With its ten scientific departments and a great many scientific 
commissions it is the highest democratic forum of Hungarian scientific life. On the 
other hand, the Academy is the supervisory authority of 36 research institutes working 
in the most diverse fields, pursuing mainly basic research. 
The Academy maintains three economic institutes, the Research Institute of 
Industrial Economics (RIIE) is one of them. (There is also an Institute of Economics 
and an Institute for World Economics.) RIIE was established in 1960. Its initiator, 
and first director, academician Gyula Hevesi, beside his earlier functions, had been 
vice-chairman of the Academy between 1960-1967. The objective set for the Institute 
was to pioneer with not too many, yet exemplary, research projects in its area of 
competence, and further the scientific foundation of industrial development. The 
director's office was taken by Zoltán Román in 1968. 
The basic task of the Institute is formulated in its statues as follows: "The task of 
the Institute is to carry on research of general interest into industrial economics, 
stimulate and help to coordinate industrial economic research, promote the 
development of scientific and practical industrial economic activity." Accordingly, the 
Institute has served, beside its own researches, the general development of its discipline 
with its coordinating and stimulating activity, mediating between theory and practice, 
among other things through helping the activities of the Commission of Industrial 
Economics of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. 
At first, the research of the Institute dealt with working time schedules, utilization 
and management of fixed assets, development of technology and products. Later on 
the scope of subjects expanded and the points of emphasis changed in line with 
demand. Since the early sixties the research has been centred on productivity and 
efficiency. For long years the Institute had been the Hungarian coordinator of the 
Productivity Working Group of the CMEA and since 1969 it has been the Hungarian 
member of the European Association of National Productivity Centres. (The manager 
of the Institute was vice chairman of the Federation, between 1972-1975 its chairman 
and since 1983 again its vice chairman.) 
The Institute participates in the medium and long-term planning of industrial 
development regularly, and has conducted several research projects on corporate and 
sectoral planning, its practical experience and the links between corporate and 
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macroeconomic planning. After the introduction of the new system of economic 
control andmänagement in 1968 the subjects to be investigated expanded to include 
enterprise behaviour and the problems of enterprise (managerial) economics 
corresponting to the new conditions. Since the mid-sixties industrial development and 
industrial policy, and lately industrial organization and the problems of management 
have obtained emphasis in its worTTpfogram. 
The Institute has placed great weight on interdisciplinary approach and empirical 
investigations from the very start. In the scope of the latter it was particularly the 
surveys relating to enterprise behaviour and intentions, problems difficult to 
investigate with traditional statistical instruments, (e. g. factors of productivity, 
judgement of technological progress, conditions of market competition) that have 
become known and generally quoted sources. 
The Institute maintains wide international contacts with related institutes in both 
East and West, as well as with international organizations (ECE, UNIDO, European 
Association of National Productivity Centres, CMEA-institutes, IIASA, etc.). It 
organizes international symposia, seminaries, conferences regularly. The papers of 
two such conferences were also published in English: 
Progress and Planning in Industry. Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest 1972. 
Industrial Development and Industrial Policy. Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest 1979. 
The following titles of books, published in Hungarian on the basis of research 
carried out in the Institute give a picture about its activity. 
Hevesi, Gy.: Economic, Organizational and Social Problems of Continuous Working 
Time Schedules. (1966) 
Topical Problems of the Management of Fixed Assets — Conference Papers. (1968) 
Kéri, Т.: Flexibility of the Industrial Firm. (1972) 
Botos, В.: Reckoning with Uncertainty in Investment Decisions of Industrial 
Enterprises. (1973) 
Parányi, Gy. (ed.): A Rapid Method for Disclosing Organizational Tasks. (1975) 
Viszt, E.: Occupational Mobility of Labour. (1975) 
Román, Z.: Productivity and Growth. (1982) 
Parányi, Gy.: Organization of Work - Organized Work. The Workplace-Centred 
Development of Organization. (1977) 
Botos, В.—Papanek, G.: Investigation of the Profitability in Industry. (1977) 
Román, Z.: The Economics of Industry. (1978) 
Mrs. Ványai, P.: Factors Influencing the Performance of Workers. (1978) 
Sternthal, J.: Production Cooperation in the Engineering Industry. (1979) 
Román, Z.: Industrial Policy. (1981) 
Botos, B.-Papanek, G.: Development of the Production Structure of Industry. (1982) 
Parányi, Gy.: The Modernizing Development of Industrial Production. (1983) 
Botos, B.-Papanek, G.: Question Marks in the Development of the Hungarian 
Industry. (1984) 
Bagó, E.: Diversification in the Industry. (1985) 
Hoványi, G.: Models of Management. (1982) 
Papanek, G. (ed.): Medium-Term Planning in the Hungarian Industrial Enterprises 
(forthcoming). 
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION IN HUNGARY 
ZOLTÁN ROMÁN 
The notion of industrial organization denotes, on the one hand, a discipline of 
economics, having come about under this name in the United States in the thirties, 
but reaching back to the book by Alfred Marshall (The Economics of Industry, 1879) 
and in the Western world it is frequently called by this name even today. Industrial 
economics came into being at about the same time in the Soviet Union, on a different 
foundation, and to a considerable extent with different content. The first large All-
Union Conference was held under this title in 1929, and the first textbook (by J. A. 
Granowski and D. L. Markus) was published in Moscow in 1940.1 analysed the further 
development of the two schools in another paper,1 together with their similarities and 
differences, thus I will not delve into this. 
At the same time, the notion of industrial organization denotes, on the other hand, 
the system of operation and relations of the organizations carrying on industrial 
activity as well as of those shaping, controlling, influencing and representing them. 
I believe it is essential to distinguish, in this approach, between two subsystems of 
the industrial organization: 1. the subsystem realizing industrial production, the 
main elements of which are the establishments, the enterprises and other business 
organizations, further, 2. the subsystem of institutions shaping, controlling, influenc-
ing and representing industrial activities. In centrally planned economies, where the 
overwhelming part of industrial output is contributed by state-owned enterprises, this 
distinction is indispensable for understanding the system and the operation of 
industry. It is, however, no less important today in the market economies, too, 
partially because of the not negligable weight of the state-owned enterprises, and much 
more because of the growing role there of the second subsystem. (I refer here not only 
to governmental organizations but also to employer organizations, trade unions and 
other local or national institutions.) 
The relationship between these two subsystems of the industrial organization is 
determined by the system and practice of economic control and management. We aim 
to establish such relationships between the two which promote the functioning of the 
whole system with the best possible efficiency. Concerning the development of the 
system of economic control and management itself, industrial organization is partly a 
precondition determining the initial situation and in many respects the pace of further 
steps to be taken, and partly the shaping of the organizational system is a possibility, 
a tool, for improving economic control, and thus for realizing the comprehensive goals 
of economic and industrial policy. 
' L'Economia industrial all'Est ed all'Ovest. Rivista di Economia e Politico Industriale, 1978. 1. 
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For the shaping of the structure of industrial organization, above all of the 
productive organizations, there are direct and indirect instruments available. Direct 
instruments are, e.g., the creation and liquidation of industrial establishments, 
enterprises or other business organizations, the rearrangement of their scope of 
activity or authority, or of their mutual relations. Indirect instruments are, e.g., such 
modifications of the system of economic control and management which influence the 
situation, survival, mutual relations of organizations and prompt some of the units to 
change, on their own initiative, the way how they fit better into the organizational 
system. Increasing interference into these processes in the capitalist countries derives 
from the recognition that the market does not properly regulate them; in the socialist 
countries, however, these processes are from the outset — and to an exaggerated 
extent — exempted from market impulses, and indirect methods are seldom used. 
The industrial organization, and both of its subsystems, are most strongly 
influenced by the division of labour, specialization and cooperation, as well as by some 
general laws of organizational life. 
The mutually interrelated forms of the division of labour, specialization and 
cooperation, appear in every area of human activity and are particularly important in 
the spheres of production and administration. The division of labour provides the 
foundation for specialization, demanding simultaneously also cooperation. The 
division of labour and specialization render large-scale production and activity possible 
and this results in a more advantageous distribution of both stock and flow inputs, in 
so-called economies of scale. It is, however, no less important that in the case of 
specialization, more specialized knowledge, software and hardware and a more 
complete and safer background can be provided for a narrower field than if many 
kinds of tasks have to be completed at the same time. 
The division of labour and specialization necessarily involve cooperation and this 
brings about mutual dependence. This dependence, the extent of mutuality and its 
judgement, may differ. All that also entails a growing social nature of production, 
and in production it is accompanied by a further general phenomenon: i.e. concentra-
tion. 
From among the general characteristics of the life of organizations the most 
important is that, besides the targets set to the organizations, they have themselves 
their own targets. These are survival and growth on the one hand, and helping the 
members (the majority of members) in realizing their individual and group objectives. 
The individual and group objectives partially meet and partially conflict; the 
objectives of the organization are formulated as a compromise. Identification with 
objectives set to the organization may be of a varying degree, mostly compromises 
are needed also in this respect. 
Every organization has not only own objectives, but also instruments for asserting 
them. From among them the greatest role is accorded in industrial organizations to 
the handling of information and the regulation (tactics) of performance. The 
individual organizations transmit information about themselves, about the phenomena 
known by them applying a certain selectivity — conforming to their interests. With 
this, state-owned enterprises may e.g. considerably influence what tasks are considered 
by higher bodies as such that can be performed by them and thus are set to them, how 
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these bodies decide on investments, development directions and subsidies. The regula-
tion of performance (tactics, reserve building) are everyday phenomena, particularly 
reinforced if a) the market is not given a serious role in assessing performances, and 
b) if the latter are compared in the first place to the 'Ъа5е data", attained in the 
preceding period, and not to national or international standards. 
The basis of the theory of industrial organization worked out for market 
economies is the paradigm structure — behaviour — performance. In many respects, 
this is also relevant for centrally planned economies, though it requires adaptation and 
expansion. This is similar to the fact - only in greater extent — that the theory 
originally worked out for the American economy had to be also adapted to the 
European environment2 and further developed in order to be suited for the explana-
tion of newer phenomena. 
International Tendencies and the Hungarian Efforts 
The Hungarian reform of economic control and management of 1968 was started, 
among other things, by the recognition that there are significant conflicts of interest 
between the enterprises and the central control of the economy and these cannot be 
overbridged with the aid of the usual mechanisms of planning, breaking down the 
plans, and stimulation for plan fulfilment. It was a further recognition (already in the 
seventies) that even the national economic interest cannot always be exactly defined. 
The independent organizational and individual interests appear not only in the 
enterprise sphere but also in the control sphere. This is why efforts are made to work 
out such mechanisms which do not disguise but bring to the surface, open and oppose 
these interests, thus trying to assert finally the common interest. 
It could be clearly seen already during the preparation of the reform that the 
elimination of plan-instructions and the increasing role of the market would demand 
significant changes in industrial organization, both in the relationship between 
enterprises and the control agencies and in their structure, also separately. Only in 
this manner would their behaviour become different and serve greater performance. 
The document laying the foundations for reform denoted the desirable directions for 
the development of the organizational pattern of enterprises rather unambiguously 
and correctly — even in hindsight — (closer relations between production and sales, 
appropriate proportions between small, medium and large enterprises, etc.), but, for 
tactical reasons, it did not provide for direct practical steps. The role of the control 
agencies, and changes therein were indicated in the principles of the reform but in 
major outlines. 
As is known, the implementation of the reform has not been unbroken, beginning 
with the second third of the seventies the old role of the control agencies has been 
revitalized, and centralization of the enterprise organization continued. With the 
change in economic policy, in 1978 a new growth path was marked out for the 
2Jacquimin, A. P.-Jong, H. W. de: European Industrial Organization. The Macmillan Press Ltd., 
London and Basingstoke 1977. 269 p. 
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Hungarian economy: while slowing down the rate of growth, the improvement of 
external economic equilibrium was put at the centre and a stand was taken for a 
resolute continuation of the reform process. Enterprise centralization was stopped by 
the government in 1980 and, beside other reform measures, steps were taken to 
reverse it. In April 1984 a new resolution was taken for the continuation of the 
reform and, within it, for essential modifications in industrial organization. 
The Hungarian economic reform is searching for the particular new methods of 
socialist economic control and management, endeavouring to develop its new system. 
Understandably, this is a longer learning process, for which no ready-made histrocial 
examples are available, but international experience may serve with important lessons. 
I think that the following are the most important international tendencies in the 
development of industrial organization: 
1. specialization, cooperation and (in certain areas and to a certain extent) the growth 
of concentration; 
2. integration of research, production and marketing; 
3. internationalization; 
4. growing government interference (with opposite waves and exceptions); 
5. spreading of industrial democracy, of various forms of participation; 
6. efforts to strengthen social control over the large corporations and government 
administrations; 
7. consolidation of the role of small and medium-sized firms; and, in the large corpora 
tions: 
8. separation of ownership from management; 
9. the establishment of internal profit and cost centres; spreading of 
the "divisional" organization; 
10. diversification; 
11. experiments with intrapreneurial ventures; 
12. the gaining ground of the "shadow economy". 
The place is insufficient here - however interesting it might be — to trace these 
tendencies historically and by countries (groups of countries) in all detail. I will only 
illustrate with a few remarks the fact that their majority can be found in both the 
capitalist and the socialist countries, at times with a time lag and, of course, with not 
negligable differences. Thus e.g., as already mentioned, growing specialization, 
cooperation and concentration are common tendencies (1). While, however, concentra 
tion (and particularly organizational centralization) was highly developed in the 
socialist countries, specialization and, particularly, cooperation is frequently faltering; 
the role of small and medium-sized firms (7) was belittled and this view is only now 
beginning to change. Internationalization (3) is of a lower degree in the socialist 
countries, even within the CMEA. Research, production and marketing were earlier 
sharply separated, the situation has improved in Hungary after the reform, in other 
countries improvement has only started in recent years (2). 
The building out of internal profit and cost centres (economic accounting within 
the enterprise) is a common effort (9). Partly owing to identical causes (more leisure 
time in consequence of reduced worktime, demand for additional income), the scope 
of the second, the shadow economy is growing in both groups of countries (12). 
11 
Diversification of production may be observed in the industrial firms of the socialist 
countries, too, but rather in the interest of eliminating the obstacles to cooperation 
and not on grounds of deliberate business policy considerations as is the case with 
capitalist firms (10). The role of industrial democracy, of various forms of participa-
tion is growing in both groups of countries (5) — if under different conditions, and 
with different roles. Experiments with intrapreneurial forms (11) are linked to 
market and profit orientation in the capitalist countries: presumably, they will be of 
importance under similar conditions also in the socialist countries. 
The problem of relationship between ownership and management (8), as well as 
the forms and extent of government interference (4) would demand a deeper analysis; 
comparison in a few sentences would be highly risky. The demand of social control 
over large enterprises (6) can be tracked back in the capitalist countries at least to a 
hundred years, in the socialist countries we cannot speak about such general efforts. 
Also the problem of control over the agencies of government administration appears in 
a different context, linked to the basic problems of political democracy. 
It should be clear from the above that the greater part of these tendencies may also 
be found in the industrial organization in Hungary (several of these are deliberate new 
efforts after the 1968 reform), together with such consequences of earlier principles 
and interferences which we now judege as irrational and to be corrected, (in them-
selves, but particularly from the viewpoint of the 1968 reform). Therefore, in shaping 
the Hungarian industrial organization, three efforts have to be amalgamated: a) correc-
tion of earlier created unhealthy structures; b) promotion of international tendencies 
that seem to be followed; and c) experimentation with and introduction of original, 
new solutions corresponding to the conditions of the Hungarian economy. 
Major Characteristics of the Pattern of Establishments and Enterprises 
in the Hungarian Industry 
According to 1983 data (see Table 1) there were 715 enterprises and 4579 establish-
ments in the state-owned industry and in the cooperative industry the corresponding 
figures were 622 cooperatives and 4315 establishments. This was complemented by 
the activity of 44177 private artisans and about 10000 other small-scale organizations. 
But Table 1 only comprises the data of organizations classified as industrial ones. In 
the last 10 years industrial output has also grown in the non-industrial organizations 
and their output already exceeds 10 percent of that of the total "socialist"(i.e. state-
owned and cooperative) industrial organizations, their employment 12 percent of that 
in the socialist industry. (As a matter of fact, they, too, belong to the socialist sector, 
but are not classified by statistics as "socialist industry".) A considerable part of 
industrial activity pursued here is linked to the main activity of the given organization. 
Thus in state farms and agricultural cooperatives food processing is decisive, in build-
ing organizations the production of building materials, but we also find considerable 
engineering, chemical, light industrial and other industrial activities and services which 
are rather far from the basic activity of the organization in question. 
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Table 1 
Major data of the productive organizations of industry 
1970 1975 1980 1983 
Number of enterprises and 
establishments, 3lst Dec. 
Number of enterprises in the state-owned 
industry 812 779 699 715 
Of which: in the industry supervised 
by ministries 532 543 546 564 
in the industry supervised 
by the (local) councils 280 236 153 151 
Number of establishments of the enterprises 5681 5387 4991 4579 
of which: in the industry supervised 
by ministries 3066 3170 3355 3089 
in the industry supervised 
by (local) councils 2615 2217 1636 1490 
Number of cooperatives 821 793 661 623 
Number of private artisans (active 
and continuing working in retirement) 43054 35677 39275 44177 
Small firms and small cooperatives - - - 286 









Average number of employees Average number of employees, 
1000 personsa) 
State-owned industry 1491 1505 1392 1286 
of which: supervised by ministries 1339 1368 1295 1196 
supervised by (local) councils 152 137 97 90 
Cooperative industry 238 239 222 202 
Private artisans 61 47 46 52 
Small firms and small cooperatives — - - 18 








a) Up to 1975: inclusive of apprentices, b) Work done partly as part time job, c) Part-time jobs. 
About one third of the industrial sales of non-industrial organizations derive from 
food processing, a further two fifths from building materials production. There is 
hardly any agricultural establishment (about 10 percent) without industrial activities. 
Their share in total sales receipts is 21-22 percent on average, but while in one third 
of them this does not exceed 10 percent, in a small group (mainly in cooperatives with 
unfavourable soil conditions) a greater part of the sales receipts (and sometimes all 
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profit) derives from it. These complementary activities do stabilize employment of 
the members, yet first of all they are sources of additional income and profit. The 
Hungarian economic policy supports them because they contribute to better supply, 
and mitigate the government burdens involved by financial support to farms with poor 
results. The more flexible industrial activity of the non-industrial organizations helps 
the "state-owned"industry, complements it, rarely competes - except for manpower. 
The agricultural establishments can frequently offer more flexible working conditions 
and greater income and this is a source of recurring tensions. 
It is a further characteristic feature of the network of Hungarian industrial estab-
lishments that — as also shown by the data quoted - only a fraction of the establish-
ments is also an independent enterprise. In the state-owned industry we find a 
relatively high concentration of labour by international comparison. Merely 25 percent 
of workers work in establishments with a staff less than 300 (see Table 2). But from 
this we cannot conclude on a similar high concentration of production. Compared 
with more advanced countries, namely, it has to be taken into account that the Hun-
garian firms frequently employ a staff 2 or 3 times higher for the same output than 
is the case in the West. A comparison performed with data corrected for this fact3 does 
not show at all that the ratio of "large establishments" would be high. As a further 
correction it ought to be considered that the Hungarian establishments themselves 
perform such complementary activities which are usually done by and bought from 
specialized independent organizations in other countries. Thus, regarding the scale of 
output, the quantity of the products released, and, particularly, the quantities released 
from individual products, the size of production lots, - several establishments employ-
ing many thousand people do not attain the so-called minimum efficient establishment 
size which is the lower limit of competitive production. 
To 2500 non-industrial organizations there belong almost 15000 — mostly small — 
industrial establishments carrying on industrial activity. With 21 percent of all 
industrial establishments of the whole socialist sector, the state-owned industrial firms 
employ not quite 75 percent of the total staff engaged in industrial activity. 
If we consider not only the so-called state industry, but the whole of industrial 
activities, the majority of industrial establishments employ less than 300 people. These 
employ almost one third of all people engaged in industrial activity. Considering that 
their productivity attains on average — in the best case — about half of the standards 
of similarly staffed establishments in developed countries, the majority of the Hun-
garian establishments may be classified rather as small than medium-sized ones. The 
Hungarian relations are thus characterized by the fact that small and medium-sized 
establishments do exist, but their majority is not independent, their technological 
equipment is poor and their possibilities for grow th and development are strongly 
limited. And these industrial establishments do not wish to separate, they would 
rather remain under the umbrella of a larger organization. 
The structure of the state-owned industriy is characterized by high enterprise 
3Román, Z.: Industrial organization in Hungary. Economic Planning and Management. Papers of 




Distribution of employment by size categories of industrial establishments 
and enterprises in the socialist (state-owned and cooperative) industry, 
1983, percent 
Size category 
(number of workers) 
Distribution of the employment of industrial 
establishments enterprises 
State-owned Cooperative State-owned Cooperative 
industry 
- 5 0 4.0 26.9 0.1 0.1 
51-100 4.4 21.9 0.1 2.7 
101-300 16.5 39.8 1.8 41.0 
301-500 13.2 6.9 3.7 25.7 
501-1000 24.4 4.5 13.7 20.6 
1001-2000 20.5 — 22.3 8.7 
2001-5000 32.1 1.2 
5001-10000 17.0 13.2 — 
10001- 13.0 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
concentration: the 4579 industrial establishments are managed by 715 enterprises. 
We only have 1975 data about the number of establishments belonging to enterprises, 
but the situation has not changed much since then. About three fourths of the 715 
enterprises manage several establishments, only one fourth of them is an independent 
firm with a single establishment (see Table 3). The industrial cooperatives are also 
characterized by having several establishments. 
This form of management became general already after the nationalizations of the 
late forties and gained further momentum with a wave of centralization in the first 
half of the sixties. In 1960 there still were 1338 state-owned industrial enterprises, in 
1965 only 840. In several branches of industry (first of all in the building materials 
and the food processing industries) all earlier independent firms were merged into a 
single large company. Later this seemed to be in contradiction to the principles of 
the reform of economic control and management — first of all from the viewpoint of 
market competition — but many experts challenge the expediency of this decision 
also independently of the reform. As against the guidelines of the reform, enterprise 
centralization continued till 1980, when the number of firms fell to 700, and the 
process was stopped by the government. (Almost one third of the enterprises were 
managed by trusts, thus the number of truly independent economic units was even 
lower.) After the reform, centralization was partly motivated by the endeavour of 
some large firms to solve their cooperation problems by amalgamating their suppliers. 
In other cases the control agencies sought this way of solution because of profitability 
problems or other enterprise troubles, and also favoured these steps because it seemed 
a simpler task to control a smaller number of enterprises. 
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Table 1 
Distribution of state-owned industrial enterprises by the number of establishments, 
1975, percent 
Enterprises with 
Branch 1 2 3 - 5 6 - 1 0 11-20 2 1 - Total 
establishments employing 20 or more people 
Mining 33 7 27 30 10 3 100 
Electric energy 33 24 19 19 5 — 100 
Metallurgy 66 19 - 11 4 - 100 
Engineering 13 14 41 25 4 3 100 
Building 6 12 23 27 23 9 100 
materials ind. 
Chemical industry 24 20 37 13 6 
-
100 
Heavy industry 20 15 33 33 7 3 100 
Wood, paper and 
printing 33 27 28 7 4 1 100 
industries 
Textile industry 15 19 32 24 10 
-
100 
Light industry 22 22 34 15 6 1 100 
Other industries 43 18 21 16 2 — 100 
Food processing ind. 21 11 30 23 14 1 100 
Total state-owned 
industry 22 16 32 20 8 2 100 
In comparison to the other centrally planned economies the enterprise concentra-
tion of the Hungarian industry is not particularly strong - looking at it either from the 
viewpoint of employment size categories or any other indicators — (lagging though 
behind Czechoslovakia and Romania), but extremely strong in comparison to the 
market economies. As could be seen, this derives not so much from the size of estab-
lishments as from the overwhelming weight of multi-plant enterprises. Of course, a 
large company has many advantages as regards concentration of resources, economies 
of scale and access to markets, yet their ratio is too high in Hungary. 
The presently prevailing concept in Hungary is that large enterprises are necessary 
in certain areas and branches (we may add that by international standards they are 
not really large firms), but the enterprise structure is on the whole too centralized. 
Also there is consensus in that such organizational re-arrangement would be desirable 
which relies on natural processes, market effects, on growth or disintegration depend-
ing on performance. That is, an inefficiently operating large company would sooner or 
later disintegrate into its components or certain units would separate from it. At the 
same time smaller firms would grow if they proved successful and would have the 
opportunity to acquire units of other enterprises and thus attain a larger size. 
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This however — in addition to the fact that we have not yet succeeded in devising 
its mechanism -- would remedy the present extreme situation only very slowly. It 
seems, therefore, unavoidable to break up enterprises through central decisions. This 
has been proceeding since 1980 at a slow pace and has brought some (relatively few) 
results. Several trusts have been liquidated and some units have been separated from 
certain large companies, a few large enterprises have been completely broken up into 
factories, but no substantial changes have taken place as yet. 
Recent Steps Taken to Improve Organizational Patterns 
The further improvements of industrial organization strives to adjust them to the 
envisaged development of economic control and management, above all to the inten-
tion to increase enterprise autonomy and the role of the market. 
In 1984 an important decision was taken in order to increase enterprise autonomy: 
in the state-owned industry new forms of enterprise management have to be introduc-
ed till the end of 1986. With a relatively few, but large firms — in which about 30 per-
cent of the staff employed in the state-owned industry are working — the presently 
prevailing system of ministerial control will be maintained. In a greater part of enter-
prises, affecting an even greater proportion of the workforce, the formal dependence 
of the enterprises on the ministry will cease: management will be exercised by an 
enterprise council. Its members will partly be elected by tire workers, and partly 
appointed by the manager. The manager will be elected by this council, for a definite 
term. Several details of this form are still being worked out, and will perhaps be 
modified, too. (Thus, e.g., in the course of preparation there were many advocates 
of the version — I too, consider it to be better — that there should also be such mem-
bers of the council who are not enterprise employees, thus strengthening external 
control and advice.) In smaller enterprises the manager will be elected not by the 
enterprise council, but directly by the assembly of employees which also decides in 
questions of major importance. In both new forms of enterprise management tire 
employees themselves will exercise the role of the owner, but it is to be feared that, as 
against the long-term interest in return of capital, they will put the short-term 
interests of employees to the fore. The practical experiences with the introduction of 
the new forms ought to be followed up and analysed in this respect too. 
The legal rules have essentially increased the role of the bodies representing various 
interests — first of all of the Trade Unions and the Hungarian Chamber of Commerce 
— and further steps may be expected in this direction. Work is in process aiming at 
the new regulation of the institutional system of the control agencies. This ramifying 
subsystem is characterized by the fact that supervisory, branch, functional, territorial 
as well as government and party control assert themselves side by side. The scope of 
authority is not always unambiguously delimited and in practice some institutions 
frequently reinterpret or transgress the framework set down in legislation. It causes 
serious concern to restrict the role of informal groups based on interests of branches, 
areas etc. 
Another important fundamental goal of transforming the industrial organization 
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is to leave larger room to market effects in stimulating performance and in regulation. 
We are, of course, aware that a larger number of producers — and such distribution of 
their market shares that none of them should dominate the market - are necessary 
but insufficient conditions of market competition. Endeavours are under way to bring 
about and consolidate all the other conditions: 
— autonomy of enterprises and their interest in increasing profit; 
— free movement of prices according to the market relations; 
— a total capacity of producers present on the market (and of potential ones) that 
exceeds the demand (also reckoning with imports); 
— access to or entry into the market without barriers; and 
— clear rules of competition, valid for everyone; the securing of their observance 
and fair competition. 
Unfortunately, these conditions are present today but in a restricted sense, first of 
all because of the precarious equilibrium position of the economy. Interference with 
the life of enterprises occurs more frequently than would be desirable, prices are 
controlled and checked centrally in a wide domain, and imports are often restricted in 
the interest of improving external equilibrium. Important steps were taken for lifting 
the administrative barriers to entry into market; a new law has ben passed (Act IV. 
1984) to secure fair competition and the new forms of enterprise management are 
expected to help in consolidating enterprise autonomy. 
In the manufacturing industry we examined in 637 groups of products, representing 
75 percent of total output, how many independent economic units participate in the 
production of the individual product groups.4 There is a single producer — thus one in 
monopoly position — in 21 percent of the product groups examined, and 20 percent 
are turned out by 2 or 3 producers. But 61 percent of the product groups are released 
by more than 3.47 percent by more than 6 and 27 percent by more than 15 indepen-
dent units. But the investigation also showed that in a greater part of cases one or a 
few producers dominate the market (see Table 4). Out of the 637 product groups 
examined more than two thirds of the output are released by the largest producer in 
323 cases, and by the three largest ones in 508 cases. It is typical that otherwise a 
relatively small part of production is distributed among a large number of producers. 
Presumably, market competition would not be strengthened even if more producers 
entered into the market, but if "small producers" significantly increased their output 
with greater specialization, initiated competition in respect of quality and price, and 
thus would also prompt their "big" competitors to better performance. 
As regards the organizational conditions of competition, alleviation of the 
exaggerated centralization is continuing, a part of large multi-plant firms in being 
broken up. Several legal measures have been initiated to stimulate the foundation of 
small firms and other ventures, affiliates and joint enterprises, including the stimula-
tion of private (small-scale) industry and other undertaking. Yet, in order to develop 
small and medium firms, to help the smaller establishments in becoming independent, 
4 
For details see: Roman, Z.: The Conditions of Market Competition in the Hungarian Industry. 
Acta Oeconomica, Vol. 34, Nos 1 - 2 (1985) and also the paper of E. Bagó in this volume. 
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Table 1 
Distribution of the product groups examined by share in total output 
of the three largest producer economic units 
The share of the three largest Number 
producers in total output of 
Groups of industrial -50.0 50 .1- 66.7- 9 0 . 1 - Total product 
branches 66.6 90.0 groups 
percent observed 
Metallurgy, building materials 
industry 7.9 3.9 11.0 77.2 100.0 127 
Engineering 6.5 7.7 26.8 59.0 100.0 246 
Chemical industry 2.0 3.0 12.0 83.0 100.0 100 
Furniture, paper and printing 
industries 19.4 19.4 22.2 39.0 100.0 36 
Textile and clothing industry 22.4 22.4 14.9 40.3 100.0 67 
Food processing industry 31.2 18.0 13.1 37.7 100.0 61 
Total 10.8 9.4 18.6 61.2 100.0 637 
and the creation of new units, also one or several central state institutions with 
appropriate financial funds ougth to be established. Without them a substantial 
increase in the role of small and medium enterprises cannot be expected. Nor has it 
been worked out as yet how a successful small venture may grow into a large 
enterprise. For the reverse case, i.e. for the rehabilitation or liquidation of enterprises, 
the legislation is under preparation. After some preliminary steps, already taken, work 
is going on to promote the flow of capital between enterprises, to work out the con-
cept of a capital market, operating under socialist conditions. Research into the 
organizational conditions of strengthening the links between research, production and 
marketing also continues. 
Some questions of the industrial organization are also treated in several other 
papers of this volume. In the following I will mention an experiment which has also 
aroused great international interest, but which is difficult to evaluate by those who are 
not familiar with the rules and conditions of the management of the Hungarian enter-
prise. I think of the workteams, the intrapreneurial groups of enterprises. 
Intrapreneurial Groups 5 
In establishing the form of intrapreneurial groups (IG) the original starting point was 
that in the agriculture it had been a great success to provide an opportunity for house-
hold-plot and complementary economic activity beside common farming (1.5 million 
^Z., Román: Productivity, Entrepreneurship and Intrapreneuiship in the Hungarian Economy. 
Europe Productivity Ideas. Jan. 1984. 
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small plots contribute one third of the total agricultural output); now, a similar 
possibility ought to be provided also for those working in the industry. Their addi-
tional performance and entrepreneurial spirit would not only earn higher income, but 
also help the economy by improving supply, making up for shortages, perhaps expand-
ing exports and substituting for imports. After an initial hesitation, the number of 
intrapreneurial groups started to grow rapidly. In the industry, in 8532 units about 
5 percent of all employees participated in them on May 31st, 1984 the total force of 
such teams being 13572, and earned 40-50 percent additional income with an average 
additional labour input of about 20 percent. But the dispersion within these averages 
is very high. 
In one third of industrial enterprises there is no IG at all, in another third there are 
only a few, while elsewhere the participation reaches even 20-25 percent of the total 
employment. There are large differences also in labour time input and incomes. As 
against the original idea, according to our surveys they are mostly not internal ven-
tures, but fall roughly into two large types. One of them is where workers continue 
the same activity after the legal worktime but not against overtime payment - they 
receive an "entrepreneurialfee" for the work done. This is not charged against the 
wage fund of the enterprise, but can be accounted as general (overhead) cost; the 
enterprises do not run thus against wage constraints and save the high progressive 
taxes on wages. (If a different regulation prevailed and enterprises had to cover the 
remunerations from the wage fund with the usual constraints and burdens, it is likely 
that much fewer of them would be operating. This feature bears some resemblance to 
the shadow economy.) 
Another form is when the workers of the enterprise themselves perform — similarly 
after legal worktime — those maintenance, repair and other services which were earlier 
done by external firms. This is usually much cheaper for the enterprise than to pay the 
external firms which calculate their prices with a high overhead; while the members of 
the team can often keep 70-80 percent of the total fee charged to the firm. (In 
principle it is obligatory to reckon with overhead costs and charge them to the team, 
but an exact accounting rarely takes place.) 
The members of the team are mostly the more diligent and most able workers, 
who much depend on additional income and thus also exhibit higher performance. 
This is also one of the reasons why productivity is on average 50 percent higher in the 
team than during the normal worktime. It probably has a positive impact, too, that 
they elect their leader themselves and work more flexibly and with better organiza-
tion. (In some cases it may contribute to the higher productivity that they prepare 
their work already during the regular hours of work.) 
In the summer of 1984 we surveyed the activity of 2000 Intrapreneurial Groups.6 
We inquired also into the problem of the about 50 percent higher productivity. 
Relying on experience with preliminary investigations, we specified 8 explanatory fac-
tors. The opinions we got from enterprises (of which even several ones could be iden-
tified by those questioned) are summarized in the following table: 
6See Z. Román: Productivity, Entrepreneurship and Intrapreneurship in the Hungarian Economy. 
Europe Productivity Ideas, January 1984. 
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Table 1 
Estimation of the factors explaining the higher productivity 
of Intrapreneurial Groups 
Explanatory factors 














indicating a role 
of the factor 
percent 
1. Higher labour intensity 41 74 34 10-80 
2. Better selection of workers 40 72 30 10-60 
3. Better work organization 37 69 25 10-50 
4. Better selection of team leaders 15 24 5 5-20 
5. Selection of "more productive" 
work 15 21 3 5-30 
6. Use of the legal worktime for 
the team's activity 13 22 2 3-30 
7. Use of more productive machinery 6 8 1 10-20 
8. Other 2 2 - 45-60 
•Eliminating the two lowest and highest values. 
Intrapreneurial Groups have been subject to much discussion in Hungary from the 
outset. (This is also reflected by the fact that in a considerable part of the firms there 
are no such units, even to this day.) In enterprises where this form is actually present 
they help in increasing production in the case of such bottleneck where surplus per-
formance cannot be achieved either because of constraints on overtime or wages, 
or because workers do not undertake additional effort for the usual remuneration. 
Frequently, not insignificant saving is achieved by their undertaking the work in 
question for lower payment than what ought to be paid for external services. Also, 
they reduce labour migration with which many industrial firms are struggling because 
of the attraction of better paying workplaces. Thus, many positive impacts of the 
Intrapreneurial Groups can be listed. 
At the same time, it causes problems that, as against the household-plots and 
auxiliary farming, membership in the group cannot be secured for every worker of an 
enterprise, but only for a small part of them. This may produce tensions within the 
firm. With the system the worktime — the legal reduction of which was hailed as a 
great achievement — is prolonged; though it is true that industrial workers have spent 
a no small part of their leisure time with (other kinds of) surplus work even up to 
now. At times even extremely large incomes may come about in these organizations, 
but they can be contained between limits with proper control. The main taks is to 
transfer the positive experience with these workteams to the main job, to the work 
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done during regular hours of work. Workers are also during regular hours willing to 
offer the same higher performance that came to the surface in this form, if the work 
is adequately prepared and remunerated. Besides, based on these experiences it is 
worth while considering the creation of true intrapreneurial forms, groups, units — 
mainly in the framework of activities performed during legal worktime. 
Concluding Remarks 
The rate of post-war economic growth was high in Hungary even by international 
standards. Between 1950—1962 and 1982—1984 national income increased on average 
by 5.0 percent p.a., labour productivity by 5.5, total factor productivity by 2.9. This 
might be attributed first of all to the annual 7 percent increase of industrial output 
and to the annual 4-5 percent increase of industrial labour productivity. The 1968 
economic reform gave a new impetus to growth but because of changes in world 
economy, a belated adjustment to them and the slowing down of the reform process 
it spent its force from the mid-seventies. 
Although the index numbers of economic growth and productivity only show a 
break in the trends beginning with 1979, the indexes corrected for the terms-of-trade-
losses already show it beginning with 1974. According to the data of Table 6, after 
1976/1978 the number of active earners in the sphere of material production fell by 
1.4 percentage points and in the course of the intented and then necessary decelera-
tion, resp. slowdown of growth, the growth rate of labour productivity diminished by 
2.7 percentage points. The output/capital ratio fell by annually 3.2 percent and total 
factor productivity hardly increased. Although the new orientation of economic policy 
after 1978 is characterized by an approach better counting with realities and a resolute 
continuation of the reform of economic control and management, an essential slow-
down of the growth of the economy, industrial output and productivity was 
unavoidable. 
The slowdown of productivity growth is a combined result of a great many factors 
— frequently with a certain time lag. In an open market economy poorer technological 
standards and unsatisfactory quality of products put a brake on growth in a relatively 
short time. In a centrally planned economy, however, the assertion of this impact may 
be delayed — if not without consequences and depending on the state of openness of 
the economy. In the slowdown of the Hungarian economy and industry after 1978 
also the problems and neglect of earlier years come to expression. Important roles are 
played, in addition, by the suppression of earlier positive impacts (as e.g. the shifts in 
employment between industry and agriculture), the unfavourable changes in world 
economy, the slower than expected development of CMEA-cooperation and - to a 
growing measure - by the necessary curbing of investments. But the most important 
cause is the poor world market competitiveness of the Hungarian economy, first of all 
of manufactures. The growth of productivity (and of output) has been and still is 
delimited in many fields directly by the import of raw materials and energy, but 
behind this we find indirectly the circumstance that the industry could not and cannot 




Growth of the Hungarian economy and its sources 
Annual growth rate, percent Difference, in percentage 


















National income 5.4 5.6 6.1 2.0 5.0 + 0.2 + 0.5 -4 .1 
Populatin 0.6 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.4 -0 .3 + 0.1 -0 .2 
Per capita national income 4.8 5.3 5.7 1.8 4.6 + 0.5 + 0.4 -3 .9 
Employment 0.5 0.5 0.6 -0 .4 0.35 0 + 0.1 - 1 . 0 
Ratio of active earners in the 
sphere of material production 0.3 -0 .1 -0 .3 -0 .5 -0.15 -0 .4 -0 .2 -0 .2 
Number of active earners in the 
sphere of material production 1.4 0.7 0.7 -0 .7 0.6 -0 .7 0 -1 .4 
Labour productivity 4.0 4.9 5.4 2.7 4.4 + 0.9 + 0.5 -2 .7 
Output/capital ratio 0.1 0.7 -0 .4 -3 .6 
-0 .6 + 0.6 -1 .1 -3 .2 
Substituation of labour by capital 0.8 1.3 2.0 1.9 1.5 + 0.5 + 0.7 -0 .1 
Total factor productivity 3.2 3.6 3.4 0.8 2.9 + 0.4 -0 .2 -3 .2 
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weakness of world market competitiveness is caused by the unsatisfactory quality 
of products, their failing up-to-dateness (technical standards), the slow structural 
adjustment to demand and (partially for external reasons) by the access to the western 
markets. 
According to several indications to this are added the weaker motivation of 
enterprises, the enterprise behaviour which cannot be effectively prompted to greater 
entrepreneurship and higher performance either by the incentives or by the stricter 
economic environment. For a better performance a different behaviour and a structure 
provoking it are needed. The steps taken in order to improve the system of economic 
control and management, its organizational and institutional framework, as outlined 
above, are aimed at bringing about such changes in the industrial organization. 

GROWTH AND PRODUCTIVITY IN THE HUNGARIAN ECONOMY 
AND INDUSTRY, 1 9 6 8 - 1 9 8 2 
LÁSZLÓ CHERNENSZKY—KATALIN DEMETER 
One of the most conspicuous phenomena of world economy in the seventies was the 
changing rate of economic growth. The slowdown of growth following the oil price 
explosion of 1973 affected all the most advanced capitalist countries and — with a 
delay of a few years — the socialist countries, too. The signs of slowdown in the early 
197CPs also appeared in Hungary but a dramatic change came to pass only after 1978. 
Holding back growth, restricting internal consumption, employing the tools of 
import limitation and export stimulation were all aimed at improving the balance of 
foreign trade. The above mentioned task, however, can only be achieved by 
strengthening the competitiveness of the Hungarian economy. An important factor 
of competitiveness is productivity, consequently, analysing it enables us to make an 
international comparison regarding the productive capacities and the efficiency of 
inputs in the Hungarian economy. 
In our study we are going to analyse the development and productivity of the Hun-
garian economy1 and within it that of the industry from 1968 to 1982. In order to 
identify more clearly the characteristics of the analysed period we will review longer 
periods, too, in certain cases in the course of analysing the factors influencing 
economic growth and the development of productivity. Economic growth will be 
surveyed by using the traditional means of statistical analysis. 
The method applied in this paper reduces growth essentially to two components: 
one of them is the changing quantity of inputs (labour and fixed assets), the other one 
is the changing efficiency of the inputs (i.e., labour productivity, the efficiency of 
fixed assets, and total factor productivity).2 Thus, we tried first of all to detect the 
We have limited our analysis to the so-called "material" sectors, since Hungarian statistical 
accounting considers only these (industry, construction, agriculture, transport and communication, 
trade and water economy) as producers of national income. 
" Total factor productivity stands for the comparison of output with the total inputs of labour and 
fixed assets. In our computations we determined the pace of changing labour and fixed asset in-
puts as the weighted average of the two factors' indices in volume. The changes in labour input 
were weighted by the amounts of wages • taxes on wages and the dynamics of the fixed assets 
by the total sum of depreciation allowance plus the charges on assets. The changing rate of output 
was compared to the change of the so-called total inputs determined in the above mentioned 
way. 
This type of numerical survey of the sources of economic growth was first applied in 
Hungarian economic literature by Zoltán Román (Román, Z.: Productivity and Economic 
Growth. Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest 1982). 
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trends of quantity and sectoral structure of the output and, respectively, of the two 
major factors of production and of the efficiency of the two resources. (The changes 
which occurred in the conditions of growth can be described adequately by taking into 
account even wider interdependencies. A significant part of the relevant factors and 
their effects, however, cannot or can only very hardly be quantified, therefore had to 
be approached by the traditional means of statistics applying much more assumptions 
than usual. Some of these factors will be referred to later on in the course of our 
analysis, or in the concluding remarks of the study.) 
Output was expressed in the computations in the case of material sectors by 
national income created, in the more detailed analysis of the industrial (sub) branches 
by gross value of production. Capital input was measured by the gross value of the 
fixed assets while labour input in the material sectors by the number of active earners, 
in the case of industry by hours worked. The indices of output and fixed assets we 
applied were based on the data at constant prices so that they did not indicate the 
effects of relative price changes which took place during the analysed period (the rise 
in the prices of material and energy, the deterioration in the terms of foreign trade). 
1. Growth and Productivity in the Material Branches 
Between 1968 and 1982 the Hungarian economy reached a relatively high dynamism 
of development which relied on the similarly high growth rate of productivity (Table 
I ) . 45 percent of labour productivity originated in substituting capital for labour and 
55 percent from increased total factor productivity, i.e., from increasing efficiency. 
Low dynamism of the efficiency indices can be traced back partly to the high pace of 
increase in the stock of fixed assets and partly to the declined efficiency of utilizing 
the assets (i.e. low capital productivity) which characterized the whole period. 
By separating the period between 1979 and 1982 from the whole it can be seen 
that not only the general characteristics of growth but the indices of efficiency also 
developed unfavourably. The increase of labour productivity as a whole was provided 
by capital substituted for labour since total factor productivity decreased both in 
absolute and relative terms. The growth rate of the fixed assets diminished only by 
0.5 percentage points which means that the degree of deterioration in capital 
productivity almost trebled. 
The survey of the indices characterizing the growth of material sectors (Table 1, 
Fig. 1) allows for some statements of more general nature. The years 1973-1974 may 
be considered a turning point in view of economic growth and development of 
productivity — even apart from the changes in world economy. Since 1973 the number 
of people employed in the material sectors has been decreasing and since this year 
the growth rate of labour productivity has exceeded that of the national income. The 
dynamism of producing national income slowed down from 1974 and, parallel to this, 
— since the extension of the fixed assets did not change — capital productivity 
declined increasingly. 
Substantial changes in the measure of growth came to pass in 1976 and later on in 
1979 as the result of economic political interventions. However, the statistical data 
Table 1 
Annual average changes of production and of factors of production in the sectors of material production 

















































































Source: Author's own computations based on Statistical Yearbook 1982 (Statisztikai Évkönyv, 1982. Statisztikai Kiadó Vállalat, Budapest.) (pp. 2—4) 
Methodological and conceptual remarks: 
a) from volume indices of national income and fixed assets data at constant prices 
b) labour productivity = national income per employee (4) = (1) - (2) 
c) fixed asset efficiency = the change of national income per unit of fixed assets (5) = (1) - (3) 
d) Inputs of labour and fixed assets, together = calculated from the weighted indices of active earners and fixed asset stocks (6) = a • (2) • (1 - a ) • (3) 
The weights are: labour inputs = wages • wage tax 
fixed asset inputs = depreciation • charges on assets 
for the years 1 9 6 0 - 1 9 7 0 weights of 1961 
for the years 1 9 7 0 - 1 9 8 2 weights of 1971. 
e) total factor productivity = national income (labour and fixed asset inputs (7) = (1) - (6) 
f) substitution = the effect of replacing labour with fixed assets (8) = (6) - (2) = (4) - (7). 
Figure 1 & 
Dynamics of growth, changes of labour force, fixed assets stock, productivity and fixed asset efficiency 
in the material sectors, 1960—1982 (three-year moving averages) 
г 
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series surveyed from 1969 on call attention to the fact that internal economic auto-
matisms caused the slowdown of growth earlier because the shortage in the quantity 
of resources was not counterbalanced by increasing efficiency. 
1.1 The Stock and Efficiency of the Fixed Assets 
The least fluctuation was shown in the pace of the increasing stock of fixed assets in 
tire sixties and the seventies. The dynamism of the fixed assets accelerated evenly in 
the sixties and became steady in the seventies. The basis for the high growth rate in 
the fixed assets was partly the outstanding ratio of accumulation, high even in inter-
national comparison, and partly the very slow pace in scrapping and replacement. 
From the early seventies on, the dynamism of fixed assets exceeded the growth rate 
of national income permanently and in an ever increasing measure. As a result, fixed 
asset efficiency, i.e., the output/fixed asset ratio deteriorated ever more in the material 
branches of the national economy. Between 1969 and 1973 the average decline was 
only one-tenth of a percent per annum, while between 1974 and 1978 it reached a 
yearly one percent — as a result of the retardation in the growth of national income. 
From 1979 it increased to 4.2 percent per annum. Basically the following factors 
contributed to the worsening of the fixed asset efficiency: 
(1) The decrease of those employed in the material branches became permanent 
after 1973. For this reason an ever higher ratio of the increase in fixed assets was 
serving for the substitution of labour. 
(2) According to our analysis, the reserves of growth deriving from the modified 
distribution of fixed assets among the particular branches decreased. In the fifties and 
sixties forced development of the direct producing sectors (industry, construction and 
agriculture) and a certain negligence of the infrastructural branches3 triggered the 
high growth rate of the economy. 
By the early 1970s, however, the relative backwardness of the infrastructural branches 
caused tensions (through the modification of the proportions in investments and the 
bottlenecks following) which increasingly restricted economic growth and contributed 
to the worsening efficiency of the fixed assets. 
(3) Fixed asset efficiency also deteriorated within the particular material sectors, 
because 
— in certain branches some areas were more capital-intensive, came temporarily to 
the foreground (for instance within industry the ratio of the investments into 
power generation, requiring large quantities of equipment with low rate of 
return, grew at the expense of the manufacturing industry), 
- owing to marketing problems, utilization of the capacities decreased to a great 
extent. 
According to the Hungarian terminology productive infrastructure includes transport and 
communication, trade and water management, and non-productive infrastructure contains 
education, health services, administration and so on. 
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Table 2 
The components of changes in the fixed asset efficiency 
in the material sectors of the national economy4  
( 1 9 6 8 - 1 9 8 2 ) 
percent 
Average annual of which 
Period change of fixed change within effect of common 
asset efficiency the sector structural effect 
changes 
a) b) 
1968-1973 -0 .15 -1 .67 1.61 -0.09 
1973-1978 -1 .08 -2 .30 1.49 -0 .27 
1978-1982 -4 .26 -5 .14 0.96 -0.08 
a) fixed asset efficiency = national income/gross value of fixed assets 
b) material sectors included are the following: industry, construction, agriculture, transport and 
communication, trade (water economy is not included) 
Remark: Owing to roundings applied in the computation, the data of the first column differ 
somewhat (± 0.1 percent) from the corresponding data of Table 1. 
As it can be seen from the data of Table 2, among the causes of deteriorating 
efficiency which have been examined, those within the branches can be considered 
as the primary ones. 
1.2 Labour Input and Labour Productivity 
In the Hungarian economy the number of the active earners continuously increased 
(both in the material and in the non-material sectors) from 1962 to 1976; at that 
time it reached the level of 5.093 thousand which can be considered a long time peak 
and by 1982 it fell back to 5.002 thousand. In these two decades the distribution of 
the inflowing labour by branches changed and so did the direction of the flows among 
the branches. 
In the sixties 55—60 percent of the manpower released lately from agriculture 
entered industry, between 1968 and 1973 30 percent of it did so. As a result of this 
the structure of employment showed the picture of "over-industrialization " to a 
4 
The formula of breaking down the change of efficiency to its factors can be found in the 
Appendix. 
31 
certain degree. Outflow of the labour force from industry became stronger after 
1973.5 
Gaining ground by the infrastructural branches accelerated essentially after 1968: 
in 1960—1968 31 percent of the manpower increase outside of agriculture took place 
in the infrastructural branches, in 1968-1975 this proportion was 53 and in 1973-82 
it became more than 100 percent. (The number of people leaving industry exceeded 
the decrease of manpower in agriculture and at the same time the number of active 
earners also declined significantly.) 
According to our survey, though the changing number of manpower diminished 
the labour input in the material branches, this was almost entirely compensated by the 
rising standards of education and professional training. The changes appearing in the 
quality of labour, as a whole, influenced the conditions of growth favourably. 
Between 1969-1982 labour productivity increased on the average by 4.6 percent 
annually in conformity with the increase of national income. By the mid-seventies, 
however, in the development of the two indicators as compared to one another a 
change came about. While in the first part of the decade, national income grew at a 
higher rate than labour productivity, in the second part — due to the decrease in the 
number employed — the dynamics of national income lagged behind the growth of 
labour productivity. 
The dynamism of productivity in the period of 1969-1978 exceeded that of the 
preceding decades. (Between 1951 — 1960 the annual average growth was 4.1 percent, 
in 1961-1968 5.3 and in 1969-1978 5.6 percent.) Applying a different periodization 
from that in Table 1 it can also be found that between 1971—1975 the annual average 
growth rate of labour productivity was 6.2 percent and in 1976—1978 "only" 5.7 
percent. The slowdown in the dynamism of labour productivity that appeared in the 
late 1970s - owing to the declining number of people employed - was not as marked 
as the retardation of economic growth. In 1979—1982 when the growth rate of the 
national income dropped to one-third of the average in the analysed period the 
dynamism of labour productivity decreased to its half. 
The positive effect on the increasing productivity of the analysed period excercised 
by structural changes definitely declined, both absolutely and relatively. (See Table 3.) 
Hence, the part of productivity growth ascribed to the fact that labour was flowing 
from the less efficient branches of national economy towards the more productive 
ones, decreased. Towards the end of the analysed period the dynamism of 
productivity was increasingly determined by the changes of productivity within the 
branches. (Between 1968 and 1982 the productivity of industry grew 2.2 times, that 
of construction 1.7, of agriculture 1.7 and that of transport and communication as 
well as of trade 1.5 times.) 
The decrease of manpower in the organizations treated as industry by statistics does not 
necessarily mean the decrease of the number of those pursuing industrial activities. Namely, 
a part of those who leave industry continue to perform industrial jobs in a non-industrial 
organization (in agriculture, trade, or construction). According to various estimates, the number 
of people engaged in industry began to decrease from the early eighties. 
32 
Table 1 
The components of changing labour productivity in the material sectors 
of the national economy (1968-1982) 
(percent) 
Average annual of which 
Period change of labour change within 

















- 0 . 1 8 
0.13 
0.08 
- 0 . 1 0 
a) national income/number of persons employed 
b) industry, construction, agriculture, transport and communication, trade 
1.3 The Factors of Demand 
The growth rate of the national economy is determined naturally not oniy by the 
quantity and sectoral proportions of the factors of production. Out of the numerous 
other factors (such as demand, changes in technology, organization, utilization of 
capacities, etc.) we wish to deal only with the development of external and internal 
demand — i.e., with consumption. In our analysis we are going to differentiate the 
inputs in other production processes, public and private consumption, investment, 
accumulation of stocks and exports. 
The part of the production used as inputs to other productive processes appears in 
statistics as "current consumption of materials and intermediate products". Up to the 
mid-seventies, the costs of the current material and semi-finished product consumption 
accounted for a relatively uniform share in the production value of the material 
branches (54-56 percent). Later on two jumps can be observed in the data given at 
current prices: the first one in 1975 and the second in 1980, the result of which was 
that by the early eighties the above mentioned ratio increased to 61 percent. In the 
rising material ratio the deteriorating terms of trade played a significant part, i.e. it was 
due to the fact that parallel to the price explosion of raw materials, the exports 
which constituted a major part of the output, became depreciated to a great extent.6 
6It is worth mentioning that the deterioration of the terms of trade is not at ail a novel trend in 
the Hungarian economy. Already in the period 1949-1970 a decline of the export product 
prices could be observed while the price level of imports remained unchanged. The change came 
forth to the measure of deterioration of the terms of trade. It must be mentioned here that taking 
into account the deterioration of about 25 percent after 1973, the slowdown in the dynamism 
of the national income in the mid-seventies was even more definite. 
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The increasing material consumption affected the conditions of economic growth un-
favourably for it reduced the part of production destined for the purposes of final use 
(consumption, investments, etc.). As one of the priorities in economic policy was 
to maintain the achieved standards of living, the attempt to restrict the share of public 
consumption also remained unsuccessful, economic management was forced to 
improve the equilibrium of demand and supply by strongly reducing the measure of 
accumulation. (Public and private consumption amounted to 75 percent of the 
national income in the years 1970 to 1978 but later on - as the result of slow 
economic growth and mainly of the restriction on investments - it reached 80 per-
cent.) In the late seventies the limitations on domestic use affected in the first line 
the share and volume of investments. 
Within final consumption - in the period reviewed - the greatest fluctuation was 
experienced in accumulation (investments and stocks) and simultaneously in the 
balance of exports and imports. The increasing share and volume of accumulation in 
the early seventies was motivated by a number of (earlier mentioned) circumstances. 
The most important of these was very likely the attempt to counterbalance the 
impeding effect of declining asset efficiency on economic growth. Thus, the powerful 
growth of the ratio of investments in the 1970s (see Table 4) fostered the dynamics 
of economic growth and also the prevention of a more significant setback. However, 
economic growth, sustained by rising investments, has led, more or less as a logical 
consequence, to a serious deficit in the balance of trade. The following played a role 
in it: 
— the investments implemented involved considerable imports; 
— im port-in tensity (the import/output ratio) of current production greatly 
increased prior to the restrictions; 
— the terms of trade deteriorated; 
— the growth of the export capacity of the economy was lagging behind its import 
requirements. 
This system of interrelations was the reason why the passive balance of trade could 
only be reduced or eliminated by the restriction of growth; within this, firstly by 
limitating imports and by restricting accumulation. 
In the second part of the period analysed external demand changed markedly. 
The slowdown in the growth of the capitalist world economy after 1973 and the 
following rapid process of transformation in its structure essentially influenced the 
changes of Hungarian economic growth from the aspect of demand. After 1973 the 
share of the Hungarian exports in the imports of the OECD countries decreased. 
A strong over-supply, the depreciated Hungarian commodity structure and protec-
tionism of the capitalist countries all played their part. Starting with the late 
seventies the opportunities to extend selling on the socialist market also narrowed. 
Further extension at customary pace of the demand of the CMEA partners was 
limited primarily by their own problems of indebtedness and the backwardness of the 
cooperation mechanism in the CMEA. 
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Table 1 
The ratios of net accumulation and of the balance of trade compared 
to the national income and average growth rate of the national income, 
1960-1982 (at current prices) 
percent 
1960- 1970- 1978- 1960-
1969 1978 1982 1982 
Net accumulation/national income 22.7 29.6 22.6 25.4 
Balance of trade/national income -0 .9 —4.4 - 1 . 8 -2 .4 
Annual average growth rate of 
national income 5.9 5.7 1.5 5.0 
Sources: Balances of the national economy, 1 9 6 0 - 1 9 7 0 . pp. 7 4 - 7 5 . 
Balances of the national economy, 1 9 7 0 - 1 9 7 7 . p. 28. 
Balances of the national economy, 1 9 7 5 - 1 9 8 2 . p. 19. 
In the second part of the period analysed external demand changed markedly. The 
slowdown in the growth of the capitalist world economy after 1973 and the following 
rapid process of transformation in its structure essentially influenced the changes of 
Hungarian economic growth from the aspect of demand. After 1973 the share of the 
Hungarian exports in the imports of the OECD countries decreased. A strong over-
supply, the depreciated Hungarian commodity structure and protectionism of the 
capitalist countries all played their part. Starting with the late seventies the 
opportunities to extend selling on the socialist market also narrowed. Further 
extension at customary pace of the demand of the CMEA partners was limited 
primarily by their own problems of indebtedness and the backwardness of the 
cooperation mechanism in the CMEA. 
2 .Industrial Production and the Development of Productivity 
The dynamism of industry in producing national income throughout the whole period 
analysed as well as in any subperiod of it exceeded the growth rate of the national 
economy. The rate of increasing labour productivity was also higher than in the total 
of the material sectors. In 1969—1982, 64 percent of labour productivity emerged 
from substituting fixed assets for labour and only 36 percent was due to the 
improvement of total factor productivity. Since manpower engaged in industry 
continuously declined from 1975, from that time on the growth of labour 
productivity exceeded the dynamics of national income produced by industry. The 
great extension of the fixed assets also accounts for the fact that the regression appear-
ing in the growth of labour productivity remained relatively small. The price paid for 
this was, however, an increased worsening of the fixed assets'efficiency — especially 
in the last third of the period concerned. (See Table 5.) 
Table 5 


















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
1961-1968 7.4 2.8 7.4 4.5 0.0 4.8 2.5 2.0 
1969-1973 7.1 1.4 7.4 5.7 -0 .2 3.9 3.2 2.5 
1974-1978 6.5 -0 .5 7.8 7.1 -1 .2 3.3 3.2 3.9 
1979-1982 2.7 -1 .9 7.2 4.7 -4 .5 3.1 -0 .4 5.1 
1969-1978 6.9 0.4 7.6 6.4 -0 .7 3.6 3.2 3.2 
1969-1982 5.6 -02 7.5 5.9 -1 .7 3.5 2.1 3.8 
Source: Statisztikai Évkönyv 1982 (Statistical Yearbook 1982), Statisztikai Kiadó Vállalat, Budapest 1983. Author's own computations based on Beru-
házásiadattár 1950-1977 (Investment Data 1950-1977) , Statisztikai Kiadó Vállalat, Budapest 1979. Beruházási évkönyv 1982 (Yearbook of 
Investments 1982), Statisztikai Kiadó Vállalat, Budapest 1983. 
Remarks: weights: labour inputs = wage • wage taxes 
fixed asset inputs = depreciation allowance • charges on assets 
for the years 1 9 5 0 - 1 9 7 0 the weights of 1961 
for the years 1 9 7 0 - 1 9 8 2 the weights of 1971. 
Figure 2 
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Apart from the average standard, the growth rate of industry also fluctuated 
considerably and frequently (see Fig. 2). Despite of these fluctuations it can be seen 
that from the mid-sixties up to 1973-1974 the production of the national income 
showed a basically accelerating trend while after this there was a monotonous 
decrease. Owing to the already described interventions and circumstances of economic 
policy, a new breaking point came about in 1978—1979. 
2.1 Output 
A more detailed analysis of industry revealed a surprising uniformity considering the 
tendencies in the development of the individual branches and those of the whole in-
dustry (these were partly mentioned before). The explanation is the great rigidity of 
sectoral structure. 
For example regarding the dynamism in the output of the particular industrial 
branches the same breaking points can be observed as with the whole of industry 
(there are only two exceptions, mining, which was essentially stagnating and the 
building material industry which enjoyed the "suction" influence of the seventies' 
impetus in housing and other investment projects). The rank order in the growth of 
the most significant branches (mining, metallurgy, engineering industry, chemical and 
light industry and the food industry) was surprisingly constant — even in the years 
after 1978 when the dispersion of the growth rates grew less, and became half of that 
experienced for the preceding ten years. This means that it was a particularity of the 
structural transformation of the industry that the fall of the growth rate affected all 
the branches. Some actual but insignificant decrease of the production appeared only 
in two branches which were worldwide in a critical situation and in both only after 
1978. Depreciation of the output of the economy made itself felt increasingly from 
the mid-seven ties but it did not bring about major rearrangements in the branch 
structure, changing the earlier trends. (See Table 6.) An even more detailed analysis 
of industry (breaking it down to 59 sub-branches) also confirmed this finding. In the 
whole period between 1969—1982 actual decrease of the production came to pass 
only in three sub-branches (coal mining, the manufacture of bricks and tiles, and other 
woodworking industry). The decrease in two of them was less than 1 percent. From 
among the 56 sub-branches where production was growing, the average annual growth 
was more than 4 percent. Even in the years 1979-1982 the dispersion of the sub-
branches by the dynamism in their average yearly output did not grow. Thus, the 
pace of the changing structural proportions has continued to be slow on the level of 
sub-branches and in this process the role of production narrowing was negligible. 
2.2 Labour Input, Labour Productivity 
The number of people employed by industry was still markedly increasing in the late 
sixties. In the first three years of the seventies this increase became moderate and 
after the peak reached in 1974 the labour forces began to decline, up to 1979 at a rate 
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Table 2 
Average annual growth rate of production in the branches 
of the socialist industry, 1969-1982 (percent) 
1969- 1974- 1979- 1969-
1973 1978 1982 1982 
Mining 2.4 2.6 -1 .15 1.44 
Electric power generation 8.14 7.87 2.47 6.39 
Metallurgy0 5.35 3.82 -0 .68 3.05 
Engineering industry^ 6.24 7.74 1.82 5.51 
Building material industry 3.48 5.71 1.64 3.74 
Chemical industry 10.56 9.35 2.18 7.68 
Light industry 5.52 3.75 0.56 3.45 
Other industry 12.25 7.0 1.93 7.35 
Food industry 4.95 3.98 3.1 4.07 
Socialist industry 6.0 5.85 1.5 4.64 
a
 Metallurgy: 1 9 6 9 - 1 9 7 4 = 6.0 1 9 7 5 - 1 9 7 8 = 2.55 
^Engineering industry: 1 9 6 9 - 1 9 7 4 = 7.2 1 9 7 5 - 1 9 7 8 = 6.73 
of less than one percent per annum; from 1980 on the rate increased to 2 percent. 
In the period 1969—1982 the number of those employed in the socialist industry 
decreased on the average by 0.4 percent per annum. (There was a growth of 1.1 
percent in the food industry, 0.6 in the chemical industry and in the engineering 
industry the number of employees remained essentially the same. The decline was 
most rapid in mining and the light industry —1.6 and —1.3 percent, respectively.)7 
The decreasing dispersion of pace in the changing numbers of manpower can be 
observed well in the successive periods. In the course of increasing the changes in the 
distribution of numbers were more significant and the decreasing number of the 
employees was paralleled by a slowdown of structural modifications, too. 
The number of hours worked in the whole of industry8 decreased between 1969 
and 1982 annually by 1.4 percent on the average. During these fourteen years the 
worked hours per capita diminished by 13.3 percent. 
The decreasing number of persons employed and hours worked was somewhat 
counterbalanced by the quality (education, training, schooling) of the workforce. 
We tried to quantify these effects (their size) on the basis of data available to us.9 
7 
The most marked changes in the proportions of branch employment were: the share of the 
food industry grew from 11.1 percent to 13.2 and that of the light industry decreased from 
24.0 to 21.6 percent. 
D The per capita hours of all the employees were obtained by estimation: assuming that the 
total number of hours changed in the same proportion as that of the physical workers. 
4 It was an essential limitation in respect of labour that, owing to the lack of data we could only 
take into account the number of physical workers (whose ratio within the total decreased con-
tinually). 
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We determined the effect of the "quality" changes in the amount of labour input 
by weighted proportions of earnings. According to our computations, between 1969 
and 1982 the 0.67 percent average decrease of the workers was partly counterbalanced 
by the favourable change in education (+0.13 percent); by the modification in the 
composition by age groups (+0.11 percent); and by the rising level of professional 
training (0.09 percent). The effect of changing proportion by sexes was minimal 
(0.03 percent). As a whole the quantity of labour inputs decreased - taking into 
account the above mentioned quality changes, too — on the average by 0.37 percent 
per annum. 
The growth rate of gross production per working hour amounted to 6.2 percent on 
the average per year in the socialist industry (Table 7) while the output per number 
of workers increased "only" by an average of 5.1 percent per annum. The fluctuation 
of growth rate in productivity in the partial sections of the period can be explained by 
the changes in the quantities of the factors of production and by those in the output. 
In the mid-seventies the growth rate of production declined somewhat but the slow 
decrease of the workforce in the preceding years still resulted in the acceleration of 
productivity growth. The powerful slowdown of productivity growth experienced in 
1979—1982 (the 31 percent fall in the dynamism as compared to the preceding 
period) can essentially be explained by two circumstances: (1) the dropping external 
demand for industrial output and the restriction applied consciously in order to 
improve the balance of foreign economy; (2) the quickening decrease of the work-
force which could no more be compensated by the extension of the fixed assets. 
The dispersion of the dynamism of labour productivity was insignificant even by 
comparing it to the differentiation in the growth rates of production. From among the 
branches representing a greater share within the output, the growth rate of 
productivity exceeded the average in the chemical and the engineering industry while 
that in mining, food industry, metallurgy and the light industry was lagging behind it. 
We surveyed the influence exercised by the changes in the distribution of hours 
worked among the (sub)branches and the changes within the individual (sub)branches 
themselves on the growth of productivity in the whole of industry. In the period 
between 1968—1982 about nine-tenths of the increase in industrial labour 
productivity came from the improvement of productivity within the (sub)branches. 
The shift in the proportions of manpower (hours worked) towards the more 
productive branches contributed to the dynamics of productivity in the whole of 
industry only to a relatively small extent. (In this respect there were no differences 
between the particular periods.) 
2.3 The Stock and Efficiency оf Fixed A ssets 
The stock of industry's productive fixed assets increased annually during the whole 
period by 9.3 percent and in view of the dynamics of the subperiods an acceleration 
could be observed. Simultaneously the ratio of the assets depreciated to zero 
markedly increased. (In 1982 the value of depreciated buildings and equipment 
amounted to 15 percent of the total of the productive fixed assets.) 
Table 7 
о 
The development o f labour productivity, asset e f f i c iency and total factor productivity in the branches 
of the socialist industry (rates o f average annual change in percent) 
Labour product iv i ty 3 Fixed asset eff ic iency' ' Total factor productivity^ 
Branch 1 9 6 9 - by subperiods 1 9 6 9 - by subperiods 1 9 6 9 - by subperiods 
1 9 8 2 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 2 
Mining 1969 -73 5.51 1969-73 —4.55 1969-73 2.35 
3.81 1974 -78 4.64 - 6 . 2 6 1974-78 - 5 . 2 0 0.65 1974-78 1.57 
1979 -82 0.72 1 9 7 9 - 8 2 -9 .62 1 9 7 9 - 8 2 - 2 . 5 4 
Electric power generation 8.11 -0 .34 2.16 
7.34 8.36 
5.13 
- 2 . 1 9 -1 .67 
- 5 . 0 8 
0.62 1.29 
- 2 . 0 9 
Metallurgy 5.25 - 1 . 6 2.31 
4.5 5.34 
2.54 
- 4 . 3 5 - 2 . 5 
-9 .87 
0.65 1.97 
- 2 . 9 9 
Engineering industry 6.42 - 1 . 6 5 4.31 
6.96 8.61 
5.60 




Building materials industry 3.65 - 5 . 9 8 - 0 . 3 8 
5.1 6.90 
4.7 
- 5 . 9 9 -3 .81 
- 8 . 6 7 
0.41 2.39 
1.04 
Chemical industry 7.72 -1 .54 2.59 
7.75 10.46 
4.48 
- 3 . 5 9 - 1 . 7 9 
- 8 . 2 6 
1.38 3.54 
- 2 . 7 3 
Light industry 6.25 -2 .51 4.06 
5.8 5.96 
5.03 
- 4 . 7 9 - 5 . 7 6 
- 6 . 3 9 
3.12 2.97 
2.13 
Other industry 10.56 1.7 9.16 
10.25 11.38 
8.45 
- 1 . 9 1.14 
- 7 . 1 3 
8.28 9.35 
5.88 
Food industry 4.05 1.64 2.58 
4.17 3.61 
5.01 
- 5 . 1 2 - 5 . 0 3 
- 9 . 4 
1.68 1.32 
1.02 
Socialist industry 6.15 - 2 . 2 3 3.32 
6.15 7.12 
4.94 
- 4 . 2 3 - 3 . 1 8 
- 7 . 9 2 
2.60 3.61 
0.47 
aLabour productivity = gross production value per hours worked by employed persons on the average 
''Fixed asset efficiency - quotient of gross production value and productive fixed assets 
Tota l factor productivity - weighted average of labour productivity and fixed asset efficiency. 
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The fact that the restriction on the allotment of national income to investments 
was only slightly to be felt in the growth dynamics of the productive fixed assets can 
be ascribed to two circumstances: (1) though the yearly average growth rate of 
investments put into operation was decreasing, this started from an extremely high 
level; (2) the pace of replacements, scrapping was significantly retarded. 
The dynamics of the productive fixed assets' gross value by branches was lying in 
a narrow range, the rate of growth in the case of the chemical industry which 
increased its fixed assets most rapidly, was higher than average only by 25 percent, 
while the growth rate of fixed assets in the most "poorly" treated metallurgy was 
merely 16 percent lower than the average. This means that the extraordinary increase 
of the industrial fixed assets in its pace was not too highly differentiated among the 
branches. (The same applies to the sub-branches.) 
The development of industrial fixed asset efficiency in the analysed period was 
rapidly worsening (see Table 7). Comparing the branches it can be found that in the 
whole period of 1969—1982 the worsening of asset efficiency was lower than average 
in the engineering and the chemical industry. (This phenomenon harmonizes with the 
circumstance that these two branches were for a long time considered as "pulling 
branches" in industrial development.) In metallurgy the decline of asset efficiency 
was average. In the years 1979-1982 asset efficiency deteriorated at a higher than 
average level even in the engineering and the chemical industry and metallurgy (these 
were the branches where capacities were increasingly under-utilized after 1978, which, 
in the case of the former two, was obviously due to the forced development of their 
fixed assets in the preceding period). 
Comparing the growth of output, the extension of fixed assets and changing asset 
efficiency by branches (and sub-branches), the conclusion can be drawn that in the 
analysed period the dynamism of fixed asset efficiency was basically determined by 
changes in the pace of production since the differences of development in the fixed 
assets among the (sub)branches played an insignificant part. 
2 A Total Factor Productivity 
The combined effects of the aforementioned tendencies find expression in the 
development of the indicator of total factor productivity. In the whole period subject 
to the analysis industrial total factor productivity increased annually by 2.6 percent 
on the average. This was basically the result of the high productivity dynamics 
between 1969-1978, since the originally high growth rate between 1969—1973 
continued to grow in 1974—1978. The contribution of total factor productivity to 
the increase of production was parallel to this (from 55 to 61 percent). By holding 
back production dynamism after 1978 the growth rate of total factor productivity 
decreased dramatically, approaching zero. (Table 7). 
By analysing the development of total factor productivity, two types of develop-
ment could be outlined. In most of the branches (most significant were: mining, 
metallurgy, light industry and food industry) the growth rate of total factor 
productivity began to slow down already after 1974. The trend of speeding up which 
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characterized the whole of industry, appeared only in two branches, i.e., the 
engineering and chemical industry which were tire most preferred ones in the course 
of development. The dynamism of total factor productivity as compared to the 
preceding period declined most after 1978 (exceeding the average of industry) in 
those branches in which, owing to the restrictions on domestic consumption and 
deteriorating conditions in the capitalist markets, problems of marketing and un-
utilized capacities came about (metallurgy, the chemical and the engineering 
industry). 
Since 1979 the growth of total factor productivity has been falling at a higher rate 
than that of labour productivity. The reason for this was the process of replacing 
labour by embodied labour, gradually accelerating throughout the whole period of 
our survey. (The measure of substitution in the whole period grew by 3.5 percent 
per annum, and the changing rates in the subperiods were 2.7; 3.4; and 4.5 percent.) 
The decline of the labour force meant a coercion to speed up substitution. As a result, 
within the increase of labour productivity the weight of total factor productivity 
decreased. While in the whole period 42 percent of labour productivity came from the 
growth of total factor productivity, the respective ratios of the individual subperiod 
were 54, 50 and 10 percent. 
3. Conclusion 
The changes of world economy in the seventies called special attention to the mistakes 
made in the development of the Hungarian economy and in economic policy, as well 
as to the problems in the system of allocating the resources and in that of evaluation. 
We are going to end our study by a brief characterization of the role of these factors 
in economic growth. 
The fact that the quantity of the factors of production was becoming an 
increasingly severe limitation on growth was no novel phenomenon in the early 
seventies nor was it a new recognition that the decline in quantitative growth had to 
be counterbalanced by rising efficiency. This recognition was, however, not followed 
by a corresponding change in the economic policy, i.e., the growth-oriented system of 
targets and means was not substituted by a productivity- (efficiency-) centered system 
of objectives. In other words, the priorities of economic development strategy based 
earlier on quick changes in the proportions of the macro-economy and on involving 
considerable new resources were in fact not shifted to the changes of the micro-
structure when the conditions basically changed. The radical changes of external 
circumstances were additional to the changes of the internal conditions. Because of 
the delay in taking into account these two coercive factors effectively - intertwined 
and orienting in the same direction —, the deficit in the balance of payments as well 
as to keep the process of indebtedness within reasonable limits have become, since the 
late seventies, the most serious concern of Hungarian economic policy. 
Two circumstances accounted for the extreme slowdown of the Hungarian 
economy (and industry) in adjustment to the global economic changes and in noticing 
the need to adapt to them. One of them was that for a long time the practice of 
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economic development considered it a priority task to build up complete verticalities 
for processing imported raw materials into finished products. As a result of this, the 
role of direct (business) contacts for transmitting international appreciation and 
requirements in the particular phases of production became practically negligible. 
The other one was that the budgetary policy of the mid-seventies, stabilizing the 
domestic conditions of economic management and economic growth by taking on 
indebtedness, contributed to the temporary conservation of the economic structure 
which was already out of date in the world economy. 
Among the factors causing the slowdown of economic growth the system of 
enterprise income regulation, the practice of allocating the resources which were even 
in the second part of the surveyed period stimulating extensive growth (i.e., involving 
as much of the factors of production as possible) played a significant part. No such 
conditions of regulation or environment were developed which would force and enable 
the enterprises to efficient management of resources and to economically reasonable 
combination of the factors of production. In the lack of these the change of the 
product structure on enterprise level, the speed of raising the technical standards and 
market-oriented enterprise behaviour remained far from what could have been 
desirable. 
The analysis of mistakes in the economic and development policy of the 1970s 
and further development of the economic mechanism are clearly indispensable 
conditions of accelerating future economic growth and improving economic efficiency. 
APPENDIX 
Factorization of the Changes of Efficiency 
The changing efficiency (labour productivity, fixed asset efficiency) of the material 
branches (or industry) can be reduced to the effects of changes in efficiency and in the 
distribution of resources within the particular material branches (or industrial sub-
branches). The formula used for this in our computations was the following: 
n n n 
n n
 2
 (P i t -P ioho 2 (e i t -e i 0 )P i 0 2 (P i t -P i o ) ( e i t - e i o ) 
P f - P o i=l i=l i=l  
Po = P o P o + Po 
where 
P = labour productivity, or, resp., capital productivity 
ej = the share of the i-th material branch (industrial branch) in the given resource 
(labour force, working hours, or fixed assets) 
n 
( £ e r - l ) 
i=l 
о and t = the starting and the end point of the surveyed time period 
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On the right side of the equation the first factor expresses the change of efficiency 
within the branches, the second one is the quantification of structural changes and the 
third one represents the common effect. 
HUNGARIAN INDUSTRIAL POLICY: ITS SCOPE OF MOVEMENT 
BALÁZS BOTOS 
In the early 1980s industry still has been playing a decisive part in the Hungarian 
national economy — though to a declining extent in comparison to earlier periods. Its 
contribution to GDP is 34 percent, and 32 percent of the working population is 
employed in industry. Its share in the whole of Hungarian investments amounts to 37 
percent and the share in total exports is 91 percent (including food industry). 
The economic results of industry in the past few years can be considered far from 
being sufficient despite the unquestionably positive phenomena, such as improvement 
in the balance of trade, maintenance of the country's solvency. We have failed in 
changing our position essentially in international competitiveness and even the 
standard of efficiency of our production has only slightly been raised. In addition to 
other reasons, the main role in all this was played by the fact that the answers to the 
basic questions of our economic and industrial policy were and are still under 
discussion. To what extent the various external and internal conditions influence 
further development of Hungarian industry, i.e., what is the scope of our movements, 
belongs to this category. 
To analyse the dominant factors of industrial policy and the scope of industrial 
development is a rather important task though far not an easy one. We have to reckon 
with a large number of restricting factors not only in the long run but even more so in 
the near future. The results of these can be assessed partly accurately, while another 
part only approximately. In the same way, one can distinguish between limits and 
endowments which assert themselves generally, in the case of every country and 
special factors which are of prominent significance for the particular countries. 
Research into the scope of industrial policy has hardly any tradition in Hungaiy. 
In developing our earlier concepts we also reckoned with our natural endowments, the 
development level of industry, the size of the country and so on. But we were less 
conscious of appreciating how severe the determination is. In the following we wish to 
present the results of our survey which attempted to solve this task on the basis of 
investment and foreign trade restrictions as examples. 
The Determination of Investments 
In the second part of the 1970s the growth rate declined in Hungary as well as in all 
socialist countries. Practically none of the socialist countries was able to fulfil their 
national economic plan of 1975-1980. The trend of slowdown - which, with the ex-
ception of the GDR and Romania continued even in the 1980s - was unequivocally 
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accompanied by lack of resources and a consequent restriction of investments. All this 
may give the impression that the only reason of the determination on investments 
has been a shortage of investment sources and - seemingly - this has to be taken into 
consideration to an ever increasing extent. 
In reality, however, investment conditions of industrial development are influenced 
also by a number of other factors in addition to the reduced availability of sources, 
for instance, among other things, because of commitments in the material and 
technical sphere, funds tied up by investments commenced earlier and still unfinished. 
In principle the investment fund available to the whole of industry means no limita-
tion whatsoever for the particular branches, product groups, enterprises, etc. The share 
of certain projects may even grow to a significant extent, beside decreasing industrial 
investments. At the same time, however, the investments in progress on the one hand 
restrict the opportunities of the affected enterprises and on the other, increase the 
determination of the investment sources available to industry as a whole. 
The national economic plan for the years 1981—1985 had forecast Ft 355—370 
thousand millions for the development of industry.1 This means that compared to 
1976—1980 the limitation of the resources made itself felt strongly. This effect was 
then further strengthened by the differentiation of the branches. In order to 
appreciate this, it is necessary to review what objectives were formulated in the plans 
as main points in the development policy. 
A part of the goals was of general nature and other parts more definite. Though the 
investments involved by the general objectives were not negligible, they did not mean 
any direct determination. 
General objectives were for instance such as improving the efficiency of material 
consumption, the saving of energy, the development of the technological level, 
improvement of production or, respectively, the supply of prefabricated products, 
components and part units, etc. This meant already some amount being tied up, since 
the plan determined for instance that Ft 30 thousand million could be spent on 
implementing the energy conservation program, while Ft 9 thousand millions on realiz-
ing the program of utilizing wastes and raw materials. It was also obvious that the 
objectives and programs mentioned could not be realized within the plan period. And 
it is rather difficult to foresee what determination will follow from this in tying up 
time and resources in the next plan period. (It is another question whether such 
programs mean the true method of realizing objectives of this kind.) 
The most concrete targets of development policy in the national economic plan 
were represented by the decisions concerning the central development programs, the 
major investment projects and other directly defined trends. At first let us say a few 
words about the determination involved by the central development programs. 
The central development programs have been appearing in the national economic 
plans since 1968, as priorities of industrial development. Industrial management 
supported the preferential development of such fields where enterprises' initiatives 
were insufficient by the allotment of capital and other means. (Between 1971 — 1975 
six central development programs were started: the program of utilizing natural gas, 
According to the current official exchange rate, Ft 100 = $ 2.15. 
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the petrochemical, the aluminium industry and the road vehicles programs, the 
program of the production and use of computers and the program of promoting 
constructions using light metal structures.) 
All of the programs were based on the rapid growth of production and in setting 
their aims the demands of the CMEA market were kept primarily in mind, similar to 
the energy sources and raw materials. The dollar markets played a lesser part in these 
aims, although in certain fields (e.g. computer techniques) import substitution was an 
important criterion. 
Owing partly to the decreasing number of priorities and partly to the inadequate 
functioning of the central development programs as tools of industrial development, 
at present the number of the priority programs has significnatly decreased. Parallel 
to the finishing of the earlier ones, two novel programs were started, namely the one 
of manufacturing drugs, plant protection and intermediary substances and the central 
development program of manufacturing electronic components. The substantial aim of 
these programs is to restore the equilibrium of foreign trade (by import substitution 
and extension of exports). At the same time they can be realized with less subsidy 
than earlier and by a greater share of efforts on behalf of the enterprises. 
Despite the foregoing the investment sources tied up by these programs are not 
negligible. An accurate measure cannot be defined since in their implementation both 
major investments (i.e., state investments) and enterprise investments take part. 
However, certain approximative computations can be made. 
In Hungarian practice, according to the competence of decisions, three types of 
investments can be distinguished: 
— major individual investment projects (government decisions, implementing 
certain significant investment projects) 
— so-called lump-sum investments (also government decisions, e.g. about the 
development of a particular sphere of the infrastructure) 
— enterprise investment (which are, of course, realized not merely from enterprise 
resources). 
By attempting to summarize the limitations which appear in the investments 
belonging to the various categories of decision-making, the following picture can be 
drawn (Table 1). 
The foregoing mean that between 1976—80 32 percent of the investment possi-
bilities of industry and between 1981-85 35 percent had to be spent on finishing in-
vestments started in earlier periods. By now it is also well known that certain major 
investment projects started between 1976-80 will be finished after 1986.2 
All these are signs of significant limitations in the scope of movement with respect 
to investments. The determination of the stock of fixed assets is closely linked to 
these limits. The fixed assets — depending on the character of production, on 
technology and on other technical parameters — determine what and how much can be 
manufactured. Though the flexibility of these limits may change in the function of the 
2
 According to preliminary computations the value of investments running through from the 
sixth five-year plan period will be about Ft 65 thousand millions. Approximately Ft 55 
thousand millions will be spent in the years 1986-87 . 
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Table 1 
Industrial investments commenced in the period 1976—1980 
running through into further periods 
million Ft 
1976-80 1981-85 1986-1990 










Total 117.345 127.354 37.470 
In percentage of the total investments 
of the plan period 32 35 — 
Source: Own computations based on the data of the Ministry of Industry. 
convertibility of production capacities and the diversification of production — still, 
they are limits. They delimit namely not only the volume and structure of the output 
but also the resources that can be utilized. One of the purposes of investments is e.g. 
to resolve the determination embodied in the fixed assets. At the same time, the age-
composition, the branch-structure, etc., of the stock of fixed assets influence 
decisively the direction of using the investment funds by the demand of replacement. 
For instance, according to the computations of I. Berend, between 1986 and 1995 
such great a proportion of replacement will become necessary in the manufacturing 
industry that will tie up a very significant part of total investments in the given 
period. 
By suming up the experience, it may be seen that industrial policy must — more 
consciously than so far — reckon with the limits of the scope of industrial 
development caused by the determination of investments: where it is possible, it would 
be needed to determine the uppermost limits of determination. It is an important 
requirement, at the same time, that the narrowing investment opportunities of 
industry should be counterbalanced by reducing the measure of determination. The 
possibility of this can be created by decreasing the number of major investment 
projects, by restricting central division of the resources and by anything in further 
development of the economic mechanism considered as a task serving for separating 
the functions of economic management and capital ownership. 
Possibilities and Limits of Adjustment to the World Economy 
The interdependence between the increasing difficulties of the Hungarian economy 
and the problems of foreign trade relations is obvious to anybody today. Since the 
mid-1960s economic policy has made it known that besides the well-known 
49 
importance of the CMEA markets we cannot become indepentent of the conditions of 
the whole world market either. However, the fact is that coming to the fore of the 
requirement to adjust to world economy remained not much more than a declaration 
in the priority decisions and other elements of the economic mechanism. Our 
economic and industrial policies do not reflect at all that the determining effects of 
international tendencies on Hungarian economy have been recognized. 
While in judging the necessity of an increasing adjustment to the foreign markets 
the standpoints can be considered uniform, the same can by no means be said about 
the valuation of the possibilities and limits. According to one opinion the problems 
of the Hungarian economy are stemming from the pressure of external limits. The 
unfavourable development of the international political situation, the increasing 
number of the limits set by trade policy and the common effects of varying market 
conditions create the basis of the problems. Since these conditions can hardly be 
influenced by us, the solution is - according to this standpoint - to make the 
economy as far as possible independent of the above mentioned conditions. This 
means a forced closing of the economy, i.e., minimizing the turnover of foreign trade. 
According to the other standpoint the decisive parameter of our adjustment to 
the world economy is the competitiveness of the Hungarian economy. The roots of the 
present insufficient competitiveness are hidden by the deficiencies of the economic 
mechanism. Thus, the basic limits of making headway and of the scope of movement 
are inner ones, that means that they can only be strengthened or weakened by our-
selves. There are, of course, some barriers we cannot surpass, yet the solution can 
only be the strengthening orientation towards foreign markets. 
The surveys conducted by the Research Institute of Industrial Economics regarding 
the characteristics and possibilities of Hungarian industry's orientation to foreign 
markets support the reality — or, more accurately, the logical necessity of the second 
opinion. The analysis, based on the data of industrial exports and imports, confirms 
that low efficiency of our adjustment is caused further on by problems of a structural 
type. The tendencies in the distribution of exports by branches may be mentioned 
as examples for this. 
The branch structure of total industrial exports shows in essence a favourable 
picture. The outstandingly high share of the engineering branches conforms with the 
characteristics of the export structure of advanced industrial countries. Endowments 
of the country in primary energies and minerals, of course, delimit the volume of such 
exports; and a background of advanced agriculture and the related natural 
endowments justify the high ratio of food industrial exports. 
But we can approach reality much more by surveying separately our foreign trade 
with each of the CMEA countries accounted for in Rbls and the characteristics of the 
turnover transacted for dollars. In this way the picture is much more differentiated 
and much more unfavourable in several respects. Regarding the proportions of the 
various branch groups, highly significant differences appear between the two types of 
markets. 
The marks of a favourable export structure appear in the Rbl exports in which the 
share of the machinery is almost 60 percent. This is, of course, accompanied by a 
relatively low share of exports of the basic branches of the food and the light industry. 
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In the turnover for dollars the share of the engineering industry is scarcely higher 
than half the share in the Rbl exports. At the same time the ratio of the basic branches 
(which is the largest group of exporters) is almost twice and of the food industry 
almost two and a half times the ratio of them found in the exports paid for in Rbls. 
This shows a rather out-of-date export structure, since, in the majority, the basic 
branches export raw materials and semifinished products and even the food export 
does not represent the most progressive direction of adjustment. 
Examining the "progressivity structure" as applied in international statistics the 
situation is similar. Four categories can be distinguished here. The industries based on 
raw materials are the extracting industry, food industry, certain branches of the 
chemical industry (organic and non-organic chemical industries, fertilizers) the wood-
processing and paper industry. Classified as traditional industry is the light industry 
(except woodprocessing). A significant part of the machinery is in the „modem" 
category and among the progressive industries the electronic industries, some other 
branches of engineering and biotechnology can be reckoned with. 
According to the above categories the investigated export structure shows the 
following picture: 
Table 2 
The distribution of industrial exports by groups of branches in 1982 
Rbl exports Dollar exports 
Branch group in million in percent in million in percent 
Forint Forint 
Of raw materials 20.261 15 47.860 36 
Traditional 44.528 34 53.670 40 
Modem 36.392 28 17.763 14 
Progressive 30.224 23 13.202 10 
Total 131.405 100 132.495 100 
Source: Own computations based on statistical data. 
This approach also confirms the earlier picture according to which an up-to-date 
export structure of the deliveries to Rbl markets stands in opposition to the dollar 
exports which reflect a rather outdated structure of the industrial background. While 
the exports of the modem and progressive branches together account for more than 
50 percent of the Rbl exports, the same ratio within the exports to markets paying 
in dollars is only 24 percent. Accordingly, taking the two other categories into 
account, in those the proportion is 76 to 49 percent. 
The same can be said about the composition of exports by the degree of processing 
as about the structure according to branch categories. As regards the picture as a whole 
it is relatively favourable but breaking it down to components by markets it is far from 
satisfactory. In the total of exports the greatest - almost 40 percent - is the share of 
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complex finished goods, i.e., of the products on the highest level of processing and the 
smallest is that of the raw materials and energy sources. Since the ratio of the 
uncomplicated products in the secondary stage of processing also reaches 20 percent, 
the two product groups representing the highest degrees of processing show a ratio 
higher than 60 percent, which is quite significant. 
Approaching the dollar exports in the same way give a much less favourable picture. 
In this relation the greatest volume, almost 40 percent is that of only simply processed 
raw materials. Together with the categories of the semifinished products and 
components the export of products on lower levels of processing account for 56 
percent of exports paid for in dollars, while the share of the two categories 
representing higher levels of processing is about 44 percent. 
Further structural disproportions might also be mentioned in connection with 
industrial exports but the characteristics of the import structure should not be left 
out of sight either. In addition to these doubtlessly severe internal limits, of course 
the role of the selling conditions in the foreign markets cannot be denied either. We 
should count with further "hardening"of the conditions in the Western markets and 
also with the circumstance that the terms of trade will be further deteriorating even in 
the markets of the CMEA. It is a fact that finally the developing countries' cost 
advantages also aggravate our position in these markets. However, all the foregoing 
may not necessarily lead to the conclusion that our scope of movements is absolutely 
limited. On the basis of what we said, in my opinion it depends on ourselves how far 
we will be able to cross over the market limitations. 
As a matter of fact, determination by external economic conditions is not 
characteristic only of the Hungarian industry. Most of the small countries have to 
reckon with the bounds which limit their scope of movement in the foreign markets. 
But among the small countries some positive examples can also be found which 
confirm that the disadvantages given by the orders of magnitude can, to a certain 
extent, be compensated. The more so, since there are such factors as well of 
implementing industrial policy in respect of which the opportunities of decisions are 
ever widening. For example, in respect of arranging the frameworks of organization or 
in regulating central interventions. 
Summarizing what has been said, regarding the development of Hungarian industrial 
policy and the determination of its scope of movement I should like to stress the 
following points: 
— It is needed in the future to count much more consciously with the determina-
tion of the scope of industrial development and where it can be influenced to define 
the permissible uppermost limits of determination. 
— When marking out the time period of the concepts of industrial policy it must 
be taken into account that owing to the interdependence of the degree of determina-
tion and the time factor, by lengthening the time, determination will decrease, while 
the uncertainty of the purposes will grow. 
— The narrowing opportunities of industrial investments have to be counter-
balanced by diminishing the measure of determination. 
— In the adjustment to foreign markets internal limitations are decisive. 
Consequently, there is no realistic alternative to the path of export oriented develop-
ment. 
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— The various limits unequivocally show the necessity of such a long-term 
industrial development policy which considers competitiveness in the world market 
the fundamental criterion of development. On the basis of this policy our market 
position in the CMEA countries may also improve. 
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PRODUCTION COOPERATION IN THE HUNGARIAN ENGINEERING 
INDUSTRY 
JÁNOS STERNTHAL 
Under the present circumstances of industrial economic management in Hungary 
relatively smaller amounts are spent on increasing fixed assets and on new investments 
aimed at creating an industrial infrastructure which may provide more flexible 
adjustment than in earlier periods. Hence, the potentialities available for increasing 
efficiency flexibility and consequently competitiveness without significant material 
inputs which were so far utilized insufficiently are gainirtg increasing importance. In 
our experience, among these possibilities the issues of division of labour and within 
this cooperation play a role of high priority. 
In order to avoid the effects which impede deepening the division of labour a 
fundamental precondition is to become acquainted with the role and weight of the 
various forms of the division of labour. However, regarding the numerical weight and 
the influencing factors of cooperation only very scarce — and hardly accessible - data 
are available. Therefore in the course of our survey we carried out investigations 
including the enterprises of the engineering industry. By doing so we wished, on the 
one hand, to recognize those statistical characteristics of production cooperation 
between industrial enterprises about which no data were available till then (e. g. its 
weight, features, composition, etc.), and, on the other, we also investigated some 
factors which are hardly quantifiable, or could only be characterized by estimation. 
From among the several possible forms of cooperation we have focussed our 
survey on cooperation of production among the domestic industrial enterprises. 
In our survey we considered it as cooperation if (for the production of some 
industrial products) independent producer companies introduced a certain division 
of labour and the products, manufactured in the framework of the collaboration, 
could not be used in themselves since they constituted a part of some end product 
turned out by the partner enterprise. We based our analysis on the 1980 data of the 
enterprises under the supervision of the Ministry of Industry, collected by 
questionnairies. In addition, we also investigated the development of production 
cooperation between 1974 and 1980. 
The Proportions of Cooperative Activities 
The enterprises involved in the survey represented about two thirds (67 percent) of all 
the enterprises of the engineering industry. On the basis of production value the re-
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presentation is even higher (76 percent), owing to the fact that in its majority our 
sample contains enterprises with a higher than average output. 
The results of our investigation confirm that production cooperation plays a 
significant part in the production of the vast majority of the engineering companies. 
In 1980 deliveries of cooperation both supplied and received amounted equally to 
20 percent of the gross production value. At the same time, between 1974 and 1980 
the weight of cooperation within the gross production had been growing, that is the 
amount of cooperation increased more rapidly than that of the whole production. It 
is characteristic that a decisive part of the enterprises participating in cooperation 
(79 percent) simultaneously supplied and received deliveries in the framework of their 
cooperation activities. (See Table 1). 
If we disregard the question whether the cooperation was supplied or received and 
consider what the share of the total amount of cooperation within the production 
value of the enterprises is, it is seen that in the period investigated — in the whole 
group of enterprises — the activities of cooperation increased somewhat, the share of 
these within production grew from 35 to 40 percent. 
Table 1 
The value of cooperation products as percentage of the total production 
value by subsectors 
Subsector 
Value of cooperation products 
received supplied 
as percentage of total production value 
1974 1980 1974 1980 
Manufacture of machinery 
and equipment 8 14 13 22 
Manufacture of transport 
equipment 29 28 26 37 
Manufacture of electric 
machines and appliances 11 13 19 11 
Telecommunication and 
vacuum technology 7 5 2 1 
Precision engineering 9 11 16 10 
Metal wares 11 12 21 14 
Engineering industry 
total 17 20 18 20 
As regards its organizational structure, engineering industry in Hungary includes 
six subsectors. A survey by subsectors shows considerable differences, in four of the 
six subsectors the ratio between cooperation and production declined and it 
increased only in two (i.e., in the manufacture of machines and equipment and in 
that of transport equipment). The weight of the latter ones was so high that it 
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resulted in an average increase of the cooperation/production ratio. The weight of 
cooperation was the smallest in the industry of telecommunication and vacuum 
technology (6 percent) and the highest in the manufacture of transport equipment 
(75 percent). 
In the differences certain particularities play a significant part. Among the six of 
them the investigation showed great differences in respect of the product pattern, 
structure of manufacturing, technology, materials, dimensional accuracy and so on, 
whereby also their requirements and possibilities in cooperation are basically 
differentiated. The organizational system of the engineering industry is also a factor 
in the varying weight of cooperation in addition to the subsectoral characteristics. The 
proportions of external cooperation among the enterprises are also determined by the 
limits set to the production of the given economic unit. 
In the early sixties significant reorganizations and enterprise mergers were 
carried out in the Hungarian industry which again influenced markedly the weight 
of cooperation. The mergers of companies were mostly horizontal. This often meant 
that enterprises having no production relationship were united so that in the given 
branch — or subsector — frequently only one large enterprise was created, obtaining 
monopoly position. 
Vertical mergers occured, too. In these cases it was hoped to provide better ways 
of cooperation. Several enterprises were amalgamated expressly for the purpose of 
transforming external, inter-enterprise cooperation into collaboration within the 
company. 
In the course of the mergers a lot of small and medium-size plants were closed 
down and incorporated into large enterprises. The lack of small- and medium-size 
enterprises destined to produce components and part units can mostly be attributed 
to these measures. 
In addition to the enterprise organization system, there is a strong correlation 
between the standards of commercial supply and cooperation. Namely, relevant 
analyses (8) indicate that — owing to the shortage of supplies of commercial stocks — 
a great number of components and assembly units are purchased in the framework of 
cooperation while in the more advanced industrial countries these can directly be 
purchased on the market. 
The data based on a categorization of enterprises by size, according to the extent 
of production, demonstrate the weight and significance of cooperation from 
another aspect. (See Table 2.) 
The data of Table 2 unequivocally reflect the trend that the ratio of cooperation 
within production — including cooperation products both received and supplied, as 
well as the total — increases with the growing size of the company. 
The smaller firms in general pursue less cooperation activity than the larger ones. 
This means that owing partly to their smaller volume of production possibilities for 
cooperation are rather limited here. The cooperation difficulties of the surveyed 
enterprises were usually emerging primarily linked to purchase orders for smaller 
quantities of products raising unique or more specific requirements. 
On the other hand, the narrow possibility of offering cooperation is caused by the 
fact predominantly that the majority of even the small enterprises is not specialized 
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Table 1 
The weight of cooperation within the total production value 

































for meeting the cooperation demands of other enterprises. These, too, are mostly 
prepared for producing end products and undertake cooperation activity only 
occasionally. The reason for this is the prices of end products being much more 
favourable than those of component parts. On the other hand, the smaller enterprises 
are afraid of losing their independence. In the past years it frequently happened 
that large enterprises incorporated their cooperating partners. 
In regard to the weight of cooperation, appearing by size categories of enterprises, 
no significant change occurred during the analysed period. The cooperation activities 
of only the smaller enterprises narrowed to a certain degree, primarily in the sphere 
of cooperation products delivered. This confirms the earlier experience that the 
smaller enterprises, as far as their specialization and capacities are concerned, still 
do not fulfil the task to support flexible adjustment by supplying large enterprises and 
partly by serving as a background for them. The data reflecting the distribution of 
sales of the smaller enterprises also contribute to this finding for according to them, 
— in addition to the shortage of cooperation — the small firms sell relatively little 
quantities of components and part units to commercial organizations. 
Invesitgating the division of production cooperation by the amounts received and 
supplied, it can also be stated that in 1980, as a whole the engineering enterprises 
supplied somewhat less in cooperation than they received. (See Table 3.) 
Significant changes occurred in this sphere in the past years. The proportions of 
cooperation acquired and supplied to one another changed in comparison to those 
recorded in 1974. This calls attention to a modification in the behaviour of the 
engineering industry in respect of cooperation. In the foregoing we have presented 
in detail that the proportions of the received and supplied cooperation have grown. 
Hence, readiness to cooperate has increased from this point of view, a fact also 
indicated by the slightly widening sphere of the cooperating enterprises. 
The changing proportions of received and supplied cooperation also show that 
production cooperation of the enterprises shifted towards cooperation received. 
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Table 1 
The division of cooperation by deliveries received and supplied as percentage 
of the total cooperation (percent) 
Subsector 1974 1980 
Received Supplied Received Supplied 
Manufacture of machines and 
equipment 37 63 38 62 
Manufacture of transport 
equipment 53 47 51 49 
Manufacture of electric 
machines and appliances 38 62 56 44 
Telecommunication and 
vacuum technology 77 23 84 16 
Precision engineering 37 63 
Metal wares 34 66 46 54 
Engineering industry total 47 53 51 49 
Namely, in 1974 within the total of cooperation the share of that received amounted 
to 47 percent and by 1980 this ratio increased to 51 percent. This may partly be 
attributed to the fact that the cooperation background of the engineering industry 
grew wider and more reliable. But according to practical experience it was also partly 
due to the fact that self-supply, regarding engineering matters, has strengthened in 
other enterprises. Considering it on the enterprise level it also means that the contacts 
of cooperation deliveries between the average engineering enterprises and enterprises 
of other branches became looser. Looking at it from another aspect, it means that the 
companies belonging to other branches of industry grew more independent of the 
engineering industry in this respect. 
Proportions of the Products in Cooperation 
From the view of economic management of the enterprises it is not negligible what 
the share of those products is to which, compared to their value, a lesser or greater 
quantity of cooperation is needed. In the experience of the enterprises troubles with 
even a relatively small volume of cooperation can essentially hold up the whole process 
of manufacturing. Table 4 demonstrates the ratio of the products manufactured by 
involving some kind of cooperation within the total number of products and the share 
of the enterprises which require cooperation. 
According to our survey, the sphere of enterprises which require cooperation has 
practically not changed in the totality of the enterprise group during the analysed 
period: the share of them was 94 percent in 1974 and 95 in 1980. By subsectors, 
however, the picture is much more varied, the share of the enterprises using coopera-
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tion decreased in three subsectors, in two it remained unchanged and in one subsector 
(precision engineering) it increased. 
Table 4 
The weight of cooperation received on the basis of various characteristics 
Subsector The ratio of enterprises 
acquiring cooperation 




1974 1980 1974 1980 
Manufacture of machines and 
equipment 100 88 99 67 
Manufacture of transport 
equipment 100 100 79 78 
Manufacture of electric 
machines and appliances 80 85 83 58 
Telecommunication and vacuum 
technology 100 100 84 91 
Precision engineering 78 100 72 42 
Metalwares 92 90 65 60 
Engineering industry total 94 95 73 58 
The situation is again quite different with the changing proportions of product 
types manufactured by involving some cooperation. Linked to these types of 
products two further features of cooperation can be established: on the one hand, 
the enterprises resorted to cooperation for the majority of their products (58 percent) 
even in 1980 and, on the other, the weight of cooperation measured on the basis of 
product types exceeds the weight calculated on the basis of production value and the 
value of cooperation deliveries received, in any of the surveyed subsectors. At the 
same time, in comparison to an earlier survey of ours, this ratio shows a considerable 
(15 percent) decrease. 
This process has already been observable since 1970. In that year the share of 
product types manufactured by resorting to cooperation was 77 percent, it was 73 in 
1974 and 58 percent in 1980. This trend, taking into consideration the increasing 
value of cooperation production and its increasing share within the whole value of 
production, means on the one hand that cooperation becomes concentrated to an ever 
narrower sphere of products at a more and more rapid rate and, on the other, that 
the cooperation content in the products manufactured by the involvement of 
cooperation is increasing, too (it increased by about 55 percent between 1974 and 
1980). 
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The Character of Cooperation 
In the course of classifying the cooperation relations — in line with earlier researches — 
we distinguished two basic types: cooperation based on specialization and cooperation 
for supplementing production capacity. Therefore, when examining the character of 
cooperation, the first question put was whether the cooperation acquired was one for 
supplementing production capacity or one of a specialized nature. By specialized 
cooperation we mean the case when an enterprise purchases various components, part 
units, tools, appliances, etc., from other plants, specialized expressly in the production 
of such products. And we speak about supplemental cooperation when a manufacturer 
of some types of products undertakes a production task greater than is able to perform 
on the basis of its own resources (production capacity) (Table 5). 
Table 3 
The types of cooperation received 
Distribution of values received by cooperation 
by types of cooperation; percent 
Subsector supplemental special- supplemental special-
to capacity ized to capacity ized 
1974 1980 
Manufacture of machines and 
equipment 67 33 52 48 
Manufacture of transport 
equipment 38 62 15 85 
Manufacture of electric 
machines and appliances 26 74 84 16 
Telecommunication and 
vacuum technology 95 5 52 48 
Precision engineering 34 66 60 40 
Metalwares 23 77 36 64 
Engineering industry total 40 60 29 71 
The data of Table 5 demonstrate that in the whole group of the examined enter-
prises cooperation aimed at supplementing their capacity represents a smaller share 
(29 percent) than that of specialized character (71 percent). At the same time, the 
cooperation of a specialized character shows a certain increase, as since 1974 the 
share of such relationships has grown from 60 to 71 percent. However, in the present 
circumstances of the Hungarian economy this does not mean genuine specialization, 
i.e., the given kind of cooperation is not rendered by production units specialized in 
a few types of products manufactured by similar production technology: it is rather 
due to the fact that certain products (or activities) are brought about by certain 
enterprises of the country which — independent of the nature of manufacture — 
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consider themselves specialists. Furthermore, in certain enterprises there may exist 
some redundant capacity in special machines or equipment missing at the same time 
from the verticalities of others. 
However, a change in the character of cooperation cannot be judged unequivocally. 
In the background of the summarized data a significant dispersion may be found 
among the particular branches. The average trend emerged namely so that while in 
one half of the branches the share of cooperation supplementing capacity decreased, 
in the other half it increased. In addition, the modification of the proportions took 
place beside rather great differences. This points to the fact that the opportunities for 
developing their capacity were different and that the regulation system provided 
markedly different possibilities for the extensive and the intensive ways of develop-
ment. 
Our earlier survey showed a relatively close connection between the size of enter-
prises and the character of cooperation. However, according to our data of 1980, 
no definite trend in the character of the cooperation received can be observed by 
examining it together with enterprise sizes and with the weight of cooperation (Table 
6). 
Table 6 
Distribution of cooperation received by types of cooperation 
as the function of enterprise size, (percent) 
Cooperation received 
Production value supplemental to specialized 
m Ft capacity 
1974 1980 1974 1980 
below 500 61 51 39 49 
500-1000 32 56 68 44 
1001-2000 33 42 67 38 
2001-5000 48 63 52 37 
over 5000 42 20 58 80 
Total 40 29 60 71 
By analysing the development of the character of cooperation by enterprise dimen-
s ions^ can also be detected that the much talked-of general attitude of the Hungarian 
regulatory system, stimulating extensive development, can be confirmed from this side 
as well. Namely, the data demonstrate that the smallest and the largest enterprises 
reduced capacity-supplementing cooperation by about 10—11 percent, the medium-
size enterprises, in tum increased it (by 9—24 percent). Since most of the enterprises 
belong to the medium zone, it is justified to think that the enterprise development 
opportunities serve mainly for increasing capacity in this sphere. 
At the same time, there are signs showing that the enterprises reduced the 
cooperations serving for supplementing their capacities because the process of 
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specialization proceeded at a faster rate in other companies. As a result of this, they 
were able to develop in many respects such a choice of cooperation which could be 
considered by the receiving enterprises as supplementary to their capacities. 
The Concentration of Cooperation 
We examined the proportion of cooperation carried out with the five largest partners 
to the total of received or supplied values of cooperation as a characteristic of 
concentration. According to our findings more than half (58 percent) of the received 
cooperation comes from the five largest suppliers and two thirds of the cooperation 
supplied is directed to the five largest purchasing partners. (See Table 7.) 
Table 7 
The concentration of cooperation 
Subsector 
Share within the total of deliveries 
purchased supplied 
by the five greatest cooperating partners 
(buyers or sellers), in percent 
1974 1980 1974 
Manufacture of machines and 
equipment 
Manufacture of transport 
equipment 
Manufacture of electric 



























According to the results of our survey, the concentration of cooperation was also 
changed by 1980. The average weight of the deliveries from the five greatest partners 
decreased quite significantly (from 66 to 58 percent) in the sphere of the investigated 
enterprises. Presumably the fact that more enterprises offer themselves as cooperation 
partners than earlier both in the engineering and other industrial branches plays a 
marked role in this. On the other hand, it is very similar too, that the enterprises 
acquiring cooperation are striving to reduce dependence on their supplying cooperation 
partners, therefore they do not concentrate to only a few partners. 
In respect of cooperation products supplied contrary changes can be witnessed. In 
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view of deliveries performed by the engineering enterprises the weight of the first five 
buying partners somewhat increased. In opposition to the former almost uniform 
process of "deconcentration"by subsectors, concerning cooperation of supplying the 
products the picture is by far not as uniform as that. Concentration measured in such 
breakdown decreased in four cases and grew higher only in two, the latter causing 
increasing concentration in the engineering industry. 
The results of our survey indicated simultaneously that with the declining number 
of cooperation partners the permanence of relationships among the partners increased 
to a certain degree. 
According to the answers given by the enterprises, lasting cooperation contacts are 
predominant in respect of both receiving and supplying the products. It has been 
characteristic of the changes in the analysed period that the share of cooperation 
contacts on a single occasion remained on the earlier rather low level, the number 
of repeated contacts even decreased but shifted in the direction of permanent coopera-
tion contacts (Table 8). 
Analysing the duration of cooperation by separate subsectors shows that in every 
branch continuous relationships are predominant. 
This tendency, however, cannot be considered everywhere as unequivocally 
favourable. For example, the changing structure of production in the subsector of 
manufacturing machines and equipment necessitated the creation of a significant new 
sphere of cooperation. To a certain extent this is also reflected by the data: this is the 
subsector where the share of single-time contacts is the highest. The number of the 
partners, however, did not grow at the rate it might have been expected. 
Table 8 
Characteristics of time in the cooperation contacts 
Cooperation 
characteristics 
Distribution of values in cooperation 
received supplied 
1974 1980 1974 1980 
percent 
One-time 4 5 2 3 
Recurrent 20 17 9 4 
Continuous 76 78 89 93 
Total 100 100 100 100 
The cooperation contacts hardly expanded, the proportions grew rigid, practically 
a rather exclusive sphere was created. One group of the permanent partners includes 
the small enterprises, cooperatives where the level of technology is raised by the large 
enterprises resorting to cooperation with them by granting them technical support, 
materials, handing over machines and equipment. However, these types of lasting 
contacts can only partially о verb ridge the gaps caused by the lack of developed back-
ground production to industry, since they come into being mostly spontaneously, 
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linked to just emerging demands. These "outworking" plants, manufacturing for the 
most part background products, are not prepared for the perspectives of covering the 
demand in their special sphere of trade, nor are they enabled to do so, owing to their 
relatively limited technical-technological capacities. 
The other part of the permanent partners consists of the specialized enterprises 
which are in general better equipped for special tasks of technology. But such 
specialized enterprises are rather rare at present and the majority of them does not 
represent a marked share in the field of manufacturing given products or pursuing 
given activities. 
The Directions of Cooperation 
For the evaluation of the cooperation contacts an essential criterion is to see where 
the cooperation is directed to and where it is acquired from. Earlier our survey 
included only the main relations. Distinctions were made by cooperation within the 
engineering industry, cooperation involving other branches of industry, and coopera-
tion activities pursued with companies of foreign (capitalist or socialist) countries. 
(Table 9). 
Data of Table 9 show that the greatest partner in cooperation of the engineering 
industry is engineering industry itself; more than 71 percent of all cooperation 
received is performed within the engineering industry. Other domestic sectors of 
Table 9 
The direction of cooperation 
Sources of cooperation Users of cooperation 
Sources/users of received supplied 
cooperation percent 
1974 1980 1974 1980 
Hungarian engineering 
industry 60 71 46 39 
Other branches of the 
Hungarian national 
economy 33 21 18 10 
Foreign countries, total 7 8 36 51 
of which: 
socialist countries 3 2 26 38 
capitalist countries 4 6 10 13 
Total 100 100 100 100 
the national economy are significant rather as sources of cooperation, their share as 
suppliers is larger than the role they play as receiving partners. There are signs, 
64 
however, which predict that the weight of cooperation managed with enterprises of 
other branches will grow in the future. Establishing the Ministry of Industry (by recent 
merger of branch ministries) brought about an approach among the so far separated 
fields of engineering, heavy and light industries, and so on, and by creating uniform 
interests and regulation, growing possibilities of collaboration may also be expected. 
Analysing the weight of foreign cooperation contacts calls attention to an essential 
contradiction in the cooperation relations. While in cooperation acquired, that coming 
from abroad is not too significant, amounting to 8 percent of all of the cooperation 
activities, at the same time cooperation directed to foreign partners is considerably 
higher: more than half of total cooperation supplied goes abroad. Hence, cooperation 
deliveries to foreign partners are the multiple of those received from them. Therefore 
it has to be emphasized that international cooperation should be considered as an 
expedient source for purchasing, even though the new price system stimulates the 
export of goods and, within this, the delivery of products for further industrial use 
or reprocessing, in the framework of cooperation more than earlier. Regarding 
cooperation dynamics by relations, in the past six years a slight increase in the weight 
of the domestic engineering industry and a decline in the share of other national 
economic branches are characteristic. Changes in international cooperation are 
negligible. 
Similar to the summary data, changes of proportions may be observed in the 
cooperation received; the share of the Hungarian engineering industry increased by 
11 percent. This demonstrates that intensity in the engineering industry has 
strengthened, cooperation received plays an increasing part within the engineering 
industry. Parallel to this, the significance of cooperation acquired from other branches 
declined. Cooperation acquired from abroad changed (increased) to a certain extent. 
It is worth contrasting immediately the modifications of proportions in the 
cooperation supplied to the aforementioned changes. Here the weight of cooperation 
deliveries directed to other countries increased suddenly; within this the share purchas-
ed by the companies of socialist countries has to be emphasized since it increased 
from the earlier 26 to 38 percent. From the side of cooperation supplied, in contrast 
to that of received, engineering industry grew more open, especially in international 
relations. Total domestic cooperation decreased from 64 to 49 percent. Presumably 
the strengthening interest of the enterprises in foreign trade, primarily in exports, 
played an important part in the increasing share of cooperation destined to foreign 
countries. 
Specialization in the Engineering Industry 
As a rule, specialization can be characterized by the proportion of enterprises within 
the industrial branch. In the course of our research we attempted to approach special-
ization from the aspect of the products, within, this, we were strhnng to answer the 
question: which are the products representing significant shares in the enterprises 
surveyed and to what extent they are predominant in production. 
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In our analysis we tried to evaluate specialization in the engineering industry - on 
the basis of the product mix — by the ratio of concentration and the proportion of the 
dominant products. (See Table 10.) 
On the one hand, the results of our survey showed that the enterprises of the 
engineering industry pursue their production activities specializing in only a few end 
products. On the average of engineering the weight of the leading product is almost 
30 percent in the total production value. 
The following second and third products play a minor role but the first three 
products as a whole account for 52 percent of the whole output. Of course, essential 
differences can be found among the individual subsectors of engineering. 
Hence, the outstandingly large weight of the few important products demonstrates 
that the engineering enterprises specialized really in the manufacture of a few 
products. At the same time the small shares of the following products in the total of 
production demonstrate that in addition to their leading products the companies 
produce a great number of other products. Investigating the average of the engineering 
industry this means that the 51 percent share of the first three products when adding 
the fourth and the fifth, i.e., in the case of the five together increases by 11 percent 
(to 63 percent) and considering the first 10 products, i.e., adding to them the products 
of the 6th to the 10th rank order, it increases by 13 percent (to 76 percent). In other 
words this means that the remaining products of the rank order which were not taken 
into account, represent 24 percent of the production value. At the same time, consider-
ing that the average weight of the 10th product reaches not even 2 percent (and this is 
decreasing with the growing numbers of the rank order), the conclusion can be drawn 
that beside the leading products, the enterprises are forced to manufacture various 
products belonging to other branches or subsectors, for the purpose of their own use, 
such as iron and steel castings, forged and moulded parts, metalwares, plastic work-
pieces, metal packaging materials, and so on. All this is, however, the result not of a 
conscious diversification but rather of endeavours for self-supply. 
According to the index numbers presented in Table 10, the first ten products 
accounts for a little more than three quarters of total production. It is also 
noteworthy that the sequence of tire branches is equal, according to all of the four 
indicators of concentration and to the Herfindhal-Hirschman index too; some devia-
tion can only be seen in respect of the first indicator (measuring the weight of the 
foremost product within total production). 
Thus, our surveys on product level demonstrate that — as a result of earlier actions 
aimed at clearing the range of the enterprises' products and supporting the specializa-
tion efforts of the enterprises — specialization by the end products is comparatively 
strong in the engineering industry. However, since it is not built on the specialized 
manufacture of components and part units, specialization by end products in itself can 
only grant the potential advantages hidden in specialization to a rather limited extent. 
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Table 10 
Concentration of production in the engineering industry by products, 
on the basis of the production value 
Subsector 
Weight within the production value of the Degree of 
concentra-
tion on the 
basis of the 
first ten 
products3 
first first three first five first ten 
products, in percent 
Manufacutre of 
machines and 
equipment 3.65 (1) 65.8 (1) 77.8 (1) 92.1 (1) 0.1909 (1) 
Manufacture of 
transport 




pliances 21.8 (5) 42.3 (5) 52.6 (5) 63.4 (5) 0.0776 (5) 
Telecommunica-
tion and vacuum 
technology 34.3 (2) 60.7 (3) 73.9 (3) 86.6 (3) 0.1495 (3) 
Precision 
engineering 8.9 (6) 19.4 (6) 27.2 (6) 39.2 (6) 0.0195 (6) 
Metalwares 30.9 (3) 57.9 (4) 70.4 (4) 84.2 (4) 0.1437 (4) 
Engineering 
industry 
total 27.0 51.8 63.4 75.9 0.1157 
a
 based on the Herfindhal-Hirschman index 
where aj = the ratio of the i-eth partial quantity within the total quantity. In this case, for 
instance, the value of this index would be one if the enterprises of the subsector in question 
would produce only a single product being this the greatest possible concentration. 
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SPECIALIZATION AND DIVERSIFICATION IN THE HUNGARIAN INDUSTRY 
ESZTER BAGÓ 
A significant transformation of industry is planned in Hungary for the coming years. 
The background of the envisaged changes is the recognition of recent research into the 
organizational system according to which the present enterprise structure of Hun-
garian industry influences the functioning of the economy unfavourably. Industrial 
organization is characterized by strong concentration even in international 
comparison. The predominance of large enterprises and the narrow sphere of small 
ones results in an enterprise structure1 which hinders the development of competition 
and the division of labour and cooperation among the enterprises, thus impeding a 
broad evolvement of adaptability to the market conditions and of foundations of 
efficient production in the industrial organizations. 
We wish to support the organizational changes deemed necessary in the Hungarian 
industry by rearranging enterprise frameworks by dint of central decisions. It is an 
additional aim to rely also on independent enterprise decisions in transforming the 
organization of industry. For this reason several measures were taken in the past years 
extending the autonomy of enterprises in shaping their own organization. (Their 
authority to establish companies, joint ventures, and to change the range of their 
products widened.) Owing to the timeliness of further development in industrial 
organization, the surveys which revealed the peculiarities and contradictions of the 
present organizational system and marked out the ways to follow, have obtained an 
important role in the research concerning industrial economics in Hungary. In the 
following we are going to present the results of a research project which fits into the 
line of these surveys. 
In our survey we have analysed the activity structure of the state enterprise of the 
processing industries, - except for the food industry.2 The aim of the research was to 
picture the degree of specialization on the level of enterprises as well as of industrial 
plants (i.e., within the enterprises).3 The timeliness of our research was justified by 
two circumstances. 
* Román Z.: A magyar ipar szervezeti rendszere (The Organizational System of Hungarian 
Industry). Ipargazdasági Szemle, 1978. 3. 
Schweitzer, I.: A vállalatnagyság (Enterprise Size). Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó, Budapest 
1982. 
2 
In Hungary the control and management of food industry is closely integrated with agriculture. 
This is the reason for having separated it from other branches of processing industries. 3 The surveys on enterprise level are related to the activities of the organization units pursuing 
self-supporting operation within the whole industry. Those on plant level picture the activity 
structure of the territorially separated organization units within the enterprises. 
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1. When shaping the sphere of activities of the enterprises in the past decades we 
considered specialization and the extension of specialization one of the most 
important tools to improve productivity and increase efficiency. At the same time 
only a very few investigations covering only a very small number of sectors were 
carried out on the degree of specialization on enterprise and plant level; with regard 
to the whole of industry no such data and/or analyses were available. We have been 
striving to fill this gap by our survey, utilizing the data base of the Central Statistical 
Office, and summing up and processing the enterprise and plant data, following the 
points of view of our investigations. 
2. In Hungarian industry the right to define the sphere of activities of a state-owned 
enterprise - as one of the most important proprietary issues — belongs to the state 
body founding the enterprise (and exercising the rights of ownership). The new 
provisions of law, however, which came into force in 1982, extended the autonomy 
of the enterprises in respect of developing the sphere of their activities considerably. 
Annulling the legal administrative restrictions on diversification has opened up the 
way towards diversified undertakings in Hungarian industry, too. As part of the 
research concerning the domestic conditions of diversification, our survey was also 
aimed at answering the question about the role of the activities outside of the main 
fine of production in the present operational structure and the opportunities offered 
by this structure for the unfolding of diversified undertakings. 
The Methodology of the Survey 
Our survey was extended to the complete range of the state-owned enterprises of five 
industrial branches (metallurgy, engineering industry, building materials industry, 
chemical industry and light industries). It describes the activity structure of 398 
enterprises on the basis of 1981 data, and also an analysis of the degree of specializa-
tion on the level of 2210 industrial plants. 
In the course of our survey we considered the product groups as basic units in the 
activity structure of the enterprises. The activity structure is characterized by the 
distribution of the manpower employed in these product groups. The groups are 
homogenous groups of industrial production which can be separated technologically 
and to which - in general — actual groups of products and/or industrial services can 
be attached. Hungarian statistics started to develop the product groups within the 
industrial branch classification system and to collect data according to this system 
in 1976. In 1981 industrial activities were reviewed in a breakdown to 247 product 
groups. 
According to the principles of forming the product groups the company specializ-
ing in a single product group covers a relatively homogenous sphere of needs, using a 
technology which cannot be converted to another product group. When activities in 
several product groups take place within an enterprise, they are not convertible to 
one another technologically and there is no overlapping between the products belong-
ing to the particular groups. Obviously, the activity structure of the enterprise can be 
broken down further and the degree of specialization can be investigated deeper than 
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by product groups. The current system of statistical reporting, however, does not make 
it possible to conduct more detailed investigations, also comprising the factors of 
production. But the identity of technologies linking up the particular groups of 
products, and the separation of productin equipment on the level of these, may be 
considered deep enough to having represented the most important points of view of 
investigating specialization in the course of our survey (i.e., the possibility of utilizing 
economies of scale, derived from the increased quantities and proportions of 
homogenous production, or the degree of concentration of material and marketing 
capacities). 
Specialization on Enterprise Level 
By surveying the activity structure of the enterprises our aim was to give a picture of 
how broad the enterprises' sphere of activity is and, within this sphere, what the 
proportions among the particular elements of activity are. Three methods were used 
for investigating the activity structure of the enterprises. First, we reviewed the extent 
of the sphere of activity by the number of groups of products included {Table 1). 
Then the distribution and concentration of the spheres of activity were investigated, 
according to product groups; on the one hand on the basis of the share of the group of 
Table 1 
The number of enterprises by industrial branches and by product 
groups comprised in the enterprise s activities 
Number of enterprise Total Number of 
engaged in more than number product 
Branch 1 2 - 5 6 - 1 0 10 of groups 
enter- within the 
product groups prises branch 
Metallurgy 1 11 4 5 21 24 
Engineering 
industry 15 71 44 15 145 45 
Building 
materials 
industry 4 23 7 — 34 21 
Chemical 
industry 8 26 11 2 47 30 
Wood, paper 
and printing 
industry 10 54 3 - 67 21 
Garment 
industry 16 48 15 5 84 40 
Total 54 233 84 27 398 
-
Distribution 
(percent) 13.6 58.5 21.1 6.8 100.0 
-
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products showing the greatest proportion (Table 2), on the other hand by the aid of 
the Herflndahl-Hirschmann index4 characterizing concentration of the activity 
structure, i.e., the number and proportions of spheres of activity by a single indicator 
СTable 3). 
Table 2 
The number of enterprises by branches and by the share of personnel employed 
in the principal product group 
The share of personnel employed in the 
Branch product group being the first on the basis Total 
of the numbers engaged in it (percent) 
up to 30 31-60 61-90 91-100 
Metallurgy 3 9 7 2 21 
Engineering industry 11 64 38 32 145 
Building materials 
industry 1 9 11 13 34 
Chemical industry 3 9 19 16 47 
Wood, paper and printing 
industry 1 40 7 19 67 
Garment industry 3 27 26 28 84 
Total 22 158 108 110 398 
Distribution (percent) 5.5 39.8 27.1 27.6 100.0 
In the course of our survey we separated the repair and maintenance jobs from 
the activities of the enterprise and examined the distribution of the persons employed 
without taking these into account. These activities account for considerable numbers 
of the manpower, in the enterprises involved in our research 9.7 percent of those 
employed were so engaged. However, the activities of repair and maintenance deserve 
specific consideration within the whole sphere of activities, since these groups of 
production are not part of the direct production operations but belong to the activities 
rendering auxiliary services to industry and as such they constitute an element of 
industrial infrastructure. From Tables 1, 2 and 3 which represent the degree of 
specialization in the activities of the enterprises involved in the survey, as well as their 
extent and concentration the following conclusions may be drawn: 
4 n 2 
Index "H" (H = 2 P j) is an indicator with highly favourable features for measuring concentra-
t e 
tion. In our research the Pj values were the shares of those employed in the particular groups of 
products within the total number of those employed by the enterprise or in a certain plant. The 




The number of enterprises by branches and by the value of index H 
(Based on the distribution of persons employed) 
Total Number of enterprises where Aver- Dis-
Branch 
number value of index H is per-
of below 0 . 3 1 - 0 .61- above age sion 
enter- 0.3 0.6 0.9 0.91 
prises 
Metallurgy 21 5 10 4 2 0.47 0.27 
Engineering industry 145 28 71 20 26 0.53 0.25 
Building materials 
industry 34 3 13 10 8 0.64 0.27 
Chemical industry 47 8 11 15 13 0.65 0.30 
Wood, paper and 
printing industry 67 5 37 7 18 0.57 0.15 
Garment industry 84 5 40 15 24 0.68 0.16 
Total 398 54 182 71 91 0.58 0.27 
Distribution 
(percent) 100.0 13.6 45.7 17.8 22.9 
1. The data bear witness of a relatively low level of specialization in the sphere of 
activities of the companies. Altogether 13.6 percent of the enterprises specialized in a 
single product group, showing a homogenous activity, and it is hardly more than a 
quarter of them (27.6 percent) where one of the product groups take a central 
position within the structure of activities. On the basis of the Herfindahl-Hirschmann 
index which characterizes the broadness and concentration of the enterprise's sphere 
of activities by a single indicator the data of only 91 of the investigated 398 enter-
prises indicated a strongly concentrated sphere of activities. 
2. Behind the aforementioned total view the data of the tables do not reflect any 
significant difference between the branches. Reviewing both broadness and concentra-
tion of the fields of activity, enterprises of most various levels of specialization take 
place in any of the branches. Though the averages of index H per branch show certain 
differences, these are not at all marked and beyond the sectoral averages the dispersion 
of the enterprise data is uniformly high. 
The Relationship between Specialization and the Size of Enterprises 
The data of our survey indicated that the wide and scattered structure of enterprise 
activities is a general phenomenon in Hungarian industry. Studying its background, we 
examined the relationship between the specialization on enterprise level and the 
enterprise size, i.e., the dimensional structure of enterprises. 
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It is customary to presume a positive correlation between the activity sphere and 
the size of the enterprise. In order to utilize economies of scale derived from grow-
ing production of homogenous products and their production facilities, the smaller 
enterprises are generally forced to a more powerful specialization and only growing 
enterprise dimensions open up reasonable opportunities for diversifying the field of 
activities. Some empirical surveys conducted among capitalist companies have also 
proven this correlation. The research projects reporting on diversification as gaining 
ground have uniformly witnessed that primarily the large enterprises are those 
which operate in a broad field of activities. The growth of enterprise dimensions is 
accompanied by broadening the sphere of activities and it is the relatively great num-
ber of small firms in the capitalist countries where powerful specialization can be 
found.5 
The distribution in the size of the companies involved in our survey reflects the 
strongly concentrated enterprise structure of state-owned industry. Afore than half, 
210 of the investigated 398 enterprises (58.8 percent) belong to the large enterprises 
employing more than a thousand people. The share of the firms employing 300—1000 
persons is 31.1 percent and not more than 16.1 percent belong to the sphere of small-
scale enterprises. Such a distribution of enterprise sizes indicates by itself that 
specialization of the individual enterprises cannot be very powerful in the present 
framework of enterprises. Owing to a strong organizational centralization of the 
particular branches the activities belonging to the given branch had to be fitted into 
the fields of operation of a relatively small number of enterprises. 
Table 4 demonstrates the distribution of enterprises with varying concentration of 
activity structure by categories of enterprise size. 
The above data make it obvious that: 
1. In the state-owned industry small and medium-size entrprises do not show mar-
kedly stronger specialization than that of the large enterprises. Only 31 percent 
of the firms employing less than five hundred persons concentrate their activity 
to a single group of products. 
2. For the sake of a more accurate demonstration of the relationship between the level 
of specialization and the size of the enterprises, we calculated the correlation 
between the number of those employed by the enterprise and index H charac-
terizing the specialization in the structure of activities. Regarding the investigated 
area of enterprises as a whole, concentration of the activities has shown a 
decreasing trend simultaneously with the growing size of the enterprises. At the 
same time, the relationship between enterprise dimensions and the degree of 
specialization both in the whole sphere of the enterprises and within the particular 
branches — has not turned out to be powerful. (Taking into account all the 
investigated enterprises, the coefficient of correlation was only 0.236; nor did they 
show significant relationships within particular branches.) 
Utton, M. A.:Diversification and Competition. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1979. 
Devine, P. J.: Diversification, Merger and Innovation. In Champman, В.: An Introduction to 
Industrial Economics. Allen Unvin, London 1974. 
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Table 4 
The number of enterprises by size categories and the concentration 
in the field of activities 
Number of enterprises where the value Total 
Categories of size of index H is number 
(persons) below 0 .31- 0.61- above of enter-
0.3 0.6 0.9 0.9 prises 
- 100 4 1 8 13 
101- 300 2 31 3 15 51 
301- 500 2 26 9 12 49 
501- 1000 9 36 15 15 75 
1001- 2000 13 31 23 22 89 
2001- 5000 17 44 18 18 97 
5001-10000 7 7 2 1 17 
10000- 4 3 7 
Total 54 182 71 91 398 
As a consequence of all this, the low degree of specialization characterizing the 
totality of enterprise activities is closely linked to the fact that the predominance of 
large enterprises is characteristic of the present structure of industry. Owing not only 
to their size but also to the lack in specialized small and medium-size enterprise, the 
large companies are forced to develop a wide sphere of activities. 
Specialization on the Level of Industrial Plants 
While analysing the activity structure of the enterprises by product groups reveals how 
broad the range of products manufactured by them is, giving a picture of inter-enter-
prise division of labour, by surveys on plant level specialization within the production 
process can be analysed in more detail. By analysing the structure of operations in the 
individual plants it is no more the management units of organization but the basic 
units of production on the level of which the extent and concentration of production 
and the degree of specialization can be investigated.6 
It is particularly justified to distinguish enterprise and plant level in analysing the 
degree of specialization of the Hungarian industry, since here the enterprise structure 
today is characterized by a strongly centralized organization: the major part of the 
enterprises include more than one industrial plant. (Only a fifth of the analysed 398 
enterprises consists of one plant and almost a third of them comprise six or more 
6 About the significance of analysis on plant level besides that on enterprise level in studying in-
dustrial organization, see: Román, Z.-.Iparpolitika (Industrial Policy). Közgazdasági és Jogi 
Könyvkiadó, Budapest 1981. pp. 1 1 0 - 1 4 9 . 
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operating plants.) Thus, the activity structure of the enterprises is in the majority 
divided among several plants. Hence, the present organization system — even beside 
the relatively wide spectrum and scarce concentration of the spheres of activity — 
would make it possible to develop, within the structure of enterprise activity, some 
kind of division of labour among the plants belonging to the same enterprise and so 
to strengthen specialization on the level of the individual plants, i.e., the basic units 
of production. 
Tables 5 and 6 demonstrate the activity structure of the 2210 industrial plants 
of the 398 enterprises involved in our survey — namely, the degree of specialization 
on plant level. (Table 5 shows the width of the activities and Table 6 the concentra-
tion of the spheres of activity in the plants.) According to the data of the tables 
the number of organizations with low specialization is relatively significant even on 
the level of plants: more than a fifth of them show a low degree of specialization, 
480 industrial plants embrace three or more groups of products and 519 take place 
in the group of plants characterized by low concentration of the spheres of activities. 
Table 5 
The distribution of plants by branches and by the number of product groups 
produced by them (in percent) 
The share of plants engaged m 
Branch 1 2 3 4 5 or Total 
more 
groups of products (in percent) 
Metallurgy 53.7 9.3 14.8 3.7 18.5 100.0 
Engineering industry 63.9 14.7 7.9 7.8 5.7 100.0 
Building materials industry 31.8 51.9 11.0 1.9 3.4 100.0 
Chemical industry 71.6 11.6 6.5 3.0 7.3 100.0 
Wood, paper and printing 
industry 45.4 13.1 35.8 4.8 0.9 100.0 
Garment industry 67.6 15.4 7.8 4.1 5.1 100.0 
Total 59.6 18.7 11.2 5.2 5.3 100.0 
For a more accurate consideration of the above picture created about the activity 
structure of the industrial plants the following factors should additionally be taken 
into account: 
1. Of the 2210 industrial plants involved in our survey 953 (43.1 percent) employ 
less than 100 persons; the numbers of manpower are between 101—500 in 852 plants 
(38.6 percent) and there are merely 158 plants where the number of the employed 
exceed a thousand. With such a dimensional structure the opportunity to achieve 
economies of scale could very likely be created by a much stronger specialization than 
today on the level of plants. 
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Table б 
The distribution of plants by branches and by the value of index H 
(in percent) 
The share of plants where the 
Branch 
value of index H is 
Total below 0 .31- 0 .61- above 
0.3 0.6 0.9 0.91 
Metallurgy 11.1 24.1 7.9 57.4 100.0 
Engineering industry 5.8 19.5 9.9 64.8 100.0 
Building materials industry 0.8 13.3 29.8 56.1 100.0 
Chemical industry 9.0 9.5 10.4 71.1 100.0 
Wood, paper and printing industry 2.2 40.6 7.9 49.3 100.0 
Garment industry 2.1 15.8 10.1 72.0 100.0 
Total 4.4 19.1 12.2 64.2 100.0 
2. This assumption is well supported by our computations which have shown that 
only a relatively weak connection can currently be found between plant size 
(characterized by the number of employees) and concentration of the activity 
structure (demonstrated by the H index); the correlation index between the two fac-
tors was —0.337. This means that the degree of specialization in the plants is not 
markedly influenced by the size of the plant. So it is groundless to suppose that the 
relatively broad activity spheres observed with a considerable part of the plants are 
justified by the dimensions of the plant. 
Activities beyond the Main Line of Production 
According to the results of our survey the vast majority of the enterprises (86.4 per-
cent) is engaged at least in two product groups. The product group representing the 
main production line, which is the most significant on the basis of labour force 
employed in it, in three quarters of the enterprises does not represent a decisive 
share within the activities of the enterprise. The activities outside of the principal line 
of products are in general rather significant; 56 percent of the manpower is engaged in 
product groups other than the main one. 
In order to consider the activity of the enterprises beyond the main range of 
products more precisely we investigated them from the points of view (1) how they 
are linked to the basic activity; (2) if they belong to the same sub-branch as the main 
products or to a different one; (3) if an economic scale of production can be ensured 
in the product groups outside the basic range of products. 
1. Not more than 186 enterprises of those involved in our survey produced every 
group of products within the sphere of their activities to sell them on the market. 
53.9 percent of them produced at least one group which was not marketed, which 
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means that this group of products is used up within the enterprise. Among the latter, 
119 enterprises had no sales in one product group, 89 in 2 to 5 groups and there were 
5 enterprises which sold no goods of more than 5 product groups. 
Thus, more than half of the enterprises involved in the survey developed the 
activity beyond their basic products for serving their own basic operation. By the 
additional activities these companies replaced external cooperation. This is mostly 
a constraint on the enterprises, since the strongly centralized structure of Hungarian 
industry, the lack of small-scale enterprises create no favourable conditions for 
widening the division of labour among themselves. 
2. Within the activity structure of the particular enterprises, intertwining of the 
various product groups belonging to different sub-branches — since statistical distinc-
tion between the sub-branches is made on the basis of the character of the products, 
the production technology applied, and the market for the products, — can be 
considered as diversified, as vertical intertwining of the sub-branches does not play a 
role of the same significance as similar connections among the groups of products. 
According to the results of our investigations, considerable part of the enterprises 
— about 80 percent — has some production capacity and pursue some activity other 
than those belonging to the sub-branch of their basic product line. With about half 
(190) of the enterprises a significant share of the operations beyond the principal 
range of products — more than 70 percent — are devoted to production belonging to 
other subbranches. On the other hand, only a fifth (87) of the total number of them 
are specialized to products belonging fully to a single sub-branch. 
As the data collected throughout our survey show it, the activities alien to the 
principal production line of the enterprise coincide generally with those adopted by 
the enterprises for the purpose of fulfilling their basic tasks. The products beyond that 
of their main sphere of activity are either not sold at all, or the enterprises sell only a 
very small share of them in the market. The intertwining of the activities that belong 
to different sub-branches in the activity structure of the domestic enterprises show no 
conscious diversification strategy, but rather the lack of inter-enterprise division of 
labour. 
3. The results of our research indicated many-sidedly that the activities of the 
enterprises outside the basic line of products are of a very scattered character. The 
data of the table indicate that the dimensions of activities outside the main product 
range can hardly reach the sizes ensuring economic production within the individual 
enterprises. Not more than 20 percent of them concentrate their activities to only one 
product group, with more than half of them the activities without the particular sub-
branch are divided among three or even more product groups. 
Our surveys, carried out on the level not only of enterprises but also on that of 
sub-branches, demonstrate a strongly scattered character of the activities additional 
to the basic product line. Production of the enterprises belonging to particular sub-
branches falling into categories outside the sub-branch is generally divided among a 
great number of sub-branches; the number of those engaged in the particular sub-
branch reaches only in a small part of the enterprises more than one percent of the 
total work force employed in the sub-branch concerned. The remaining — 
comparatively very small - share of those engaged outside the sub-branch is again 
79 
divided among a number of further sub-branches. Beside such distribution of the 
production outside the sub-branch it is hardly presumable that the dimensions of 
such production reach the extent needed for economic production. 
Table 7 
The number of enterprises by branches and by the number of product groups 
outside the sub-branch 
Number of enterprises engaged in product 
groups outside the sub-branch 
Branch Total Number of those engaged in 
number 6 or 
of enter- 1 2 3 - 5 more 
pnses product groups outside the 
sub-branch 
Metallurgy 17 7 1 3 6 
Engineering industry 124 34 23 46 21 
Building materials industry 29 7 7 9 6 
Chemical industry 41 15 7 18 1 
Wood, paper and printing industry 28 17 6 4 1 
Garment industry 65 13 10 23 19 
Total 304 93 54 103 54 
Distribution (percent) 100.0 36.6 17.8 33.8 17.8 
Summary 
According to the results of our statistical survey into the activity structure of the 
industrial enterprises of the branches involved in the survey, they have in their totality 
wide and scattered activity structure. The broad sphere of activities, characteristic of 
the majority of the enterprises had been developed, however, not as the result of the 
diversifying strategy widely applied by the companies in Western countries. In the 
Hungarian industry the broad sphere of enterprise activities indicates much more the 
low level of inter-enterprise and intra-enterprise division of labour. Numerous results 
of our survey bear witness to this fact (the relatively low standard of specialization on 
industrial plant level, the low degree of specialization among the small and medium-
size enterprises, the scattered character of the activities outside the main range of 
products, and, within the latter, the important part played by the activities assisting 
as services to the basic activity). 
On the basis of the results of our research such changes seem to be expedient in the 
organization of domestic industry which boast the concentration of activities in the 
individual plants (and, consequently, enterprises). Opportunities for this are offered 
from three directions: 
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1. The results of our analyses show that concentration of the activity structure of 
the enterprises is hindered by several separate small-scale activities of little portent, 
which had been taken up by the enterprises in order to enable them to fulfil their 
basic tasks. By increasing the role of specialized small and medium-size enterprises 
within the company structure of industry — which would entail the development of 
inter-enterprise division of labour — it would be possible to diminish, or even to 
eliminate the constraint of self-supply. In the past years several measures were taken 
(dismemberment of enterprises, establishment of subsidiaries, the support of small-
scale enterprises), which were aimed at decentralizing the organization of industry 
and strengthening the sphere of small and medium-size enterprises. The results of our 
research justify the necessity of such measures and call attention to the need for a 
more differentiated distribution of size in the enterprise structure of industry and for 
efforts to broaden the sphere of specialized small and medium-size companies 
vigorously. 
2. In the current organization system of our industry large companies with several 
plants are predominant. Therefore the broad activity structure of the enterprises, built 
on a strong division of labour within them, could make it possible to achieve 
economical scales of production and utilization of the advantages of diversification. 
Our surveys on plant level have shown that the standard of division of labour within 
the enterprise, among the plants, is inadequate. Relieving the constraint on enterprises 
for self-supply would undoubtedly lead to a stronger concentration of the activities of 
both the enterprises and the industrial plants than today. But, parallel to that, it is also 
needed to help the deepening division of labour within the enterprise by emphasizing 
the interest in increasing the profitability of production. 
3. Despite the broad activity structure of the enterprises we still cannot speak of 
implementing diversification strategies in Hungarian industry. The endeavours of 
diversification aimed at increasingly many-sided utilization of moral and material 
resources in the enterprises, bringing about a higher standard of structural 
adjustability, gained ground only to a very small extent in Hungarian industry. Since 
1981 the autonomy of the enterprises has been broadening, their sphere of activity 
has increased considerably. The generally broad sphere of activities — as it is well 
reflected in the results of our survey — may be expected to open up the way for 
diversification. On the basis of the well-known advantages of this process in the sphere 
of capitalist enterprises it is obvious that concentration of the activity structure of 
enterprises may only be our aim in order to concentrate production, and achieve 
economical scales of competitive production. If built on a conscious strategy of 
diversification which urges the utilization of economies of scale, the broad activity 
structure of the enterprises encompassing several groups of products can be 
favourable from the view of stability and flexibility of the enterprises and of 
competitiveness as well. 
INDUSTRIAL ACTIVITIES IN NON-INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS 
ANDRÁS BÁNKY-KRISZTINA PENYIGEY 
When dealing with industry, construction or trade, we usually take into consideration 
and analyse the activities of organizations belonging to the given branch of the national 
economy. We seldom reckon with the fact that sectoral classification and acteal 
activities of the economic organizations coincide only very rarely. Classification into 
sectors and statistical registration of the enterprises is done on the basis of their basic 
function.1 The fact that in 1980 only 65 percent of total industrial production and 
58 percent of the annual workers were directly supervised by the branch ministry 
responsible for shaping the concepts of industrial policy (the Ministry of Industry) 
shows how industrial management and control is split-up in Hungary. A number of 
supervisory bodies and federations take part in tire guidance of Hungarian industry.2 
Organizations pursuing statistically well definable homogeneous activity were 
rather infrequent even in earlier periods. The summarized data of statistics as well 
as the practice followed by the enterprises indicate the generally increasing trend: 
virtually every economic organization pursues some kind of activity in addition to its 
basic function. At the same time in the production processes of any national economic 
branch also organizations, belonging to other branches, are involved. The production 
data of the years 1970 and 1982 clearly reflect this phenomenon (Annexes 1 and 2). 
It is noteworthy that during the last ten years the weight of industrial production 
increased in the economic organizations working outside the sphere of industry within 
the activities additional to their basic function. The economic units outside of 
industry represent an ever increasing part in the production of the Hungarian 
industry. In 1980 in addition to the about 9000 plants of the socialist industry3 
approximately 12000 industrial plants were in operation organizationally belonging 
to some other national economic sector. About 97 000 manual workers were 
employed in these plants producing more than one tenth of the gross industrial out-
put. These non-negligible orders of magnitude and the dynamics of development are 
warnings that when investigating the structure of Hungarian industry and assessing its 
' By "basic function" we mean the activity belonging to the prime branches of the statistical 
classification system, i.e., the sectors of the national economy. 
2The state-owned industry belongs to the Ministry of Industry, cooperative industry to the 
National Council of Industrial Cooperatives, the building materials industry to the Ministry 
of Building and Urban Development, food industry and the industrial plants of the agricultural 
cooperatives to the Ministry of Agriculture and Food. 
3 Socialist industry includes the state-owned industrial enterprises and cooperatives. 
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capacity we must not narrow down the sphere of industry to merely the economic 
units listed within the branch of industry. 
In this paper we wish to present two sets of questions in detail. On the one hand, 
our aim is to give a picture about industrial operations outside the proper sphere of 
industry and the role played by them. On the other hand, we try to give a deeper 
analysis of industrial activities performed in agriculture. 
The Various Types of Industrial Activities 
When investigating the features of industrial activities carried out by non-industrial 
organizations, a number of common characteristics can be found which render it 
possible to typify them. Based on the extent of their intertwining with the basic 
function, on the various degrees of attachment, and on the contacts with industry, 
three types have been distinguished. 
1. The first type includes industrial operations belonging closely to the basic 
function of the given branch of the national economy. Integration of these activities 
into the non-industrial organizations is a normal phenomenon, since they go hand in 
hand with the basic function (such as e.g. sand and gravel production by the organiza-
tions of water management, or printing performed by the enterprises working in the 
non-material sphere). 
Owing to the strong intertwining with the basic function, repair and maintenance 
of the means of production also belong to this category. Repair and maintenance are 
ancillary services to the basic production and, as such, constitute a part of the infra-
structure of the given national economic branch. Decentralizing them is frequently 
a necessary condition of continuing the basic activity, therefore they can be found in 
the organization of any larger enterprise, irrespective of the national economic 
branch they belong to. 
2. The second type consists of the industrial activities closely linked to the basic 
function. The non-industrial economic units may extend their sphere of activities 
generally in two directions: 
a) They may complement their original product range of activities by phases of 
industrial production preceding their basic activity. So they perform the production 
of indispensable materials, component parts, semi-finished and finished goods used 
in the course of their basic function. Some characteristic examples of this type are the 
manufacturing of agricultural machines by large-scale farms, doors, windows produced 
by the building material industry, the production of textile and garment articles for 
the enrichment of the choice offered by domestic trade. 
b) In other cases economic units, outside industry, extend their sphere of activities 
to the production of industrial products which have to follow their basic activity. 
They engage in reprocessing the products produced or sold in the framework of 
their basic function. A typical case of this kind of activity is food processing carried 
out by farms, by general cooperatives of consumers and sellers and by wholesale 
organizations dealing with agricultural products. 
3. The third type of industrial production includes the activities which are not 
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linked to the basic activity of the non-industrial economic unit in question. These 
mean a radically new orientation for the related organizations. Two groups can be 
determined within this type, on the basis of the direction of using the products: 
a) Manufacturing industrial products which serve for the production activities of 
industrial enterprises, or rendering certain working processes for them, in the frame-
work of cooperation contacts. This type is mainly characteristic in the large-scale 
farms and a small number of general cooperatives of consumers and sellers.4 
b) Manufacturing industrial products which serve for broadening the selection of 
articles on the market and performing industrial services (e.g. production of 
consumers' articles by large-scale farms, or industrial services to the population by 
building organizations). 
A General Survey on Industrial Production outside the Framework of Industry 
The sectoral structure of industrial operations carried out by non-industrial organiza-
tions is different in the individual branches of the national economy, closely connect-
ed with the purpose of the production and the given potentialities. (See Table 1.) In 
the following, according to our typology, we are going to give a brief review of the 
trends of industrial production taking place in non-industrial organizations. 
In 1980 more than 50 percent of industrial production, pursued by non-indust-
rial units, came from agriculture and forestry; more than a fourth of it was produced 
by the building industry and 15 percent by domestic trade. 
In agriculture industrial production can look back upon a past of about fifteen 
years and today it has reached a significant extent within both agricultural and 
industrial production. In 1982 6.7 percent of gross industrial production was 
performed by agriculture and forestry. 
A decisive part of industrial production is directly linked to the basic function 
(e.g. food processing, wood-working). Mining and building production based on the 
extraction and primary processing of local materials also does not mean a radically 
new orientation for these organizations (types 1 and 2). 
However, the major part of metallurgical, engineering, chemical or light 
industrial production is not linked to the basic function of the large-scale agricultural 
plants (farms). The share of these within the full industrial production of agriculture 
is much lower than that of operations linked closely to the basic activity. Many 
people still query these forms of diversification (type 3). 
The supply offered by socialist industry left significant unprovided gaps in the 
fields of both productive and individual consumption. This had a stimulating effect on 
the development of agriculture's industrial production. Thus, the emerging demand 
created favourable opportunities for the agricultural plants (farms) to substitute for 
the activities of the missing small firms in industry and complement the choice of the 
products of the socialist industry. 
4The general consumers' and sellers' cooperatives (in the following called ÁFÉSZ, by the Hun-
garian abbreviation), are commercial organizations, carrying out functions similar to those 
of the consumers' cooperatives in Western countries. 
Table 1 
The value and distribution of the industrial activities of the national economic branches other than industry, 
by industrial sub-branches 
The value of industrial production in the branches of 
Industrial sub-branch Construction 
Agriculture and Transport and Internal trade 
forestry3 communication 
million distribution million distribution million distribution million distribution 
Forint percent Forint percent Forint percent Forint percent 
Industrial production 
Electric power 
- - - -
- -
5.2 0.0 
Mining 19.8 0.1 752.2 1.5 - - - -
Metallurgy 172.0 0.6 388.9 0.8 - - 646.6 4.4 
Engineering 5782.1 21.7 4609.6 9.1 758.1 16.7 248.7 1.7 
Building materials 15281.5 57.3 502.2 1.0 28.5 0.6 319.7 2.2 
Chemical industry — - 2924.6 5.8 - - 279.7 1.9 
Woodworking industry 2037.6 7.6 8183.8 16.2 3.2 0.1 3986.0 27.3. 
Other light industries - — 1129.3 2.2 - - 1360.9 9.3 
Other industries 1621.1 6.1 633.4 1.3 - — 526.9 3.6 
Food industry — — 25880.2 51.2 - — 5111.0 35.0 
Industrial services 1770.3 6.6 5498.5 10.9 3748.6 82.6 2131.3 14.6 
Total 26684.4 100.0 50502.7 100.0 4338.4 100.0 14616.0 100.0 
Source: Iparstatisztikai Évkönyv 1981 (Yearbook of Industrial Statistics 1981) Központi Statisztikai Hivatal, Budapest 1982. 
aIn the lack of data on production value, the return from sales of industrial production. 
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Income regulation and strong profit-orientation of the agricultural cooperatives 
encouraged them many-sidedly to utilize these market opportunities as far as possible. 
Development possibilities and personal incomes in the cooperative sector of agriculture 
are more closely and consistently linked to the economic results of the production 
than it is in the case of industrial enterprises. 
The introduction and development of industrial activities offered great 
opportunities to increase the profitability of operations, since in the present price 
system the incomes to be gained in industry are normally higher than those achieved 
by agricultural production. Almost every large-scale farm is engaged in some kind of 
industrial production. 92.4 percent of the state farms and 88 percent of the 
agricultural cooperatives practice industrial activities. 
The food processing sections of the state farms account for 82.5 percent of the 
total income from industrial activity showing that these are plants of considerable 
capacity. Industrial services and woodworking are following them in the rank order. 
Food industry is the leading branch in the cooperatives too, though almost as many 
of them are engaged in indistrial services and only somewhat less in woodworking. The 
numbers of industrial plants and the distribution of the returns from sales by branches 
are shown in Table 2. 
* 
A decisive share of industrial activity in the building industry is vertically linked to 
the activities of construction and assembly, i.e., constitutes their industrial back-
ground. 
The large share and rapid development of industrial operations in the organizations 
of the building industry is closely linked to the technical and technological 
development achieved in the past fifteen years. As a result of this process a major part 
of traditional building is carried out in prefabricating industrial plants. 
In order to assert the advantages of vertical links the large-capacity building 
factories and the industrial plants producing various elements of construction were 
established within enterprises of the building industry. In addition to the favourable 
effects of organizational integration certain problems have also come to the surface, 
since the economic situation of some building enterprises was largely influenced by the 
over-dimensioned industrial background and the low-level capacity-utilization. 
The deficiencies of the supply of the industrial organizations constituting the back-
ground of construction in respect of quantity and assortment also acted in the direc-
tion of encouraging industrial activities. As a result of this the building enterprises 
tend to solve the manufacturing of products hardly obtainable from other producers 
and those considered as shortage goods by using their own production facilities (e.g. 
some part of the engineering products and building materials). 
In the case of construction cooperatives, founded for the purpose of repair and 
maintenance of buildings, carrying on their basic function is stimulated by tax 
allowances. For this reason they make no efforts to increase industrial production 
to more than 50 percent of their output which would mean to change their classifica-
tion into industrial cooperatives. Within the industrial services of the construction 
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Table 2 
The number of industrial plants in agriculture and forestry and breakdown 
of their returns of sales by industrial sub-branches in 1982 
Industrial plants Distribution of 
Industrial sub-branch Number Distribution industrial returns 
of sales 
percent 
Mining 30 0.3 0.1 
Metallurgy 38 0.4 0.6 
Engineering 2988 27.2 19.0 
Building materials 
industry 758 6.9 2.3 
Chemical industry 618 5.6 9.5 
Woodworking industry 1886 17.1 14.0 
Other light industries 803 7.3 4.0 
Other industries 886 8.1 3.1 
Food industry 2982 27.1 47.4 
Total 10989 100.0 100.0 
Source: Iparstatisztikai Évkönyv 1982 (Yearbook of Industrial Statistics 1972). Központi Statisz-
tikai Hivatal, Budapest 1983. 
cooperatives the repair activities rendered to the population play an important part 
(e.g. the repair of household equipment, or passenger cars). Owing to the low profit-
ability, however, gradual repression of the servicing activities can be observed. 
A decisive part of the industrial production in the enterprises of domestic trade 
consists of industrial activities linked to the commercial functions — which we 
classified as type 2. Beside the industrial services after the sale of commodities, i.e., 
the maintenance of the fixed assets, industrial production serves basically to broaden 
the selection of commercial goods and for making up for shortages. The advantages 
stemming from the integration of industrial and commercial operations in one 
organization and local processing of the collected products promoted the evolvement 
of food industrial, woodworking and light industrial production. The deficiency in the 
supplies offered by specialized industrial organizations and, consequently, the tensions 
appearing in the sphere of commercial supply also contributed to the fact that a part 
of the enterprises of domestic trade were forced to introduce production activities to 
replace articles in short supply (e.g. manufacturing garments of special sizes). 
Industrial activity in domestic trade shows a strong concentration by sub-branches 
of trade,5 since nine-tenth of the production comes from the wholesale trade of the 
"'"The specialized commercial companies are grouped into various subsectors by statistics (e.g. 
wholesale and stockpiling of the means of production, wholesale of agricultural products, whole-
sale of consumers' commodities, retail shops, and so on, constitute particular subsectors in 
internal trade). 
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means of production and the stockpiling companies, the wholesale trading enterprises 
of agricultural products and from the general consumers' and sellers' cooperatives. 
About 60 percent of the industrial production produced by the state-owned sector 
of domestic trade is realized by hardly more than 10 enterprises in the trade of means 
of production. In this group of enterprises production has been concentrated first of 
all to organizations not restricted to marketing, where local processing of products is 
also included in their tasks. These pursue industrial operations of woodworking, 
metallurgy and the building materials industry in their premises, mainly serving for 
processing the wastes. 
The vast majority of the organizations for selling the products of agriculture are 
cooperative enterprises and almost all of them pursue some industrial activity. Within 
the production of them reprocessing of the marketed agricultural products (e.g. 
pickling and canning) is predominant. The development of woodworking was also 
promoted by the problems in the supply of packaging materials, indispensable for 
performing their main function (e.g. the manufacturing of wooden boxes). 
Within the spheres of internal trade the share of the economic units performing 
industrial production is highest among the consumers' and sellers' cooperatives (96 
percent in 1980). One-third of the industrial products in internal trade is produced by 
them. 
Industrial production of the ÁFÉSZ-s has largely been influenced by the given 
circumstances of the district where they operate. A part of their industrial plants has 
been organized to solve the disturbances emerging in the regional supplies, to fill up 
the "blank spots", or was built upon the local resources of raw material or labour. 
Eighty percent of their industrial plants pursue food industrial work as their main task; 
in the course of that, they carry out processing of the agricultural products procured 
by them, or provide their local shops with the commodities produced by themselves. 
The food industrial plants of the ÁFÉSZ-s perform to a great extent initial phases of 
processing, the choice of their products is narrow, owing to the lack of appropriate 
technology. 
In the past few years, because of the declining profitability of trading, the interests 
of the ÁFÉSZ-s in broadening their industrial activities evolved to a larger extent than 
before. The production of industrial articles which were sold not through their own 
marketing network but by the intervention of other commercial organizations to 
consumer markets, or directly to industrial enterprises, increased. Today, however, this 
orientation is not yet a general phenomenon. Beside the hindrances caused frequently 
by the lack of means, also the rigid views about commerce and the missing enterpre-
neurial behaviour are retarding powers. 
Extending the spheres of activities similar to the industrial ventures in agriculture is 
characteristics of only a small group of ÁFÉSZ-s, namely of those working in the 
neighbourhood of industrial centres. In remote provincial settlements the ÁFÉSZ-s 
provide the inhabitants with basic consumption commodities. In industrial centres 
and their area of gravitation, in turn, the ÁFÉSZ-s are working side by side with state-
owned commercial organizations. Therefore covering the consumption needs of the 
population is expected from the public sector of commerce, not from them. Hence, 
they can shape the structure of their activities more freely. Parallel to this, the 
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competition of state-owned trade is also acting towards changing the sphere of their 
activities. 
A small number of the ÁFÉSZ-s, beside the production for enriching the selection 
of commercial articles, produces industrial goods, components for state-owned 
industrial companies and for industrial cooperatives in the framework of cooperation. 
These activities are concentrated in the first fine to jobs of the metalwares, plastics 
and woodworking industry. In general, labour-intensive products, requiring simple 
equipment, little investment and low standards of education are manufactured. 
Owing to the limited material and development possibilities and the relatively 
low level of labour culture, collaboration of the outworking type is predominant. 
Another feature of the industrial production conducted by the ÁFÉSZ-s is that the 
production of the outworking type6 gained ground in a relatively broad sphere. 
This form of production imposes a lesser burden on the ÁFÉSZ's development sources 
(the shop and machines are often owned by the outworkers and even a part of 
transport is performed by them) and renders a better adjustment to the territorial 
distribution of the labour force possible. 
* 
In the sphere of telecommunication and transport more than 70 percent of 
industrial output is stemming from the vehicle repair shops which constitute an 
element of the infrastructure of the branch. Within the manufacture of engineering 
products the production of traffic and transport equipment linked vertically to the 
main function is predominant. The problematic character of the supplies to the 
engineering organizations is signalled by the fact that the transport companies are also 
engaged in the manufacture of components, assembly units, tools (e.g. such as metal 
screws, bolts, fittings, component parts of road vehicles, etc.). 
Nearly half of the industrial activity of the water management organizations con-
sists of building material production intertwined with their basic functions (extrac-
tion of gravel and sand.) The industrial sections rendering services to the main 
activity were set up in these organizations, too, where in addition to the repair and 
maintenance of the equipment for water management, small volumes of special 
products, serving the purposes of water economy, are also produced. 
In the case of organizations belonging to other material and non-material branches, 
activities of the printing industry as an aid to the main functions may be emphasized 
(e.g. making printed forms). 
The mam characteristic of the production based on the system of outworking is that those 
employed (frequently women) pursue production, i.e., work with the workpieces received from 
the cooperative, at home. 
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Conditions to Perform Industrial Activities in Agriculture 
The expediency of carrying out industrial operations in agriculture is questioned by 
several economists. In their opinion the industrial plants do not fit into the organiza-
tion of agriculture although they acknowledge that, owing to their possibilities in 
gaining benefits, they play an indispensable role in the farms. At the same time 
socialist industry and industrial policy reckon with the industrial activities of the 
agricultural plants (farms) which are able to relieve shortage situations emerging on 
the market of industrial commodities of consumption. Let us deal with the most 
important problems which are in the cross-fire of discussions, one after the other. 
1. Industrial production of the large-scale farms is mostly carried out in obsolete 
buildings, using machines and equipment of little value, often depreciated to zero, 
or having only a fictive value. The far too low level of technology prevents labour 
from being appropriately utilized. 
2. It is a peculiarity and a contradictory phenomenon of the economic activities of 
the large-scale farming units that industrial production is much more profitable than 
the agricultural operations pursued with a technology considered to be advanced and 
on a high level of productivity. Our survey has proved that the economic results of 
certain farms and their industrial production are closely linked. In all of the 
cooperative farms investigated the units of income gained by industrial activity 
showed a higher profit content than those of any other branch. According to our 
surveys the proportion of profits to the return from sales in the industrial sections 
of agriculture is twice that of the cooperative industry and three times higher than 
the same in state-owned industry. When comparing the profits to the value of wages 
plus assets, the picture is the same. 
The profitability being higher in industrial activities of agricultural cooperatives 
than that in the socialist industry can be, to a lesser degree, traced back to the 
differences of the price system and, to a greater one, to the differing development 
of the costs. When evaluating profitability it must also be taken into account that 
in the product structure of ancillary industrial work a large share of the products 
belong to the areas of free price formation. 
3. Many in professional circles are of the opinion that the dynamically developing 
industrial sections in agriculture — owing to the varying wage regulations in industry 
and agriculture — draw away the labour force from the industrial enterprises which 
could utilize it more efficiently and unequivocally work on a higher standard of 
technology. According to opinions of the industrial enterprises this "enticing" effect 
appeared expressly in the trades in shortage and among efficient and skilled workers. 
In fact, the gain of agriculture in the numbers of manpower was nearly 13000 in 
1980 and this originated mainly from the loss in the labour force of industry and 
construction. Those employed in industrial work in agriculture were 25000 (36.3 
percent) more in 1980 than in 1975. Their numbers approached 100.000 already in 
1980, and 134.000 in 1982. The attractive power, causing the inflow of industrial 
labour, consisted of the work being close to the dwelling place, the working time 
similar to that of industry and the opportunity of higher earnings. 
The problem grew sharp first in Budapest and in its zone of agglomeration where 
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the agricultural cooperatives set up new plants. Certain agricultural cooperatives in the 
neighbourhood of Budapest can no more be considered large-scale agricultural farms, 
they are rather some kind of conglomerations in which the various activities are 
linked up only by the legal form of belonging to the same enterprise. 
Regarding the wages paid by the industrial sections of the cooperative farms and 
their dispersion, no data are available, therefore it is hardly possible to determine the 
real and accurate extent of the personal incomes. The data of the plants investigated 
deny the opinions about irrealistically high earnings, though our experience is that 
personal incomes are much more dispersed in agriculture than in the state-owned 
industry. The incomes of those working in the industrial sections of the cooperative 
farms come from complex sources, the incomes of leaders are relatively instable, 
since they depend on the economic results. Earnings of the most excellent specialists 
not in leading position depend on the profile, on the availability of experts, on 
geographical situation, and so on. The proportions of earnings in the various trades 
do not coincide with those in industry, this can be explained by the differing 
structure of trades required. Whether there is time and opportunity to join the second 
economy also exerts an influence on the proportions of earnings. When judging the 
incomes it must also be taken into account that the members of cooperatives receive 
various fringe benefits beyond wages and salaries. In addition, the basic incomes are 
considerably complemented by the benefits of breeding collectively owned livestock 
in household plots, the possibilities of purchasing produce and services at reduced 
prices. 
4. From the view of flexibility in marketing and production the small-scale plants 
working in agriculture are highly differentiated. The number of industrial plants 
working directly for the market is small. These types of strongly market-oriented, 
flexible small plants pursue mainly activities of the food industry, woodworking, and 
some special ones of engineering and the light industries. 
Most industrial plants operating within agriculture are linked more or less closely 
to an increasing number of industrial enterprises. It is characteristic of this group 
that most part of their capacity is tied up by the industrial enterprises for one or two 
years in advance. The small plants fill up their remaining capacity with occasional 
contracts, or appear directly in the market (mostly with some consumption articles). 
The plants of food processing, woodworking, mining and building materials are 
normally linked to a single industrial company or to an organization of procurement, 
while the engineering, chemical, light industrial plants, and, to a certain extent, wood-
working plants can be characterized by deliveries to 2 or 3, occasionally to even more 
industrial enterprises. 
5. We compared state enterprises, industrial cooperatives and the industrial produc-
tion units of agricultural cooperatives to find out the differences between them. The 
individual organizations were ranked from the viewpoints of prices, quality, delivery 
times and flexibility by the experts who were inquired. 
In the almost identical rank order a general tendency can be discovered. The views 
are especially uniform in respect of the prices and quality. It is an unequivocal ex-
perience that the industrial sections of the agricultural cooperatives usually work for 
lower prices. (In certain cases, however, - especially when products in short supply, 
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monopoly articles, or very urgent jobs are concerned, — they ask high prices, too.) 
The prices of the cooperative farms, though generally depressed, still contain quite 
significant profits. 
In the view of quality level it can be noted that the state enterprises show a 
higher level. This is not surprising, since they have more up-to-date technology, higher 
technical culture and expertize and, in general better conditions of work. When 
evaluating the differences in quality it must also be taken into account that in the 
product range of the industrial sections of agriculture just those products are pre-
dominant which were given up by the state-owned industrial enterprises because they 
were considered hardly mechanizable, labour-intensive and uneconomical. These fac-
tors at the same time give some explanation to the differences in efficiency. 
The comparison in respect of delivery times and, as closely linked to it, flexibility 
is much more difficult, sometimes even impossible. Let us remember that a finished 
product in the industrial enterprises is the result of a much more sophisticated, 
complex manufacturing process and it is usually much more intricate than a simple 
component, assembly unit or even end product manufactured by the small industrial 
units. 
In addition, the industrial enterprises undertake several tasks of planning, organiza-
tion, manufacturing preparations, purchasing, transport, calculations, etc., which the 
smaller plants need not bother about. The sophisticated products of the industrial 
enterprises, as a rule, require several types of material inputs, components, and a 
number of the assembled part units come from cooperating partners. These circum-
stances make the process of production necessarily more difficult, slower and more 
risky, bringing about less flexibility and longer delivery times. By taking into account 
the above points of view, a more shaded comparison among the various organizations 
can be made. 
A Few Concluding Remarks 
The importance of industrial activities pursued by non-industrial organizations lies 
not only in the role they play in the given national economic branch, they also 
influence the organization system, production structure of socialist industry, and 
the development of the production cooperation contact between the industrial 
enterprises. A further important thing is that they also participate in providing the 
population with certain industrial articles. 
In our opinion equal conditions of competition, equal circumstances of operation 
need to be provided for pursuing industrial activities to any organizations, should they 
belong to any of the national economic branches. This, in turn, makes it necessary to 
regulate activities instead of organizations and to build up the management system 
in accordance with this concept. The interrelations and difficulties of action, revealed 
unequivocally, bear witness to the effect that the industrial operations of 
non-industrial organizations must be reckoned with by industrial policy, since in order 
to make well-founded decisions the activity of these cannot be left out of view. (Let 
us think either of labour or income policy or questions of profitability.) 
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The differences in the structure and organization of industry are, to a certain 
extent, necessary tendencies of technological and economic development. In our days 
the interactions between economic activities that were earlier separeted, grow stronger, 
the traditional views of delimitations are continuously changing. The prevailing general 
trend is that ever closer contacts are developing among the various economic activities. 
The tensions appearing in the spheres of specialization and cooperation also play 
a part in the intertwining of the economic branches in Hungary. The opportunity to 
the evolution of industrial production in non-industrial organizations has often been 
created by shortages and market gaps experienced in the supply offered by industry. 
On the one hand, owing to the disharmony between demand and supply on the market 
the non-industrial organizations were striving to ensure the industrial products fitting 
vertically into their main function partly by their own efforts. On the other hand, they 
also utilized their capacity either available, or built up for safe performance of their 
tasks, to produce consumption goods foreign to their branches — making use of the 
shortages in the market. Both kinds of orientation, different from one another, need 
varying approach and consideration. 
From the aspect of socialist industry and industrial policy it is not negligible that 
the industrial plants of non-industrial organizations — as a sphere of small-scale plants 
complementary to the production of the large-scale industry — may, in the future, 
fulfil important roles of covering demand in certain Fields of industrial articles. The 
production of these organizations, making up for shortages and broadening the selec-
tion of commodities, as well as competition faced by industry, may be contributions 
to the improvement of supply and quality of the products and to perform smoother 
production either in industry or in other branches of the national economy. 
It is questionable, however, what conditions are, in reality, available in the small-
scale plants for efficient fulfilment of these tasks.lt must firstly be considered that 
the present technical and technological standards in the plants are mostly rather low. 
The lack of development sources makes this trend permanent, hence, usually the 
manufacturing of labour-intensive products, needing little investment and easily 
leamt, is unfolding in these plants. 
The restriction of growth possibilities of the industrial plants and the taxing away 
of their sources of development is unfavourable also from the viewpoint that it 
reduces the flexibility of the production unit, puts a brake on the evolving initiative 
and readiness of enterprising. Thus, exactly those properties are deprived of the 
possibility of development which would promote the attainment of some important 
goals of industrial policy by flexible organizations, constituting a background of 
small-scale plants to industry as a whole. 
Despite the difficulties expounded, the industrial activities evolving in non-
industrial branches have also brought about several favourable results, therefore our 
opinion is that in the current situation of the economy they play a positive role. 
To maintain, what is more, to develop them is justified not only from the views of 
industry but also by considerations regarding economy and society as a whole. We 
think, however, that the industrial activity of the branches outside industry will 
not be able to solve, in the long run, the problems arising from structural dispropor-
tions of socialist industry. 
Appendix 1 
Distribution o f activities among the branches o f the national e c o n o m y on the basis o f gross product ion 
in the years 1970» and 1 9 8 2 b 
(percent) 
Act iv i t ies I n d u s t r y C o n s t r u c t i o n 
Agr i cu l tu re a n d 
f o r e s t r y 
T r a n s p o r t a n d 
c o m m u n i c a t i o n 
T r a d e 
O t h e r ma t e r i a l 
a n d n o n - m a t e r i a l 
ac t iv i t ies 
O r g a n i z a t i o n s 1 9 7 0 1 9 8 2 1 9 7 0 1 9 8 2 1 9 7 0 1 9 8 2 1 9 7 0 1 9 8 2 1 9 7 0 1 9 8 2 1 9 7 0 1 9 8 2 
Socialist organizations 
I n d u s t r y 9 3 . 5 8 9 . 3 4 . 6 4 . 9 0 . 5 0 . 7 1 .8 1 .3 6 . 0 13 .8 2 . 5 1.9 
C o n s t r u c t i o n 0 . 7 0 .1 6 2 . 2 5 6 . 5 0 . 0 _ 0 . 2 0 . 4 0 . 4 1.5 0 . 4 0 . 5 
Agr i cu l tu re a n d f o r e s t r y 2 . 1 5 .8 10 .7 11 .0 6 2 . 8 7 0 . 8 5 .2 4 . 5 2 . 1 5 .9 1.7 1.1 
T r a n s p o r t 
a n d c o m m u n i c a t i o n 0 . 4 0 . 3 4 . 7 2 .5 — — 9 1 . 7 9 0 . 9 0 . 4 0 . 4 0 . 6 0 . 4 
T r a d e 2 .1 1.9 0 . 8 0 . 4 0 . 1 0 . 1 0 . 2 0 . 6 9 0 . 1 7 4 . 3 0 . 4 0 . 5 
O t h e r ma te r i a l a n d n o n -
mate r i a l b r a n c h e s 0 . 2 0 . 3 4 . 8 10 .1 0 . 1 _ 0 . 2 0 . 5 0 . 6 1.1 8 6 . 4 8 6 . 9 
Private sector and 
population 1.0 1 .3 12 .2 14 .6 36 .5 C 2 8 . 4 c 0 . 7 1 .8 0 . 4 3 . 0 8 . 0 8 . 7 
T o t a l : 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 
a) Distribution calculated at current realization prices, without customs duties and differences of value 
b) Distribution calculated at current producer prices 
c) Includes the production of household plots cultivated by the members of cooperative farms 
Sources: Népgazdasági mérlegek, 1970 (Balances of the National Economy, 1970) Központi Statisztikai Hivatal (Central Statistical Office) Budapest 
1971 
Népgazdasági mérlegek, 1982 (Balances of the National Economy, 1982) Központi Statisztikai Hivatal (Central Statistical Office) Budapest 
Appendix 2 
Distribution o f gross product ion o f the branches o f the national e c o n o m y according t o activities in the years 1 9 7 0 a and 1 9 8 2 ^ 
(percent) 
Act iv i t i es 
Organ i za t i ons 
Y e a r I n d u s t r y C o n s t r u c t i o n 
Agr i cu l t u r e 
a n d 
f o r e s t r y 
T r a n s p o r t 
a n d 
c o m m u n i c a -
t i on 
T r a d e 
O t h e r 
m a t e r i a l a n d 
n o n -
m a t e r i a l 
T o t a l 
Socialist organizations 
I n d u s t r y 1 9 7 0 9 7 . 3 0 . 9 0 . 1 0 . 2 1.0 0 .5 1 0 0 . 0 
1 9 8 2 9 6 . 7 0 .9 0 . 2 1.1 1.7 0 . 4 1 0 0 . 0 
C o n s t r u c t i o n 1 9 7 0 5 . 6 9 3 . 2 — 0 . 1 0 . 5 0 . 6 1 0 0 . 0 
1 9 8 2 10 .8 8 6 . 3 - 0 . 3 1 .6 1 .0 1 0 0 . 0 
Agr i cu l tu re a n d 1 9 7 0 9 . 0 9 . 0 7 7 . 1 2 . 1 1 .4 1.4 1 0 0 . 0 
f o r e s t r y 1 9 8 2 2 2 . 1 6 .8 6 5 . 9 1 .8 2 .5 0 . 9 1 0 0 . 0 
T r a n s p o r t 1 9 7 0 3 .7 9 . 2 — 8 5 . 1 0 .7 1 .3 1 0 0 . 0 
a n d c o m m u n i c a t i o n 1 9 8 2 2 .7 4 . 1 
-
9 1 . 9 0 . 4 0 . 9 1 0 0 . 0 
T r a d e 1 9 7 0 12.8 0 . 9 0 . 2 0 . 2 8 5 . 4 0 .5 1 0 0 . 0 
1 9 8 2 17 .9 0 . 7 0 . 2 0 . 6 7 9 . 7 0 . 9 1 0 0 . 0 
O t h e r ma te r i a l a n d n o n - 1 9 7 0 1 .3 5 . 1 0 . 3 0 . 1 0 . 5 9 2 . 7 1 0 0 . 0 
ma te r i a l b r a n c h e s 1 9 8 2 1.5 7 .9 0 . 1 0 . 2 0 . 6 8 9 . 7 1 0 0 . 0 
Private sector and 1 9 7 0 6 .8 1 5 . 3 6 6 . 9 с 0 . 4 0 . 4 10 .2 1 0 0 . 0 
population 1 9 8 2 10 .0 18 .2 5 3 . 6 е 1.4 2 . 6 14 .2 1 0 0 . 0 
a) Distribution calculated at current realization prices, without customs duties and differences of value 
b) Distribution calculated at current producer prices 
c) Includes the production of household plots cultivated by the members of cooperative farms 
Sources: Népgazdasági mérlegek, 1970 (Balances of the National Economy, 1970) Központi Statisztikai Hivatal, Budapest 1971 
Népgazdasági mérlegek, 1982 (Balances of the National Economy, 1982) Központi Statisztikai Hivatal, Budapest 1984 
CLOSING DOWN PLANTS IN THE HUNGARIAN INDUSTRY 
ERZSÉBET VISZT 
The fact that a number of enterprises working with low efficiency draw away 
resources from spheres where their operation would bring about higher results and 
benefits affects the development of economic efficiency unfavourably. In past years 
state subsidies were granted to a wide range of such enterprises with reference to their 
activity being irreplaceable and to the problems that could not be solved in the case of 
closing them down. Series of individual interventions secured their further operation. 
Liquidation of firms without successor so far did not occur, save for one or two 
exceptions and reorganization also only in a few instances. It is expected, however, 
that the number of such events will increase in the future because, owing to their 
limited resources, the central control agencies are forced to reduce the subsidies 
granted to enterprises working with inadequate efficiency. 
Tensions caused by retrogression can largely be averted by getting familiar with the 
experiences gained through setbacks. In the lack of closings on enterprise level, the 
opportunity ro recognize such experiences attached to the closing of organization 
units (plants, shops) within the enterprise is available which occur more often result-
ing from technological obsolescence or changes in the structure of demand. 
The survey of reductions within the enterprise is justified by the very reason that 
the need for closing uneconomical enterprise departments will likely increase in the 
future. This is in conformity with the efforts of economic control and management 
aimed at urging the enterprises to strengthen efficiency instead of increasing their out-
put. The economic regulators that come into force at the beginning of 1985 were 
modified in order to suit this purpose. 
Solutions tending to close (sell, or lease) the non-profitable sections of the enter-
prise are expectable and desirable especially with the so-called low-profitability 
companies.1 
The purpose of the empirical survey summarized in the following was to charac-
terize the closed industrial plants and to give an account on the actual questions 
connected with retrogression which engross the attention of the enterprises and 
economic control organs of Hungary. 
'The indicator of low profitability is a complex and uniform index on the basis of which a rank 
order of the enterprises can be drawn up. Its formula is as follows: 
accounting profits 
net value of fixed assets * labour costs 
The sphere of the low-profitability enterprises has been regularly determined by the Ministry of 
Finance every year since 1979. 
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The main results of the research shall be grouped around three sets of questions, 
i.e.: 
1. The character of the industrial plant abolished 
2. The causes and factors which evoked the closing 
3. The conditions promoting and impeding the reduction of the plants. 
1. The Character of the Closed Industrial Plants 
Industrial plants are smallest units observed by statistics and presumably the 
development of their number also gives some information about the fields of industry 
where reductions in this respect took place. At the same time we have to be cautious 
because the observation of the entire sphere of industry is impaired by the branches 
outside industry, for the data supplied by them on their industrial activities are 
usually given irregularly and they are not comparable to those of industry. We tried to 
account for this distorting circumstance. On the basis of analysing the statistics from 
this point of view we found that the increasing weight of the industrial activities 
pursued by the national economic branches outside industry has not been expressed 
in growing numbers of industrial plants. (The growth experienced in the industrial 
activities of the non-industrial branches revealed itself not in the number of plants 
but in strengthening the particular plants and in the increasing concentration of them 
and so it did not counterbalance the declining number of the industrial plants.2 
In the sectors where smaller organizations are predominant (industries under the 
management of /local/ councils and cooperative industry) decrease was stronger — the 
plant numbers decreased annually by almost a hundred — while in the state industry 
including mostly larger enterprises no decrease could be experienced. Reviewing the 
sub-branches of industry this appeared in such a way that the number of plants grew 
less, primarily in the branches consisting of several small enterprises (see Table 1). This 
resulted in the conclusion that the larger enterprises are less sensitive to the fact that 
among their plants, too, there are some units which work less efficiently.3 
In order to identify the closed industrial plants in more detail and to survey the 
causes leading to the fact of closing we conducted a survey and an assessment by 
questionnaires. The basis of the survey was the list of plants closed in 1981—1982, 
made available for our purpose by the Central Statistical Office, related to state 
industry. It included 208 plants for two years, 2.3 percent of the total. 
One of the branches most affected was food industry, 40.8 percent of the closed 
plants belonged to this sector. Similar was the ratio of closed plants in the building 
2 
"Regarding industrial activities of the non-industrial branches see K. Penyigey: Iparunk tevékeny-
ségi és szervezeti struktúrája (The Structure of Activities and Organization in our Industry). 
Ipargazdasági Szemle, 1984. 1 - 2 . 
3It is noteworthy that the Hungarian enterprises are usually not too sensitive to the development 
of costs and this is why they break down the economic results only rarely to plants. See: J. 
Sternthal: A gépipari vállalatok költségérzékenysége (Cost Sensitivity of the Engineering Enter-
prises). Research Institute of Industrial Economics. Manuscript in Hungarian. 
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materials industry, especially in the manufacture of brick and tiles (see Table 1). It 
is worth mentioning that closing of plants occurred to a significant extent in enter-
prises having a great number of plants. 
Table 1 
Industrial plants, total and closed 





of closed plants 
percent (2:1) percent 
1. 2. 3. 4. 
Engineering 2065 32 21.1 1.5 
Building materials 
industry 334 12 7.8 3.6 
Paper and printing 
industry 153 3 2.0 2.0 
Textile industry 289 3 2.0 1.0 
Leather industry 668 2 1.3 0.3 
Garment industry 1020 20 3.2 2.0 
Handicraft industry 759 14 9.2 1.8 
Food industry 1738 62 40.8 3.6 
Total 7022 152 100.0 2.2 
Correlation between the technological equipment and the closing of the plants can 
also be found: in the highly equipped industries of electric power, metallurgy, the 
chemical and the paper industry, no closing occurred. In the branches affected by 
closing, the per capita value of the gross fixed assets was — with two exceptions — 
lower than the average in industry. Within the food industry as well, the most labour-
intensive sectors (bakeries, distilleries, mineral water and soda-water works) were set 
back and in the sectors technologically equipped to a higher standard — e.g. meat 
processing, vegetable oil or sugar industry — such changes did not emerge in the analys-
ed years of 1981-1982. 
The workforce of the closed plants was less than 10 persons in 43 percent of them 
and not more than 20 in 57 percent, thus, mostly substantially smaller plants than the 
average size characteristics of the given sector were closed (Table 2), where also the 
value of the fixed assets was lower, often even negligible, as compared to the average 
plant data of the affected enterprise. 
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Table 2 
Average numbers of labour force of the industrial plants by branches 
of industry in 1982 (persons) 
Average number of those employed in the 
industrial plants 
in the industrial 
branch 
in the closed 
plants 
Engineering industry 348 38 
Building materials industry 256 59 
Printing industry 181 44 
Textile industry 469 24 
Leather industry 443 28 
Garment industry 177 8 
Handicraft industry 89 43 
Food industry 104 26 
2. The Causes of Closing the Plants 
We were primarily aimed at detecting the real causes for closing the plants and to 
become acquainted with them we carried out investigations in the companies affected 
by using questionnaires. Fifty-one provincial enterprises filled in the questionnaires 
concerning seventy plants and twenty enterprises of Budapest were interviewed by 
telephone. (The proportion of the returned questionnaires was almost 90 percent.) 
Going beyond the factual cases we tried to picture the standpoints of some func-
tional and branch ministries regarding plant closings, especially the factors economic 
management is willing to strengthen in influencing the reductions. 
In our survey we investigated the influence of three groups of factors playing 
important roles: 
a) the maintenance of buildings, machines and equipment (due to technological 
obsolescence, danger of accidents, or death) became problematic; 
b) no good conditions of economical operation could be provided 
- because of low utilization of capacity, difficulties in marketing, shortage in 
certain factors of production, — labour, material, machine capacity, etc. 
- emergence of costs unfavourably influencing the profitability of the enter-
prise ; 
c) objections from the aspect of regional and local development: 
- some requirements of urban development and of the regional structure of 
industry 
- objections linked to environment protection. 
Closing of the industrial plants is often explained by more than one factor. In the 
questionnaires we divided the groups of factors into 10 further categories and allowed 
the enterprises to mark more of them. 
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The factors which promoted closing acted in the particular sectors in the following 
ways: In engineering half of the cases were attributed to obsolescence and 25 percent 
to urban development; in the light industries shortage of labour played a much more 
important part, — in about one third of the cases it was the exclusive reason. In the 
food industry obsoleteness, outdated technology and capacity shortage were the main 
reasons. In the building materials industry the exhaustion of the sources of raw 
materials were additional causes. Environment protection as a single — and thus, 
coercive — cause did not occur. 
a) Decreasing Physical Serviceability 
In the investigated cases obsolescence played the main part. Almost 50 percent of the 
enterprises marked it as the main reason for closing. In some cases it was a secondary 
cause linked to urban development and, as a matter of fact, all those referring to un-
economical production as the most important reason stressed obsolescence, too. The 
average age of the buildings in the closed plants was more than 50 years in about 60 
percent of the cases and in 40 percent it was between 20—5 years. 
(We must note that in the USA after having investigated 1000 cases of closed plants 
it turned out that their average age was much lower, 19 years and in most of them it 
was 15 years.)4 
In several cases the closing of the plants came to pass only because of physical 
destruction (explosion, tumbling down of buildings) and in some cases the plants had 
to be closed down in the wake of the supervision of accident protection regulations. 
However, the obsolete plants were mostly liquidated only when the production of 
them became replacable by the creation of new, larger, up-to-date capacities. For 
instance, the possibility to close a larger mass of old bakeries and flour mills came 
about only as the result of development projects of such types. 
Though the most significant part in the closing of plants was played by physical 
obsolescence, to stimulate the closing of obsolete plants would be advantageous in 
order to accelerate the pace of economic development. Even the branch ministries 
acknowledge that it would be reasonable to close the obsolete factories which were, 
to the major part, built at the turn of the century, since despite the minimum charges 
on assets, the costs of production are unbearably high in them (owing to the unfavour-
able utilization of materials, low personal performance, low efficiency of the machines 
and to the high overhead). No development fund is generated and the development 
activity is unable to attain more than the conservation of the old circumstances; new 
investments could also be implemented with only a very low efficiency. Often also on 
behalf of industrial leaders a kind of resignation can be experienced, since the 
manufactured product is usually indispensable, because of domestic supply, foreign 
trade interests, or cooperation contacts (to cut down the manufacture of the products 
would make the capacity of the companies supplying the semifinished goods and 
processing the wastes unnecessary). 
4 Schmenner, R. W.: Every Factory Has a Life Cycle. Harvard Business Review, 1983. 2. 
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In our opinion to refer to the difficult situation gives no adequate basis for reconcil-
ing ourselves to the continued operation of such plants which the enterprises are 
unable to modernize. In those sectors which work with high state subsidies the central 
decisions regarding reduction should be considered determinant. Individual analyses 
must determine every time whether to renew certain sectors of production by reloca-
tion, to reconstruct the parts built a long time earlier in the obsolete companies, or 
complete liquidation is the most expedient. 
b) The Problems of Profitability 
The problems of profitability, deriving partly from the low degree of utilizing the 
capacity, partly immediately from the increase of certain cost factors, caused the 
closing of only about one third of the plants. And instances can hardly be found when 
low efficiency of production, influencing profitability, was the main motive. 
Low utilization of the capacities may be brought into connection, on the one hand, 
with the shortage of labour and/or materials and, on the other, with the decrease or 
changing structure of the demand. For example, the market of printed textiles had 
narrowed by changing fashion, causing excess capacity in this industrial sector and 
forcing the management of one of the enterprises to close several plants and sell the 
buildings. In addition to this, in the garment and textile industry the shortage of 
physical operators has always played a significant - in some cases decisive — role. 
In the manufacturing of bricks the closing of factories has been a normal attribute 
of development, depending first of all on the exhaustion of the material resources; the 
life cycle of the factories was planned by taking this into account. In the past ten 
years altogether 60 brick factories were gradually closed. The problems of capacity 
utilization caused by shortage of labour and decreasing productivity due to the 
quality of labour rendered it possible to keep up only a standard of production which 
created shortages in some categories of the products. Hence, the highest economic 
management tries to hinder the closing of factories which are ripe to be closed. 
In several cases the closing of plants, owing to short labour and the state of the 
technology, was effected only when a reconstruction program of the sector in ques-
tion had been accomplished and novel — labour saving — capacities started production. 
(Several such cases were met in the food and in the garment industry.) 
In the course of the survey we experienced a setback in the chemical industry 
which was due to the rising price of natural gas. The issue excited large interest, for 
the leaders of the industrial branch did not approve of raising the price level of natural 
gas. They referred to the fact that all over the world its price is lower than that of 
fuel gas and it will question the compatitiveness of the chemical industry relying on 
the basis provided by domestic gas sources in an even wider sphere of markets. 
Sensitivity to transportation costs can mainly be found in the sectors of the food 
industry — as the result of the requirements of delivering great masses of products. 
In this connection the number of food pre-processing plants was reduced and located 
to the fields of cultivation, transferring the activity in question to the large-scale agri-
cultural plants (farms) (e.g. in the canning and tobacco industry). 
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The high transport costs at enterprise level arise from the territorially deconcentrat-
ed plant structure. In the food industry , for instance, the major part of food industrial 
activities are carried out in about 1700 plants which are classified industrial, and in 
some further 7500 plants within the framework of agriculture.5 Beside the claim to 
rationalize transports, the creation of the conditions for optimum size of the plants 
should also be promoted, in plants of ten-person staff, owing to the absence of 
economies of scale, the efficiency of production cannot be high. 
The branch ministries devote great importance to the requirement of decreasing 
territorial scattering, partly in order to reduce transport costs, and partly for the sake 
of better coordination of the activities of the plants. One of the ideas regarding the 
method to solve the problems is to draw up maps for the geographic perspicuity of the 
plants. This might be a basis for building up cooperation contacts between plants in 
the vicinity of each other even if they do not belong to the same enterprise. 
c) The Views of Settlement and Regional Development 
On the level of industry distinction should be made between the relocation of 
industry and the closing of industrial plants. Yet, relocation of industry has to be in-
volved in our subject matter, since in the given region it may cause troubles similar 
to those of final closing — although relocation and simultaneously the new location 
do not cause any loss in production. 
According to our survey urban development and resettlement aspects, in the course 
of which the authorities wanted to provide areas for living quarters, public buildings, 
roads, bridges, parks, and so on, appeared in three quarters of the cases when plants 
were closed. Prior to the investigated years of 1981—1982 in Budapest industry this 
factor played a more significant part since government decrees were aimed at decreas-
ing the weight of industry and to develop some less industrialized provincial regions. 
The ideas at the same time served for mitigating labour shortage in the capital and to 
utilize the redundant labour force in the country. 
From the analyses following the related resolutions of 1966 and 1975 it could be 
seen that both the enterprises affected as well as the branch ministries were striving 
to protract the implementation of the task and to fulfil it only formally. The enter-
prises' interest in relocation in several instances could not be raised so that bargaining 
for the necessary central support sometimes took several years. The executives of the 
ministries appreciated the tasks of marking out the plants to be relocated subsequently 
as rather thankless. The enterprises on the other side objected that decisions were 
often taken without consultation and their interests were not sufficiently considered. 
Recently several analyses have been made about the development of Budapest and 
propositions put forward for the future connected to the elaboration of the long-
term concepts. Even on behalf of industry it is considered important to return to this 
5AZ iparon kívüli népgazdasági ágak ipari tevékenysége (Industrial Activities of the National 
Economic Branches outside Industry). Központi Statisztikai Hivatal (Central Statistical Office), 
May 1982. 
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task. A true dialogue, however, between industrial management and those responsible 
for regional development has not taken place yet. The leaders of regional development 
can determine exactly why continued relocation would be desirable from the view of 
Budapest — or any other industrial town. The wish to find the relative optimum 
considering both the interests of urban development and of — the increasingly im-
portant — environmental protection as well as those of industrial production is 
reflected in their recommendations. The method of solution, however, had not taken 
shape so far. 
* 
One can also arrange the groups of plant closing according to the degree they were 
effected by the initiative of the enterprise or motivation from outside. It has been 
borne out by our survey that external motivations were almost merely those linked to 
the development of settlements. The enterprise decisions were mostly called forth by 
situations of constraint — obsolescence, physical destruction or danger of accidents 
caused by these — or some shortage of productive factors acted coercively. It is rarely 
experienced that the enterprises attempt to increase their economic results (profit-
ability) in this way, since they have been able to attain it by even less „painful" 
ways, e.g. by raising their prices or acquiring state subsidies. According to the basic 
principles of the changes in the economic regulators to come into force on January 1, 
1985, this situation should radically be changed. In line with these endeavours of 
economic control, liquidation of some enterprises — eliciting great press reaction — 
and cuts within enterprises (divestments) were also carried out in Hungarian industry. 
3 .Some Conditions of Reduction 
The processes of reduction could be strengthened as the common result of several 
jointly working conditions which would call for flexible changes in the economic 
structure of the country. The fundamental condition is to create interest of the 
enterprises in economic reduction, in other words to employ economic regulators 
which place increasing efficiency into the focus instead of the so far emphasized basic 
interest, i.e., the coercion to grow .As the new economic regulation to be introduced 
on January 1,1985 — which will be asserted by more strict income regulation — is ex-
pected to mean a coercion to make reductions, it seem to be reasonable to extend 
future research in a greater measure to the investigation of the effects of economic 
regulation. It is first of all expectable that (according to previous calculations) the 
sphere of the enterprises struggling with financial difficulties will increase. It is also 
expected that the situation of some of these will not turn to the better either by 
internal reorganization, by changing the line of products or by state support and so 
— since the reserves which can be mobilized will also become more and more ex-
hausted - their partial or total closing will become necessary. The reductions will 
very likely be also prompted by the intention of central control to drive the insolvent 
enterprises to an automatic path, less dependent on state administration. 
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Among the numerous limits to reductions the convertibility of the fixed assets also 
plays a delimiting part as the result of which the reductions may bring about losses to 
various extent. 
Here we should like to stress two of the conditions of reductions which are 
currently impediments of setbacks within the enterprise and consequently may be the 
same on enterprise level, too. These are the turnover in selling the industrial buildings 
and the used machines and the re-utilization of the work force. 
a) The Turnover in Selling the Industrial Buildingsand Second-Hand Equipment 
While statistics annually report the entry of about 300—400 new industrial buildings 
into the Hungarian economy, the losses (destruction, sorting out) are not registered. 
Our survey showed a similar situation, closing the plants had only rarely been followed 
by scrapping and we hardly found any initiative measures for the re-utilization of the 
buildings out of use. The demand for such measures was first of all raised by the 
executives responsible for the management of territory in Budapest who attributed 
the disorderly state of these intensively industrialized areas, among other things, to 
the falling of such activities into the background. The leaders of industry argue by say-
ing that the old buildings out of use charge their cost accounts only to a minimum, 
while capacity or financial resources to pull them down or maintain their condition 
are not available. Within the decisions made on investments the costs of liquidation or 
demolishing are not at all reckoned with. 
The argument is only partially acceptable according to which, owing to their bad 
state of repair and limited possibilities of utilization, these landed properties render 
no economic advantage to the enterprises wishing to expand. A few good examples 
were found in the course of our survey. We have met cases when the place of 
industrial activity was taken over by commercial enterprises willing to extend their 
areas for the purpose of marketing and storing. 
In our opinion an assessment of unused industrial properties and the infrastructural 
projects linked to them would enliven the turnover of these fixed assets. Of course, it 
would be necessary to support starting of this flow of assets by adequate registration 
and an expedient institution ought to be found for doing this work. 
The fate of the equipment becoming redundant is to the major part similar to that 
of the buildings. Our research shows that the machines that become unnecessary in 
the closed plant are relocated to other plants of the enterprise. Not more than 25 per-
cent of these machines were sold and the share of those scrapped was negligible. This is 
conspicuous even because among the reasons that led to closing the plant obsolete 
equipment was playing a significant part. This kind of passive behaviour of the enter-
prises can be explained — in addition to low cost sensitivity — by inadequate function-
ing of the channels for selling second hand equipment. 
The enterprises trading in the means of production which ought to fulfil this task 
operate insufficiently. Their interests are negatively influenced by the limited possi-
bilities of storage, the shortage of financial sources to cover the costs of stockpiling 
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and the financial interests of senior management stimulated to reduce the volume of 
stocks annually ,6 
The enterprises under the supervision of trusts (holding companies) feel the 
increasing activities of the firms engaged in selling the unuseful machinery even less 
important. But as a result of the loosening framework of the trusts and continuing 
growth of enterprise autonomy it may be expected that this sphere of the enterprises 
will also require increasingly the activities of intermediate trade. 
b) Re-Utilization of Released Manpower 
The reduction of the plants — according to the experience of our research — caused 
no serious problems of manpower. This is, first of all, due to the fact that the majority 
of plants employing only little staff were affected and redirection of labour could be 
carried out within the enterprise. The cases when larger numbers were involved 
occurred in Budapest where — according to the informations given by the enter-
prises — finding employment for the workers caused no trouble. On the contrary, 
upon the rumour of closing the plant fluctuation increased. In several cases, however, 
it turned out that the redundant workforce remained engaged by the enterprise 
further on. This was characteristic in the cases of reductions which were initiated by 
the controlling organs or the local councils and the opportunity to "conceal" tlje 
manpower was considered an allowance to the company. 
Owing to the undeveloped practice in reduction, certain forms of employing the 
released labour efficiently or ways of drawing them out of work which are practically 
widespread in the advanced capitalist countries are less familiar to Hungarian industry. 
For instance we did not find cases of early pensioning or part-time work. Thus, hiding 
the workforce must be considered a provisional solution until the formation of more 
advanced methods of labour management and, since it is a more favourable alternative 
than to continue operation of the low-efficiency enterprise units, it would not be 
correct to condemn in unequivocally. 
The government supports the activity of the enterprises to train adults for new 
trades by the ways of financial subsidies advising and organizing training courses. The 
emerging demands indicate that re-education within the enterprise is more preferred 
than the subsidies for retraining and preparing people for regrouping them between 
the enterprises. Only a few claims laid for the latter, linked to centrally initiated enter-
prise reorganizations.7 This fact underlines that the enterprises strive to substitute 
their jobs becoming redundant even by changing the range of products and to keep 
their workforce in that way. 
We hope that in the future regrouping the labour force between enterprises will 
take place in increasing numbers. Partial or total liquidation of the enterprises unable 
^These problems are summarized in the study of J. Bodrogi: Miért nincs, ha van (Why are 
Existing Things Non-Existent?). Figyelő, March 29, 1984. 
7 , 
See A. Soós: Uj lehetőségek (New Opportunities). Figyelő, August 23, 1984. 
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to change their situation forecasts a rapidly increasing demand fore re-education that 
also enforces the widening of retraining opportunities, first of all in those fields of 
industry where ample changes of organization are to take place and the choice of 
available jobs is narrow. 
As shown by our survey it is often the lack of experience of the leading and directing 
staff that has led to the closing down of industrial plants. We have met such problems 
both in the cases of factories handed over to large-scale agricultural units (farms) and 
in those of enterprises wanting to replace the lost production of the closed old plants 
in new ones situated in other regions of the country where there were no traditions of 
the production concerned. This calls attention to the fact that changing the produc-
tion structure or technological modernization without providing leaders with the 
necessary skill and experience does not result in higher efficiency and that such 
experiences do not encourage the changes otherwise absolutely necessary. 
* 
We think that the problems linked to the closing of industrial plants may be in-
teresting not only for the enterprises being in critical financial position but for all 
those who wish to increase the profitability of the enterprise by closing the in-
adequately efficient, outdated plants impairing regional development or not fitting 
into the line of their production. This is why it is hoped that a changing of views will 
take place in the sphere of central and enterprise management which will consider 
"closing" not the final stage of a disease but a natural phenomenon of dynamic 
development. 
Improving the conditions for other forms of plant closing and reduction might 
definitely contribute to such changes of views. 

AUTONOMY OF MEDIUM-TERM ENTERPRISE PLANNING 
AND ITS RELATIONS ГО NATIONAL ECONOMIC PLANNING 
GÁBOR PAPANEK 
In 1981—1983 the Research Institute of Industrial Economics of the Hungarian 
Academy of Sciences surveyed the situation of medium-term (five-year) enterprise 
planning and the possibilities of its further development in collaboration with the 
Institute of Economic Planning of the National Planning Office. The aim of this 
paper is to present some of the most important results of the research and to give 
a picture about the relationships between central economic control and the planning 
of the independent enterprises as it developed in Hungarian industry. 
The Subject Matter and the Methods of our Survey 
As it is known, the possibility of autonomous management was granted to the Hun-
garian industrial enterprises by modifying the system of economic control and 
management in 1968. 
The 1968 modifications were aimed at changing the practice of central economic 
control that had been developed since 1946-1947. In that system which was 
traditional in the centrally planned countries the enterprise plans were defined by 
"breaking down" the national economic plans. Thus, in the course of planning the 
central organs decided on the activities of the enterprises, what is more, "of the 
plants, workshops, every single working bench and worker" forecast for the plan 
period,1 on the resources to be utilized, production, deliveries of goods among the 
producers, the prices to be applied in accounting, the directions of developing the en-
terprises, and so on. The system of incentives (wages, salaries and premiums) mobilized 
the workers and their collectives to fulfil the plans. This strong centralization made it 
then possible to concentrate the available resources to the development, i.e., rapid 
industrialization of the Hungarian economy. However, unforeseen disturbances in the 
operation of the system, impeding the fulfilment of the set targets, occured fre-
quently ; these were first of all shortages and, ever more often troubles caused by the 
low efficiency of production. At the outset economic and political leadership 
attributed these problems to insufficient experience and practice of the planners or, 
respectively, to the effects of power working against the social system and thought 
* Breakdown of the plans in the given details was ordained by the laws of 1949 and 1951 on the 
five-year plan for the period 1 9 5 0 - 1 9 5 4 . 
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that these "infantile disorders" can soon be overcome.2 Pragmatic analyses starting 
later, however, marked the over-centralization of the economy and the consequent 
limits of interest and flexibility as the main reasons of the emerging problems.3 There-
fore the resolutions which prepared the 1968 modification of the economic system set 
the target to decentralize the spheres of authority powerfully, to make decisions in the 
field of managament, i.e., implementing the national economic plans, — while, at the 
same time, maintaining the advantages of central planning by determining the main 
trends of development of the national economy.4 
The provisions of law promulgated in 1968 and the following years introduced a 
series of many-sided measures.5 Numerical breakdown of the national economic plan 
to enterprises had ceased and the majority of decisions concerning production were 
delegated to the competence of the enterprises. In the hope of diminishing earlier 
shortages the coordination of product deliveries in the majority of cases became 
subject to delivery contracts between the enterprises selling and buying (allowing 
also the use of free prices to a greater extent). In order to improve the efficiency of 
management, the working communities were motivated to increase the profitability 
of production. And for the purpose of realizing the central targets set in the current 
national economic plan, a great arsenal of tools for the indirect control, regulation 
and motivation of the economy (an appropriate system of taxes, subsidies, credits, 
etc.) has been developed. 
Our aim in the framework of our common research was to survey the role of enter-
prise planning amidst the new circumstances. We started from the fact that from 1968 
on, owing to the modification of the economic control system, central planning rarely 
marked out tasks to be realized by enterprises or enterprise groups. At the same time 
the enterprises, either by themselves or on central initiation, prepared the plans more 
and more frequently outlining their future position and activities. In the course of 
developing the new practice close ties have been created between enterprise and 
national economic planning: the planners of both above-mentioned planning spheres 
were enabled to get acquainted with the forecasts, plans and decisions mutually. 
It became furthermore clear that — by resorting to the arsenal of tools available to 
them — the central organs of economic control can strongly encourage the enter-
prises to develop plans and economic management appropriate for attaining the central 
targets. But we also gathered more information on the problems of the new system. 
Some examples of enterprises became known where the planners were, even recently, 
not looking for the possibilities of improving efficiency. In other cases it could be 
seen that though the forecasts drawn up in the planning documents were adjusted to 
2 
See e.g. the speech of Zoltán Vas addressed to Parliament recommending the modification of the 
laws on the first five-year plan. Published in: Ötéves tervünk: béketerv (Our Five-Year Plan: a 
Plan of Peace). Szikra, Budapest 1951. Quotation from page 9. 
3 
Kornai J.: Overcentralization in Economic Administration. Oxford University Press, London 
1959. 4 
Resolution of the HSWP CC on the Reform of the Economic Mechanism. May 27, 1966. 
5 In more detail in English see e.g.. Friss, I. (cA.) . Reform of the Economic Mechanism in Hungary. 
Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest 1969. 
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the directives of the central plans, the efforts in practical enterprise management were 
aimed at implementing other targets. As questions discussed in economic literature and 
in practical life, we wished to study 
(1) how far the enterprise plan does or can orient or regulate autonomous enter-
prise management under the described circumstances (especially, to what degree the 3, 
or 5-year plan does or can formulate the strategy of the enterprise) and 
(2) what role the enterprise plans do or could play in the implementation of the 
national economic plans. 
In order to find answers to these questions,6 we surveyed 50 enterprises. Our 
' sample" consisted of 11 enterprises producing basic materials and energy, 18 en-
gineering, 9 chemical and 12 foods processing and light industrial enterprises. From 
among them 12 were smaller firms (employing less than 1500 persons), 17 large 
ones (employing more than 5000 persons), and 21 medium-size. As it can be seen 
from this list, our sample is not representative in every respect, the share of large 
enterprises is greater than on the average in Hungarian industry. In the course of the 
research project, from the enterprises — i.e. the planning experts working with them — 
data in written form, based on uniform and detailed questionnaires, brief textual 
analyses, opinions were twice collected and information was also gathered on the 
spot. Before finally formulating them, the findings and conclusions of the research 
were submitted to national scientific forums for discussion. Following this, our most 
important recommendations were forwarded to the economic control organs dealing 
with the development of national economic planning, who then built them into the 
decrees being prepared for the purpose of updating the economic control system. 
Enterprise Plans in the Orientation of Enterprise Acitivites 
The present system of planning is regulated by Act VII of 1972. According to its 
provisions, the state defines the main targets, the extent and the proportions of 
economic development, the main socio-economic aims and the tools of implementa-
tion, in the framework of the national economic plan. Parallel to this, every economic 
unit (state enterprise or cooperative) and council (local control organization) is also 
obliged to elaborate 3 to 5-year plans.7 
The main task of enterprise planning, also prescribed by the Act on planning, is 
— in accordance with recent standpoints of authors in the special literature and of the 
leaders of Hungarian economic control — orientation and regulation of economic 
management, the preparation and making of the principal decisions as well as marking 
6On behalf of the Research Institute of Industrial Economics of the Hungarian Academy of 
Sciences Katalin Demeter, Éva Nádor, Péter Sárkány and the author, on behalf of the Institute 
of Planned Economy of the National Planning Office Péter Ákos Bod, Katalin Faragó and 
Mrs. József Huszár took part in the research. A volume giving a detailed picture of the research 
is going to appear in Hungarian. Papanek, G. (ed.): ,4 középtávú tervezés iparvállalatainknál 
(Medium-Term Planning in the Industrial Enterprises of Hungary). Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest. 
7 Act VII of 1972 on National Economic Planning. Magyar Közlöny, 1972. No. 104. 
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out the ways of implementing them. For instance, the following quotation from the 
instructions on planning of the President of the National Planning Office is rather 
characteristic: "The medium-term economic plan defines the main directions and 
targets of enterprise economic activities and the tools necessary for their implementa-
tion".8 
According to our experience, the tasks of economic planning described in the 
quotation are implemented in the effective current practice of the Hungarian enter-
prises only partly. 
We received information on the fulfilment of the above tasks. The same standpoint 
could also be supported by the analysis of the capacities created for carrying out the 
tasks of planning. Namely, already in the 1950's, in the course of developing the 
planning system, relatively significant enterprise planning sections had been set up in 
Hungarian economy and industry. Though after 1968, in line with the modification 
of the tasks, the size of these departments has been decreased, according to informa-
tions gained in our research, most planning organizations within the enterprises consist 
of 5-9 persons even today. The importance of planning is shown by the fact that, 
contrary to the earlier unfavourable situation, today about half of the staff possesses 
university degrees. In addition, with a number of enterprises, the creative contribu-
tion of the working community is also requested and utilized in the preparation of 
the plans. The participation of senior management of the enterprise in planning is also 
widespread (and, parallel to the increasing autonomy since 1968, growing) almost 
everywhere. 
Furthermore, it has been borne out by our survey that enterprise planning, with 
participation of the described staff, made really strenuous efforts to fulfil its task. 
In the case of the most enterprises e.g. the experts involved in the survey found that 
the technical staff provides a more or less wide choice of alternatives for medium-term 
planning, while the planning department performs the computations for detecting the 
details and correlations, and senior management makes the decisions in questions 
where it is needed. All this is shown in Table 1. 
On several occasions during our survey we became convinced about the important 
role of the approved plans in guiding economic management. Our information are cha-
racterized in detail by Table 2. It is likely, though, that the ratio shown by the Table 
of the enterprises (experts) who attribute an orienting but numerically non-obligatory 
character to the medium-term plan targets is somewhat higher than in reality, since 
those questioned were aware of the fact that this view is conform with the official 
opinion. Still, the table undoubtedly shows that the majority of the enterprises utilize 
— the "smaller" ones even more than the "large" ones — the orientation of their own 
plans in economic management. 
The real importance of the enterprise plans is indicated, however, by the fact that 
the surveyed enterprises strive to harmonize their plans to a great extent with supply-
ing enterprises. According to the following data these endeavours are especially strong 
in the short run. 
о 
Guidelines Issued to the Decree of the Chairman of the National Planning Office. Tervgazdasági 
Értesítő, 1980. 1. Quoted from pp. 26 and 39. 
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Table 1 
The participants in medium-term planning and their tasks 
Participants 
Ratio of enterprises giving tasks to the participants 













Technical staff engaged 
in production 32 48 18 18 
Technical staff engaged 
in development 70 60 34 — 
Economic and financial 
experts 32 70 50 6 
Commercial experts 30 50 36 10 
Senior managers of 
the enterprise 40 20 82 2 
Social bodies 10 26 38 20 
Planning apparatus 34 80 30 6 
Table 2 
The role of the medium-term plan targets 
Roles 
Ratio of the 
small medium-size large 
enterprises asserting the described 
role in percent3 
Obligatory indicators 25 19 18 
Minimum forecasts 17 24 6 
Indicators of main lines of enter-
prise management, non-obligatory 
figures 75 67 71 
Data for general 





'Some of the enterprises assert more than one role, therefore the ratios of most indicators add 
up to more than 100. 
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Table 3 
Reconciliation of material purchase plans with the potential suppliers 
Reconciled ratio of the demand 
(in percent)2 
Ratio of enterprises which reconciled 
the given share of planned material purchase 
in 1981 for the year 
1981 1983 1985 
in percent 
0 12 18 
1 - 2 0 — 16 16 
21 —40 — 8 10 
4 1 - 6 0 2 8 8 
6 1 - 8 0 12 18 18 
81-100 86 38 30 
al 
'as compared to the total demand 
A few further findings indicate also clearly — on the other hand — the still existing 
limits of the role of enterprise planning. 
We have e.g. analysed and not rarely found the perspectives and the sphere of 
motions of the possible plan alternatives of the enterprises restricted. We also wished 
to investigate in our work, how far some "external" circumstances, the given endow-
ments of the companies, or even enterprise decisions made sometimes necessarily, 
other times unjustifiedly, prior to planning, exercise decisive effect on the enterprise 
plans. Of course, we could not reveal every restricting factor. Hence, we took into 
account that the enterprises, for the most part, considered the market problems and 
the difficulties linked to acquire the resources of production (with emphasis on in-
vestment funds) as the most significant problems of the plan period, therefore 
concentrated on these subjects. By doing so we have established that several details of 
the enterprise plans are really predetermined but the planners can reckon with not in-
significant scope of movement even in the fields of some details. For example, the 
volume of production covered by contracts in the period of planning — according to 
Table 4 in the following — shows rather wide market possibilities in the case of most 
enterprises (at least in the short run), and means much more a predetermination 
deriving from capacities engaged than difficulties arising in loading free capacities. 
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Table 4 
Distribution of the enterprises supplying information 
by the volumes of orders on hand at the time of planning (in percent) 
Share of capacity for 1981 for 1983 for 1985 
engaged by orders 
0 - 30 10 44 47 
3 1 - 60 8 24 29 
61-100 82 32 24 
Total 100 100 100 




Similar degrees of limits are proven by the following data characterizing the scope 
of movement in the investments (though they seem to be different by branches). 
Table 5 
Distribution of the enterprises supplying information on the basis 
of the ratio of the 1 9 8 1 - 1 9 8 5 investment funds predetermined by contracts 
or other obligations (in percent) 
Industrial branches 
Predetermined 














1 - 30 



















Total 100 100 100 100 100 
According to our experience, however, certain further factors in Hungarian 
industry restrict the role of enterprise planning sometimes more powerfully than the 
former ones. It seems, namely, that the enterprises are often not — or not in the 
theoretically recommended way — striving to make use of the possibilities rendered 
to enterprise management by planning. We received informations on enterprise 
management by planning. We received informations on enterprise decisions which 
were not fitted into the process of planning, or efforts and endeavours which were not 
foreseen in the plans. The experts demonstrated this practice of so-called double 
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planning in 28 percent of the enterprises: in these cases enterprise management, after 
having compiled the plan documents, was striving more or less openly to attain targets 
they thought inexpedient to settle in the plan. Furthermore, we found in a great 
number of enterprises the signs of a certain disinterest in the directives of the 
documented plan: though the approved meidum-term plans became obsolete relatively 
rapidly, efforts to update them were rather rare. The plans elaborated in the spring of 
1981 were considered obsolete (in details) already in the autumn of the same year by 
72 percent of the enterprises. In the spring of 1983 the real information content of the 
plans decreased further and in spite of the occasional plan corrections by that time no 
medium-term plan, considered valid at least in its main lines, was available at all with 
one quarter of the enterprises. It is obvious that in the case of such rapid obsolence 
the plans covering several years can only play a restricted role in the orientation and 
regulation of enterprise management. 
In our research we tried to reveal those active factors in detail which prompt the 
enterprises to narrow the role attributed to autonomous planning. A picture about 
the findings of this investigation can be given by the following analysis. 
Relations between National and Enterprise Planning 
As we have mentioned, economists are of differing opinions on the desirable relation 
between national and enterprise planning and especially about how the enterprises 
help or can help the fulfilment of the national economic plans. Several publications 
and official statements after 1968 have emphasized that the national economic plan 
formulates tasks of the government and that the governmental organs have to promote 
their implementation not by direct planning instructions but by the indirect tools of 
economic control. In this way economic planning may become a tool of enterprise 
management. Others, however, as well as the official provisions developing the new 
system of economic control have attributed a double role to enterprise plans. As 
mentioned earlier, abolishing the practice of breaking down the central plans to 
enterprises, they emphasized the importance of autonomous enterprise planning, 
but destined important roles to enterprise planning in supplying basic information 
to national economic planning as well as in aiding the fulfilment of the central plans. 
The provisions serving for the assertion of the above described principles prescribe 
(a) that the National Planning Office must inform every enterprise about the main 
statements and decisionsof the national economic plan, (b) that some of the larger 
enterprises have to be involved in central planning, (c) that the enterprises should also 
inform the central organs about their plans. Act VII of 1972 ordered further that (d) 
"The economic organizations (enterprises, cooperatives) are obliged to set up their 
plans so as to secure the implementation of the decisions of the national economic 
plans affecting their activities and the requirements expressed by the means of 
regulation."9 
q 
Op. cit. in Note 7, quotation from p. 1129 
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In the practice of planning because of the presented provisions a really many-sided 
relationship (exchange of information) has developed between the plans and the plann-
ing organs of the national economy and the enterprises. These — direct — relations 
were able to complement in a specific manner the indirect possibilities of economic 
management to influence enterprise planning and activities. Thus, on the one hand, the 
informations given to enterprises about the national economic plans, on the other side 
the collection of information about the enterprise plans became traditional. The 
contents and appreciation by the enterprises of the former can be characterized by 
the following data: 
Table 6 
Central informations (or, decisions) deemed necessary 
by the enterprises 
Information or decision 








the information in question, in percent 
Quotas of the CMEA 24 16 60 
Decisions on central investment 
projects 20 14 64 
Decisions on central development 
programs 20 14 66 
Decisions on regional 
development 8 24 68 
Changes of organization 8 20 72 
Modifications of profit 
distribution rules 30 38 32 
Modifications in wage 
regulation 30 42 28 
Decisions on subsidies 12 40 48 
Decisions on credits 14 32 54 
Among the larger enterprises in addition to the central supply of information also 
the direct participation in central planning turned out to be important. In the scope of 
our survey the forms and frequency of this developed as follows: 
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Table 7 
The forms and frequency of participation in central planning 
The form of 
participation 
Ratio of the 
"smaller" "medium-size" 'large" 
enterprises participating in the given way, 
in percent 
Direct assistance in national 
economic planning 8 10 65 
Assistance in working out 
sectoral development 
concepts 17 43 82 
Participation in working 
committees of the CMEA 25 33 71 
Assistance in elaborating 
technological forecasts — 43 65 
Other forms 8 10 24 
It is interesting that regarding the usefulness of the contacts presented in Table 7 
the central control organs and the enterprises are not of the same views. For instance, 
according to central planners the aim of the enterprises directly participating in 
central planning was not to render realistic information but to influence the 'higher" 
decisions in their favour therefore very often there was no possibility to make signi-
ficant use of this source of data in central planning. On the contrary, the experts of 
the enterprises, to a major part, deemed the possibility to be involved in central 
planning as rather favourable. 
Our survey revealed that a wide sphere of enterprises deemed the central informa-
tion obtained from the above and other sources as indispensable for drawing up 
their plans. According to the following table, priority in this respect was attributed 
to the central forecasts of opportunities of investments and wage payments (namely, 
in these issues the regulatory system punishes the enterprise management if it deviates 
from the central ideas). 
The research also revealed positive and negative experience regarding the methods 
used so far to get acquainted with enterprise targets and efforts. Namely, in the past 
(medium-term) planning period the central organs asked every economic unit to 
submit its plans and in addition obliged them to supply a large number of data and 
information, sending out detailed questionnaires. An overall picture of how the 
enterprises evaluated this practice is given in Table 9. 
In this case conclusions from the data of the table can only be drawn in knowledge 
of the arguments found in the export opinions. Several of our experts, giving a positive 
evaluation, emphasized that it was very useful for them to be able to prove the asser-
tion of the targets and expectations set by the central organs. The described methods 
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Table 8 
Enterprise judgements on the importance of basic planning informations* 
Distribution of the value points characterizing the 
Information importance of information obtained from the given 
supplied by organizations on the subject matters 
a b 
с 
d e Total 
other enterprise 51 29 11 11 54 50 39 
central agency 39 61 69 68 36 40 49 
other organs 10 10 20 21 10 10 12 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
"The enterprises estimated the importance of informations gained on each subject matter to 2, 
1, or 0 value points. 
* *a) informations on purchasing possibilities 
b) informations on development (investment) projects 
c) informations on labour 
d) informations on wages and salaries 
e) informations on selling possibilities 
0 informations on selling prices 
Table 9 
The methods used by central agencies for becoming acquainted 
with enterprise plans and their valuation 
Method 
Ratio of enterprises which valuate the method 
positively neutrally (or not at all) 
in percent 
negatively 
Asking to submit 
the plans 18 52 30 
Asking to submit 
"plan informa-
tion"* 20 34 48 
•An enterprise gave partly positive, partly negative valuations, so the index numbers add up to 
more than loo. 
of collecting information enabled them to broaden their otherwise narrow "higher" 
contacts to influence favourably the "image" developed about their enterprise by the 
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central control organs, to improve — as a result of higher approval of the plans — the 
possibility of realizing them (e.g. obtaining the central grants, allowances and favours 
forecast in the plans). Some experts also deemed it useful that the "attention" of 
central organs (as a substitution for the power of the incentive system which proved 
weak for this purpose) prompted the management of their enterprise to a higher 
quality of planning work. The reasons explaining the negative estimations are similarly 
characteristic. Most experts, criticizing the submission of the plans, said: the plan 
forecasts desirable from the view of their enterprise differed from either the tasks 
deriving from the national economic plans, or more often, from the higher "expecta-
tions". However, since the plans had to be submitted to the control organs, enterprise 
management came to face a contradiction (conflict of interests) as the result of the 
double role of planning, which it could solve only by a "compromise ".This means 
that, in order to acquire the benevolence of the supervisory authorities, they formally 
"asserted the requirements raised by the national economic plan", "had put into the 
plans or approached the expectations", "took into account, or fulfilled the claims of 
the controlling authorities" in their plans. At the same time they were also aiming 
to assert the particular interests of their enterprise, therefore in practical management 
work they followed targets and efforts other than those fixed in the plans submitted 
to the central organs. Nevertheless, the plan informations collected in the form of 
tables were violently criticized, if only because being ah too detailed (although the 
criticism was less sharp than in earlier planning periods). 
Many experts, not influenced by enterprise interests, similarly think that the direct 
information contacts between national and enterprise planning can supplement the 
scope of movement of the indirect tools of economic control to a certain extent and 
will or can contribute finally to the fulfilment of the targets by the national economy. 
In order to adduce arguments to the answer given to our question, the National 
Planning Office compared the main indicators of the medium-term national economic 
plan every time with the index numbers obtained by summarizing the enterprise plans 
and did so after working out the five-year plan of the period 1981—1985, too. This 
survey — since, after having completed the enterprise plans, the above mentioned types 
of "compromises" left no trace, — established mostly that the differences between the 
plan figures of the national economic plan and the summary of enterprise plans are 
small. Namely, while the totals of the production and especially of the export plans 
of the enterprises were somewhat under the central forecasts, in respect of labour, 
investments, inputs of imports, the enterprise forecasts were a little higher than the 
central ones. The differences, however, remained mostly within the margins of error 
in planning, and formally reflected strong efforts of the enterprises for the implement-
ation of the national economic plan.10 
But the National Planning Office's investigations - and our survey as well -
analysing the enterprises' efforts to fulfil the non-numerical central targets led to less 
favourable results. Several times significant differences seemed to emerge between the 
^ H o ó s , J.: A vállalatok és megyei tanácsok VI. ötéves tervezőmunkájának tapasztalatairól (On the 
Experience with the Planning Work of Enterprises and County Councils for the 6th Five-Year 
Plan). Pénzügyi Szemle, 1981. 5. 
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plan targets of the national economy and the aims defined by the enterprises in their 
plans. In the 1970s and 1980s it became ever more clear on the level of the national 
economy that an essential improvement of efficiency in economic operations is 
indispensable. Several signs indicate, however, that the enterprise plans do not reflect 
this recognition and its consequences and do not seek the possibilities of increasing 
efficiency which can be exploited first of all in the enterprises with necessary 
intensity. We have often discovered the lack of informations needed to analyse 
efficiency for determining the tasks to raise it. Though detailed calculations of 
profitability were frequently found in the plans, it is in vain to try to find the conc-
lusions drawn from these in the enterprises' targets. What is more, decisions contrary 
to considerations of efficiency could often be demonstrated, e.g. the extension of 
activities deemed from the outset to cause losses were often included in the plans. 
Thus, it could be seen that we failed in eliminating the well-known problem of the 
previous system of economic control that, while the economic units strive to include 
the quantitative forecasts of the center in their plans, insufficient attention is directed 
to realize the targets of quality. It was also clear that these phenomena can, to a great 
extent, be explained by the aforementioned disturbances in the role of enterprise 
planning, among other things by the formal efforts to reflect the "higher" expecta-
tions in the plans. 
Further analysis of the planning problems pointed to other causes distant from 
the very subject of the present paper, linked to several elements of the regulation 
system. We have often found that the problems of interests were decisive reasons 
of the difficulties. It is generally known that our system of economic control puts 
the emphasis on the operative tasks of the enterprises and does seldom force senior 
management to actions based on the consideration of tasks of the long run, or en-
courages them only very slightly to do so. In our experience this by itself reduces 
the interest of the enterprises in creating higher quality autonomous plans. It shows 
that to broaden the role of planning and to improve the relation between national 
economic and enterprise planning requires also measures outside the planning system, 
linked to the modernization of economic control as a whole. 
Conclusions 
On the basis of the informations outlined above, gained by our research, we drew the 
conclusion that since 1968 a double role of planning has taken shape. Increasingly 
important tasks are attributed to the plans in orienting autonomous enterprise 
management but an important function of them is to help national economic plann-
ing to support the fulfilment of the centrally set targets, too. This double role makes 
it possible to plan more effectively than earlier — but several opportunities of 
improvement are still hidden. 
Our surveys made it also possible to outline the tasks needed to improve enterprise 
planning and the contacts between national and enterprise planning. In working out 
our recommendations we started from the concept that, regarding the main targets 
and interests of economic policy, information will be given to the enterprises even in 
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the future mainly by using indirect methods, through economic penalties and 
incentives. Hence, we need not insist on the appearance of the central will in the way 
of formal interdependence of the plans. We deem it the most essential element of 
improving the investigated system of relations that the enterprises receive the central 
planning informations in the future — more ample than so far — in a way harmonized 
with the mechanisms of indirect economic control, that is, really without any claim 
of being formally reflected in its plans and without the possibility of detailed control. 
We think it necessary to consider whether the paragraph of the 1972 Act on plann-
ing we quoted at the beginning of the preceding section regarding the harmony of 
central and enterprise planning should be interpreted in a manner more strict than up 
to now, in order to meet the above mentioned requirement. It is obvious that in creat-
ing this harmony not only the enterprises have or may have essential tasks but the 
central organs are also expected to take numerous measures (in the development of 
expedient regulation system, or perhaps by employing the system of the so-called 
plan contracts or state orders, etc.). Furthermore, it is possible that in the case of 
differences between preliminary forecasts of the national and enterprise plans (or 
between the endeavours of the sectoral control agencies and the enterprises) we so far 
prompted the enterprises to modify their forecasts too soon and to a too wide 
extent. After having discovered the differences a repeated checking of the central plan 
should not be omitted. 
For the sake of improving the investigated system of contacts it would be purpose-
ful to permit the enterprises to supply planning informations to the central organs 
independently of their own plans on their efforts that may be important from macro-
economic views. Furthermore, it would be wise to end the practice of compulsory sub-
mitting of enterprise plans. In this way the plan could not become a misused tool of 
the enterprises for influencing the central organs. 
Beyond all that our experience also indicated that the described system of planning 
relations in itself is by far not sufficient for the desirable changes of the Hungarian 
system of economic control. Though the implementation of our propositions would 
mean a help in achieving many of the aims set by the national economy, it can only 
supplement but not replace either the enterprises' efforts in planning or the creation 
of an economic mechanism that can stimulate the enterprises to long-term 
management and planning. 
SOME TECHNICAL AND ECONOMIC EXPERIENCES 
OF ENGINEERING ENTERPRISES IN SHAPING THEIR PRODUCT STRUCTURE 
GYÖRGY PARÁNYI 
Development of the product structure is a generic term, including the modernization 
of existing products of the enterprise, thereby enhancing their marketability; develop-
ing new products, partly in the traditional product line and partly belonging to a new 
line of products; and finally, eliminating obsolete products. 
The direction and internal proportions of developing the product pattern are 
determinated by the demand and the opportunities of the market as well as by the 
objective to increase economic efficiency. From the technical side, development is 
aimed at the desirable modernization of the products as well as of production 
technology. 
Technological development has always been an important task of the Hungarian 
industrial enterprises. To speed up its rate, to improve marketability of the products, 
mainly to adjust them to the export rquirements has been in the focus of Hungarian 
economic policy since the early 1970s, and gained special emphasis in the mid-years 
of the decade, i.e., since the world economic depression set in. 
The review on how the general guidelines formulated in government resolutions 
were practically realized in one of the most important branches of industry, in 
engineering industry, was the subject of a survey carried out by the Research Institute 
of Industrial Economics of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. 
The large enterprises were selected for the purpose of the analysis which practically 
represented all the significant subsectors of the engineering industry. Their production 
in 1980 accounted for 13 percent of the total value produced by engineering. Using 
actual data and expert opinions on these 10 enterprises we reviewed (1) the entire 
product pattern; (2) the characteristics of 84 products considered the most important 
by the enterprises representing 74 percent of their total production; (3) the 
particularities of the development of 31 products selected from the latter ones (in 
production value half the group) apt to be generalized. The survey was centred on the 
period of the fifth five-year plan, between 1976-1980. 
In the following we are going to present a categorization of product development, 
then the enterprises'ой/ecriVes and the effects achieved in the same categorization. 
Finally the factors influencing the method of development will be analysed. 
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1. The Techno-Economic Structure in the Modernization of the Products 
In order to obtain a detailed picture of the products of various modernity and 
perspective, we have developed a classification into which all the products can be 
fitted, according to their novelty. We have pursued the analyses according to this 
division which has proved useful in practice and will present our result accordingly. 
The novelty groups of the products were the following: 
Group 1: New types of products, foreign to the range of production of the enterprise. 
A diversifying extension of the product line, products taken up either independently, 
or for the delivery of complete systems, differing from the traditional range of 
production. 
Group 2: Entirely new products fitting into the range of production of the enterprise. 
Constructions based on applying some new scientific principle or serving for the ful-
filment of some new purposes of using the product. 
Group 3: Products substantially modernized from the point of view of the user. 
Construction variants of existing manufactured products, modernized in their func-
tion, regardless of the changes or development of production technology they entail. 
(The modernization may be aimed at e.g. making up for the backwardness compared 
to the international market; enhancing the use value; increasing the number of func-
tional variants, etc.) 
Group 4: Products modernized substantially with respect to manufacturing. Manufac-
turing becomes easier and more economical by some substantial "internal" moderniz-
ation of the construction (e.g. improving the quality of manufacturing or promoting 
interchangeability; increasing economy in the inputs of material, energy, worktime by 
transforming the construction; improving aesthetic appearance). 
Group 5: Products developed by some kind of minor rationalization. The purpose of 
the modernization does not affect the construction substantially but it eliminates 
certain deficiencies; it may follow fashion by minor modifications; or simplify certain 
operations of production. 
Group 6: Unchanged products; products manufactured without any modification 
throughout the period analysed - apart from rough deficiencies to be eliminated. 
Group 7: Products ceased to be manufactured due either to obsolote construction, or 
to uneconomical production or perhaps because of narrowing the range of products, 
production is passed on to another producer. 
1.1. The Composition of the Product Range by Groups of Novelty 
This criterion gives a picture about the extent and content of technological develop-
ment and modernization. The criterion is what happened to the product manufactured 
already in 1980, throughout the plan period. Has it appeared as a new product, was it 
manufactured in an unchanged form, or has it been modernized? We determined the 
number of important products by novelty groups, the proportion of the latter to the 
rest of the products, reviewing their life cycle preceding and following the plan 
period. 
The product structure of 1980 is demonstrated by Column ,,d" of Table 1. 
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Table 8 
Development of the product structure in the surveyed period 
Groups of 
products 
by degree of 
novelty 
Distribution of the volume of products 
manufactured in 1980 (in percent) 
Forecast change of the 
production 




of those produced 
at the beginning of 
the plan period 
(1976) 
Composition 
at the end of the 
plan period 
(1980) 
a b с d e 
1 New, foreign 
to the range 
of produc-
tion — 
2 New, within 




















Total of modemized 
















Forecast growth of 
total production 
volume 100.0 100.0 1.3 
•With products transferred to other enterprises: 4.3 percent 
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The data characterizing the dynamism of updating the products are the following: 
— During the plan period (until its end) the new products introduced amounted 
to 11.3 percent of the production which means 1 —4 products per enterprise. (See 
groups 1 and 2). The enterprises intended to almost treble the volume of new products 
in the period subsequent to the survey (Column "c"). 
— The products substantially modernized during the plan period (groups 3 and 4) 
accounted for one-third of the production. Half of them were significantly moderniz-
ed mainly from the point of view of production technology, the other half also from 
that of use value. The production of the modernized products was intended to rise in 
accordance with the average growth of production (30 percent). 
— Another quarter of the products (group 5) were developed by minor rationaliza-
tion. 
— The remaining not much smaller ratio (group 6) of the products were technically 
not modified. (The assumption of the enterprises was that the production of these can 
be maintained in an unchanged quantity even in the future.) 
The production of 3 percent of the products was stopped during the plan period. 
Consequently: 
a) a smaller part (47.4 percent) of the production in 1980 consisted of products 
introduced and substantially modemized during the plan period; 
b) taking into account the rationalization process, 74.7 percent of total produc-
tion in 1980 was developed during the preceding 5 years (groups 1—5); 
c) 76 percent of the 1980 production was already produced before 1976 and 51 
percent of it (i.e., two-thirds of the traditional products) without any significant 
changes; 
d) the 30 percent total increment, planned by the enterprises, consisted of the 
increased production of the products manufactured in their basic types already in 
earlier years, significantly modernized during the plan period. 
1.2 Raising the Level of Technological Standards 
The general technical and economic purposes of developing the product mix, and 
their relative weight are shown in graphic form in Figure 1 both for the complete 
sample and by groups of novelty. 
Among the aims of making new products and perfecting the existing ones the 
most important ones are to keep abreast with international progress, to improve 
quality and to produce exportable goods. 
— International competitivity and up-to-dateness, — as can be seen from line A 
of Figure 1 — has a medium weight on the average of the total sample. 
— Improvement of quality (line B) has a greater weight. Modernization by follow-
ing the others (to be dealt with later on) is a moderate but realistic purpose. It is 
interesting that to follow the international trends was decided by the enterprises 
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mostly with respect to the products which were new in relation to their special line 
of products1 and those modernized functionally. 
— A factor qualified as significant is to manufacture exportable products (line C). 
It is a realistic aim to achive this goal mainly by moving in well-known fields, by 
functional modernization of existing manufactured products and by introducing new 
ones within the special range of products of the enterprise. It is worth attention that 
the above-mentioned purposes are mainly felt in the groups updated in their func-
tion while with respect to new types their weight is less. Regarding the chances of 
success of the new products it is unfavourable that no outstanding role was given to 
quality improvement. 
As far as the realized developments are concerned, the changes were primarily 
aimed at diminishing the technological backwardness in the functions and quality of 
the developed products. 
Outward appearance, improvement of design was also considered an important 
factor. In their turn, the quality and accuracy of manufacture increased essentially 
the result of development in general. The effect exercised on exportability is only 
moderate. 
According to a comparison of development purpose and results by product groups 
the enterprises could not fully achieve their set targets. The parameters of the products 
which were modernized in their function did not reach the planned ones, while the 
new products approached the targets more closely. 
We also reviewed the technical aims and solutions of the sampled enterprises or the 
degree of implementation of the particular actions of development. 
The general conclusions to be drawn from the comparison of the standards of the 
related products of domestic and international manufacture are as follows: 
- no significant difference can be found in the construction parameters; 
— the lag in new construction is 2—6 years; 
— compromises have to be made occasionally with respect to design materials and 
component parts; 
- the structures are heavier, and their aesthetic appearance, quality, durability, 
wear resistance often do not match international standards. 
1.3. Improvement of Economic Results 
From among the objectives of product development those of achieving higher prices, 
reducing the costs and increasing the profits stemming from the increased volume of 
production (lines D, E and F of Figure 1) serve for the improvement of economic 
results. 
- Increasing the profits by the growing volume of production is the foremost 
'"The group of products which are new with respect to the main product line of the enterprise 
cannot be qualified, due to the small number of cases analysed. For this reason we will abstain 
from drawing generalizable conclusions from this group though for the sake of completeness we 
shall mention them here as well as in the following. 
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objective of the enterprises. As borne out by line F, this is the only purpose which 
represents significant weight in all of the four groups of novelty. From the introduc-
tion of products which are new with respect to the special product range the enter-
prises expect an outstanding growth in the volume of profits. But the fact that the 
products which were new to such a degree had not yet been introduced in the market 
and their immaturity arouse doubts regarding the reality of this expectation. 
— According to the enterprises the feasible way to increase profitability is to sell 
the new and functionally modernized products at higher prices (line D). 
— To increase profits by reduction of the inputs (fine E) is an aim thrust to the 
background. 
Though it is logical that the costs can firstly be reduced in the case of the 
modernized products, it seems that when developing the new products this objective 
hardly plays any part. The enterprises attach very little importance to the effects of 
development on material-intensity. ^ According to personal opinion, the decline in 
labour-intensity is also insignificant. 
The rank order of methods (F—D—E) aimed at improving the economic results 
- taking into account the international situation —reflects a non-adequate adjust-
ment. Owing to the lack of demand, the primary aim to increase the volume of 
production is unreal. Because of the strong competition the prices are depressed, so 
that restriction on inputs would be the only possibility, depending on internal and 
therefore much more utilizable potentials. 
In the totality of the enterprise the effects of the realized developments on 
profitability are deemed significant; it is, however, curious that — in contrast to the 
forecasts - profitability of the new products within the range of manufacture special 
to the enterprise is the lowest. 
The hierarchy of objectives by groups of novelty of the products is considerably 
varied. This makes us remember that the development of the product structure must 
not be treated schematically; multifarious interactions assert themselves among the 
objectives (and the tools needed for implementing them) and the methods of 
development. 
2. The Factors Influencing the Selected Methods of Development 
In the following we are going to present the factors and the extent to which they 
influence the enterprise in selecting one or another way of modernizing the products 
that are mostly developed. 
2 
In the period following the survey a broad action to reduce the weight and material consumption 
of the products was started in Hungary. 
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2.1. Preparation of Decisions, Alternatives of Development in General 
As regards the 31 types of considerably developed important products more than one 
alternative emerged only in 50 percent of the surveyed cases but the possibilities 
were elaborated to the depth needed for decision-making only in 29 percent. 
In the cases where alternatives of development emerged, two phenomena were 
conspicuous: 
— The highest ratio of alternatives can be found among the products modernized 
with respect to manufacturing. The explanation is logical; in the current practice of 
financing the investment projects this is the type of investments where the chances 
of the enterprises are lower than in the case of other development methods, 
consequently this prompts them to serious work in preparing their credit requests. 
— The ratio of alternatives is the lowest, not more than 33 percent with the new 
products, fitting into the traditional line of manufacture. In these cases the alternatives 
were elaborated to the depth needed for the decision, and possibilities on both a 
higher and a lower level than the selected one were analysed. This ratio is not 
satisfactory for these are the products which form the main line of future production. 
The actions of development with no alternatives given were mostly supported by 
the argument that the selected method is the most up-to-date solution. This opinion, 
though seemingly winning, makes one think in several directions (a) the "existing most 
up-to-date" does not always cover a single technological solution, since development 
usually progresses in several parallel directions; (b) overall information about the world 
market is also often questionable; (c) as an argument of decision it enhances our 
doubts against a conception that stimulates the creation of most up-to-date products 
without a selective survey of the market; these doubts will prove to be justified later 
on. 
It is similarly questionable — although sometimes it may be justified — that the 
path to be followed is unequivocal, or that the users' requirements determine the 
given solution. All these depend on the issue of being adequately informed and even 
an unequivocally optimal construction may have several substantially different 
technological alternatives, and so on. 
In fact, seemingly often only one solution is reckoned with, i.e., the one which 
was "invented by someone ", or the one fulfilling most easily the emerging require-
ment, or the one "found right by the boss". 
As a matter of fact, to form a true picture of the role of the supervisory bodied 
recommendations or opinions of the enterprise's senior managers in the decision-
making is rather difficult, therefore we attempted to investigate this question from 
several aspects. 
The weight of this factor in setting the tasks of technological development is 
shown by line H of Figure 1: it plays a moderate part, and comes to be dominant in 
taking new products into the program which are foreign to the range of manufacture. 
The managers' opinion in choosing the method of development plays a decisive role 
in all of the product groups. 
However, this is only rarely the reason for omitting the alternatives. It is mostly 
decisive in the case of new products within the traditional range of products. 
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The lack of development alternatives seen in half of the cases and the ratio of 
detailed analyses hardly exceeding a quarter of them, as well as the significant role 
of the leaders'opinion are two sides of the same coin. They indicate the voluntaristic 
views still existing in practice and the insufficient role played by techno-economic 
considerations in making the decisions. 
2.2. Consideration of the Market Factors in Development Work 
The enterprises involved in the survey deemed the role of the market factors very 
important in selecting the method of development. The elements of these are shown 
in detail in Figure 2. The factors are demonstrated in the order of decreasing average 
significance. 
It is unequivocally favourable that the buyers' requirements linked to the use 
value of the products (a), (b), as well as the element of connection between the mass 
of production and the order of magnitude of the demand (c) are deemed important 
by the enterprises. The complete production period (e), a significant element of 
flexible adjustment, plays a moderate role in the decisions on development. 
The static way of looking at product development is indicated by the under-
estimation of the optimum volume of production versus the stationary or uncertain 
character of the demand (g). Notwithstanding, this factor influences to a great degree, 
already in the phase of designing, the costs of the construction and the flexibility of 
production. 
An important problem is indicated by a factor not mentioned so far — which in the 
course of consultations prompted the experts to self-criticizism — namely, the know-
ledge of foreign prescriptions (f) whose importance was underrated. This may involve 
two harmful consequences: 
a) insufficient acquaintance with the specific standards, prescriptions on material, 
labour safety, health protection specified by the foreign customer may lead to 
complaints, and in less favourable cases to the cancellation of the order. 
b) The concept of "products marketable in any market" might be valuable to call 
attention to the high standards needed for turning out products saleable in the most 
demanding markets and to improve quality but this "slogan" may also be the source 
of several uneconomical marketing actions. 
The requirements of one and the same product may differ in several respect on 
the various markets. On the one hand products of different quality (and price!) may 
be considered the optimal ones according to the development level and the standards 
of living of the given country. On the other hand, national particularities, traditions, 
usage, specifications, standards also influence the demand. 
Use value is only attributed to (and paid for) the quality which can be utilized. 
Requirements which may be minimal in advanced (and rich) countries regarding 
product quality and level of service may not be needed in less developed countries and 
in the latter the product may prove to be not serviceable. They might not even be able 
to handle the "over-modernized", sensitive equipment at all, and at the same time 
appropriate maintenance and repair cannot be provided either. Thus, a given product is 
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Figure 2 
The role played by the factors linked to the market in selecting the way 
of development 
The weight of factors 
Factor 
a) services expected 
from the product 
b)the degree of explor-
ing the market and 
level of informations 
c) the connection 
between optimum 
size of production 
and magnitude of 
demand 




e) the total production 
period 
f) foreign prescriptions 
and knowledge of 
them 




h) the solution of spare 
parts supply, after 
sale service and re-
pair 
Novelty group of product: 
1 product new to the traditional product line 
2 new product within the traditional product line 
3 functionally modemized product 
4 product modemized with respect to manufacturing 
Average of products in novelty groups 1 - 4 
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not simply of a better or worse quality, it must be adjusted to the varying require-
ments (of different) markets. 
It is remarkable that with the products novel to the range of manufacture and 
those modernized functionally (taken into development after a longer period) 
greater attention is paid to the foreign prescriptions. With respect to the new products 
within the standard range of manufacture this view is omitted, though it is the latter 
product group determining the production of the next period. In this group develop-
ment is seemingly controlled by tradition. 
Regarding the effects of realized development on market position, according to 
the enterprises the results are of a medium impact in the capitalist markets. In the 
socialist countries it is somewhat better and the situation shows a significant improve-
ment in the domestic market. 
Asa conclusion it is conspicuous that on the one hand research and exploration of 
the market, the level of information, the knowledge of the services expected from 
the products are considered important, at the same time other factors (such as being 
familiar with foreign prescriptions and conditions, with actual demand, with continued 
services in order to ensure the position of the products on the market) are gaining in-
sufficient consideration. 
2.3. R+D and Technology 
The extent of research and development (R+D) needed for forming the product 
pattern is a question highly disputed in the literature. In our survey we examined not 
the demand for R+D but the question of how far the following factors are determinis-
tic in choosing the way of development: the existence of the enterprise's own 
research basis and the availability or shortage of equipment, the need for external 
cooperation; and finally, how R+D is financed. 
Our sample showed that, on the average, all these factors are ranked by the enter-
prises as having little or medium weight. This is, however, contradictory to accepted 
opinion. This has no unequivocal explanation; one of the reasons is the well known 
fact of inadequate utilization of creative mental capacity: the limitation to develop-
ment is not the R+D basis; "if it is really necessary, the task can be solved" - is the 
general idea. A further cause is inadvertency, under-estimation or failing recognition 
of the importance of research and development in shaping the future. It is, however, 
a warning sign and can be seen from the enterprise responses that organizational 
rearrangement3 of the development units in itself can hardly provide the more 
"scientific" and perspectivic foundations of technological development. It may at 
most promote their practical utilization to the degree that they meet a rather mo-
derate level of demand. This finding of ours is supported by the role the particular 
elements play in the various life cycle groups. 
3 
Up to recent times most of Hungarian industrial research institutes worked as independent 
institutions of the Academy of Sciences or of a ministry. Several institutes have been in-
corporated into the organization of the enterprise engaged in the production of the related 
products and directly utilizing the research results. 
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To possess a research basis is an important condition for the enterprise to 
modernize functionally or, respectively, renew its current products. Regarding these 
products it is in fact the producer who has adequate tradition. But it is, at the same 
time, obvious that with respect to new products alien to the traditional range of 
manufacture — and, to a certain degree, in that of other new products — they 
require more cooperation with external research and development organizations. 
At the same time — and this seems to be the greatest contradiction — the enter-
prises entirely agreed in saying that their own research basis met demands. 
As far as the two fields of engineering, linked most closely to technological 
development, i.e., construction of the product and production technology (that is, 
working out the detailed documentation of product design and of the manufacturing 
process) are concerned, we surveyed the influence of novelty of the task, the extent, 
the education standards and composition of the staff. These were deemed more im-
portant by the experts. The novelty of both construction and production technology 
is outstandingly significant in selecting the method of development. This is logical in 
itself though contradictory to the picture given on research and development. It 
indicates that the border between R+D and engineering in preparation is drawn by the 
enterprises practically not at the place where the categories, as interpreted by theory, 
would make it justified. In practice a greater significance is attributed to the realizing 
phase of development, i.e., modernization of the actual products and manufacturing 
technology, while the activities of R+D are considered rather abstract. If this is true, 
this constitutes another contradiction. Namely, according to the assessment no special 
problems arose either in the number of designers and technologists or in the 
qualification and composition of the staff, though the role of these is considered 
essential from the views of possibilities of development. 
Hence the question arises: do all the deficiencies of our products, harming compe-
titiveness, reputation and operation, result from the manufacturing process due to 
the neglect of design prescriptions and technological instructions or is it the lack of 
care we touched upon in the foregoing and under-estimation of design work and 
production technology? Devaluation on a social level is well-known, to do away with 
it has been put on the agenda. 
In the qualification of the products by groups of novelty the following are note-
worthy. It is obvious that in the case of products, foreign to the traditional range 
of manufacture, the novelty of the task is a prominent factor. But, in opposition to 
the given opinions, it is hardly believable that the technological preparation of 
manufacturing modernized products involves higher requirements than those of the 
new products, with emphasis on assuring good quality for the long run. It is also 
remarkable that in view of almost all factors the products modernized in their func-
tion are the most demanding. 
2.4. The Characteristics of Cooperation 
It is well-known that most products of the engineering industry are very complex. 
They are built up of a great number (several hundreds or thousands) of components 
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or assembly units (in the following we will mention these as elements) and by using 
hundreds of materials. The development of a new product or modernization of an 
existing one is largely influenced by the following questions: (a) what is the share of 
the elements available in the form of ready-made goods from stock; (b) what are the 
circumstances of purchasing and supplying the special materials and other elements 
as far as imports are concerned; (c) which are the elements that must be manufactured 
locally and what are the conditions of doing so? 
Depending on the source from which the enterprise, manufacturing the end-
product, provides the semi-finished elements and components, we distinguish three 
types: 
— elements manufactured within the enterprise, maybe by cooperation between 
plants; 
— elements manufactured partly or completely in cooperation, and 
— elements purchased as commercial goods, with occasional reprocessing. 
The following distribution was found in our base sample: two-thirds of the com-
ponents were home-made, one-fifth came from commercial sources (domestic or im-
port) and less than one-seventh is the ratio of the elements supplied by cooperation 
partners. 
In industrialized capitalist countries the proportion between in-house production 
and other sources of component supply is just the reverse: two-third, or three-fourth 
are not manufactured by the producers of the end product, and even the remaining 
part is produced because of policy considerations. 
A survey of the different life-cycle groups gives no better results either. 
Among new products, alien to the standard product line of the firm, the share of 
the home-made elements is extraordinarily high. It is easy to understand why in stand-
ard products of the enterprise the share of these was higher than average. With new 
products of the standards line a favourable development could be noticed in the 
increase of the share of components acquired from commercial sources or coopera-
tion. 
By comparing the composition of the parts in the products before and after 
modernization no shift was found in the proportions. In the manufacture of the 
modernized products the ratio of cooperation increased somewhat at the cost of 
commercial articles. 
This is not the only sign showing that there is no progress in cooperation. The 
effect of development on the division of labour in production is negligible or 
moderate; some improvement can only be found in the case of new products of the 
standard line. 
The share of cooperation is low and this has two negative consequences on 
technological development: 
1. Less than half of cooperation agreements is aimed at technological specializa-
tion, the rest at the expansion of capacity. The elements provided by the partners 
are made at best by the same universal production technology, also available for the 
producer of the end product. 
2. Even the long-term cooperation contracts often have a "permanently provi-
sional" character. No such connections have developed between the manufacturer of 
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the product and the cooperating partner which would have a modernization effect on 
the products. The task usually being merely to fulfil the current orders, the collaborat-
ing partner makes no arrangements for co-ordinated development or for long-term 
up-to-date and economical production of the component part in question. 
This results in parallel research and development of uniform elements, requiring a 
surplus of intellectual work without bringing about competitive products on higher 
levels of technology. The production volume is dispersed, no processes can be 
introduced ensuring higher productivity and better quality. Owing to the repeated 
"starts from the outset", the terms of both design work and manufacturing, as well as 
of ripening the product are too long. Owing to the innumerable individual variants 
it is difficult to solve the supply of spare parts through the channels of trade. 
2.5 The Background of the Enterprises own Production 
This title is aimed at embracing practically the entire technological and production 
basis of industrial (in this case the engineering industrial) enterprises. The composi-
tion of the stock of fixed assets was also a subject to detailed analysis both in 
quantity and quality. Here we limit ourselves to some statements reflecting the 
findings of earlier surveys expounded elsewhere.4 The most substantial experiences 
are the following: 
— The available machine park can be applied in a wide range of technology, thus 
making the modernization of the product pattern and a flexible adjustment to the 
market possible. Among the recently purchased production equipment too only a 
fraction are single-purpose machines, which can only be used for producing a certain 
component of a single product. 
— Production equipment is larger than the manpower available for its operation. 
There are still significant reserves, however, in utilizing the best part of machinery 
by working shifts or in operating them at a higher rate of intensity. Among the fac-
tors, determining the development process, the influence of fixed assets plays the 
least part in any of the life-cycle groups. 
The supply of tools and fixtures, a basic condition of operating the production 
equipment, has, along with labour, only a moderate influence. Consequently the given 
characteristics of the enterprises' own production basis is no delimiting factor in 
modifying the product structure, or bringing it up to date. It must be strongly 
emphasized at the same time that in addition to the convertibility of the machine 
park, another indispensable condition of flexible modifications in the product pattern 
is the opportunity of prompt purchase and setup of equipment necessary to the solu-
tion of special technological tasks (for the fulfilment of new structural requirements 
and the realization of higher quality standards). 
4 Paranyi, Gy. : Korszerűsítő fejlesztés (Development Aiming at Modernization). Közgazdasagi es 
Jogi Kiadó, Budapest 1983. 
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3. Conclusions 
Earlier, in the system of directive planning, the industrial subsectors were the basic 
units of planned development. By now competitiveness requires the differentiated 
technological development and the transformation of the product structure of the 
level of product groups and individual products. Accordingly, planning the product 
pattern is today the task of enterprise planning. In the new situation, however, the 
danger of a new kind of one-sidedness arises. 
For example, the trends of development may become blurred behind several 
individual enterprise actions and this may restrict the system of conditions — which 
is external to the enterprises — to develop in the desired direction by means of the 
industrial policy. In order to decide what should be the role of complete product 
replacement and product redesign within the general strategy of modernization of 
the product structure a deeper consideration is needed. This is part of the general 
question: on what areas should Hungarian industrial exports concentrate; i.e., which 
are the fields where we are able to compete with the products of the advanced 
industrial countries and where should we strive to deliver reliable products of medium 
quality i.e. being on a lower technological and cultural level? It is the task of industrial 
policy to take a position in this conceptual problem and to adjust its control measures 
and preferences to it. 
Namely, as our survey has spectacularly proven, it is not only the marketing 
possibilities and the tasks, but also the system of conditions that is different in the 
case of various types of development. Taking all this into consideration, the reality of 
the objectives, the conditions and the results indicate that development was most har-
moniuos with products which were essentially modernized as to their use value. This 
product group is built on existing tradition and conditions where we can keep abreast 
with continuous international development. In the forefront of our efforts are: to 
obtain higher prices, increase exportability, improve quality and observe foreign pre-
scriptions. 
This kind of a balanced situation can much less be found in the group of new pro-
ducts. Due to the novelty of the products and the lack of experience, obviously a lot 
of questions are open, with the exception that in the enterprises' view these products 
are highly competitive. They do not take a number of factors i.e. the risk of failure 
and the growth of production forecast into account sufficiently. A goal in our strategy 
can be to develop the product structure mainly by functional modernization, as a 
successful method of increasing marketability. Considering our endowments, the 
present potentials of industry, this endeavour seems to be realistic, of course, not as a 
compromise to the absolutely new products as "ideal" ones, but as a strategic goal in 
addition to them. 
International experience also indicates that, despite the strong competition, even 
the capitalist enterprises are careful in introducing products which are entirely new. 
In the engineering industry of the United States it is a "golden rule" that the ratio of 
entirely new elements in a new product, not manufactured so far, may be at 15—20 
percent maximum. 
At this point, however, a circumstance rather different from our domestic situation 
136 
must be taken into account. Namely, that the above ratio applies to the product as a 
final one. Since the overwhelming majority of the product elements are manufactured 
in specialized factories as end products, and these are also continually developed, the 
modernization in the final product is of a much higher degree. The risk of the develop-
ment is, in turn, much less, because the assembling enterprise, at the end of the chain 
of division of labour, is responsible merely for its "own" share of novelty. 
Of course, changing or replacing the products, modernizing them, or the other 
variants are not categories excluding one another, but may exist side by side. But in 
the case of adopting one of them as a general method in any of the production 
branches (a) it must become a conscious, declared policy and (b) the entire system of 
conditions must be elaborated and asserted in the enterprise as well as in the industrial 
policy of the government. 
Since the limitations and basic principles of the development methods often coun-
ter each other, the principles to be asserted do not support exclusively any one of the 
methods. Therefore the measures which assure the opportunity of consistent, rapid 
development in the main directions, assert their effect also on development in general. 
Some recommendations to the realization of the development strategy of the 
modernization type: 
On enterprise level it is an important condition to bring the whole system of 
marketing, product planning and production, the control and organization into 
harmony with the requirements of the given type of development. For the sake of rapid 
reactions and rapid turn-out of new variants it is needed to apply the principles of 
product families, construction sets, the connected system of registering technical do-
cumentation, flexible and adjustable production technology (related types of machines 
and tools), technological processes typical of the products, methods of production 
control based on team-work. Widespread cooperation contacts and systems of com-
mercial information are further indispensable conditions. 
In the sphere of government control the resources, namely research, the develop-
ment of the technological bases, the policy of credits, the division of labour within the 
engineering industry, market policy need to be concentrated on most rapid, qualified de-
velopment of the "traditional products", on extending and stabilizing their market and 
on developing the services necessary for these purposes. Such efforts ought to be 
remunerated, and the support of real novelty concentrated on products which are 
promising. 
From among the tasks addressed to industrial policy we wish to emphasize only 
one and this is the necessity of a break-through in the specialization of components 
and parts production. 
In essence it is the quality of the elements in the products that determines (at pre-
sent: limits) the standard and quality of the products built. For this reason the promo-
tion of establishing and strengthening productive (and trading) organizations which 
specialize in characteristic elements of machines, parts, technological operations 
should be treated as tasks of high priority. The production units serving for these 
purposes must become appropriate to meet national (international) demand in their 
narrow, specialized range of manufacture. Within this, they have to grow fit for 
research and development, for the design of the elements and variants in conformity 
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with the particular demands, for the manufacture, maintenance and repair of them 
in good quality and productively, both in the form of cooperation, or for the pur-
poses of trading and stockpiling. 

THE CAPACITY TO INNOVATE IN HUNGARIAN ENTERPRISES 
GÁBOR HOVÁNYI 
The Background 
Hungary falls in the middle range of industrialized countries considering its technol-
ogical and economic achievements. But to guard this place in our era of accelerated 
technological development or to catch up with countries of more advanced technology, 
Hungary needs to innovate in many segments of the economy. This points to the great 
importance of innovation — above all innovation in industry, the branch that is the 
main source of GDP in Hungary. 
Innovation in industry is realized on the enterprise level. But in a planned economy 
where economic regulators are aimed at the fulfilment of the plan — which is the case 
in Hungary - it is decisive for the government to know the endeavors, motives, limits 
and possibilities of the enterprises. That was the reason why the Research Institute of 
Industrial Economics of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences started a research to 
reveal the industrial enterprises' attitude towards innovations. 
The research comprised 19 Hungarian industrial enterprises and their chief 
executives (every branch of industriy was represented by two or three large com-
panies), 28 more or less successful cases of innovations and 220 middle managers, 
working at the above companies. The techniques used in the research were case 
studies, questionnaires and interviews. 
In the following I shall try to summarize the main findings of our research. 
The General Outline Research 
To establish a solid base for the research we set up three innovation models: the first 
one described the process of innovation, the second representated the innovation 
chain and the third introduced a new concept in the theory of innovation, the field of 
innovation. Let me enumerate some specific characteristics of the models. 
— The process of innovation model was based on the clearly discernable innova-
tion redinessand ability of the enterprises, influenced strongly by the social climate 
and the economic regulators of the planning system of the country. (The research 
proved that different incentives have to be introduced to stimulate the readiness or to 
increase the ability of an enterprise and its employees.) The innovation process can be 
realized on three levels: as a project with heavy investments, as a programme using 
available resources on a long-term basis, or as an action mobilizing available resources 
in the short run. (It has become clear that different management systems are 
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necessary to control different kinds of processes. The final stage of a market-oriented 
innovation process is not selling or consumption, nor the feedback of information but 
the transfer and dissemination of the innovation. (The research has proved that a huge 
resource of efficiency is provided simply by the lack of spontaneous transfer and the 
neglect of deliberate dissemination by governmental organizations.) 
— The innovation chain model examined the characteristics of the cooperation of 
R+D institutes, component producing companies, assembling companies, trading and 
servicing companies in the realization of innovations. This investigation was based on 
the continuous feed-back of the evaluations of one phase's results to the previous 
phase, scrutinizing its contribution to the results. This kind of investigation revealed 
the characteristic breaking points of the innovation chain: the inconsistent interests 
of the cooperating companies, shortages in the supply etc. (It has become clear that 
some changes are needed not only in the incentive system but also in the organiza-
tion structure of the economy — both are tasks of the government — to solve the 
problems of motivation and shortages.) 
— The field of innovation requires an integrated analysis of the factors of the 
innovation processes and chains together with the factors of the economic, social and 
cultural life of the country, connected with similar events and trends on a worldwide 
scale. It has also turned out that — following the typical situation of firms in technol-
ogy, marketing and international competition — there are some specific forces in the 
innovation field, to which the innovation requirements and abilities of the enter-
prises respond. To fulfil those requirements and to fit their abilities different factors 
of the innovation processes and chains have to be stressed by the firms' management. 
The typical combination of the different factors, however, renders the planning, or-
ganisation and control of innovation easier for the managers — and helps the govern-
ments, too, when they have to assess different innovation plans to decide the way 
and degree of support. 
The research on the innovation readiness and ability of enterprises and their emp-
loyees began with formulating and checking those three models. 
The Innovation Process 
Looking at the features of the innovation process our first aim was to find and weigh 
the motives of starting innovations. Examining the processes of the sample we 
have found that the motives derive from 
— marketing problems in 22 cases, 
— R+D aims in 18 cases, 
— company strategy in 18 cases, 
— financial incentives in 8 cases and 
— governmental initiatives in 2 cases. 
The first source clearly shows the importance of the market and its impact on the 
enterprises, even in a planned economy, if it is efficiently controlled by the govern-
ment's economic regulators. 
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Table 1 
Main motives of the innovation processes 
in the 28 Hungarian innovations examined 
Area where Number of 
Motives the motives effects3 
fit into 
To follow the technological trends R+D 6 
Growth of exports on Western markets marketing 5 
To follow market demands marketing 5 
Fitting into the strategic goals of the enterprise corporate 
strategy 5 
Substitution of Western imports by home made 
products finance 4 
More profitable sales marketing 4 
Closing of the technological gap of the enterprise 
and its competitors R+D 4 
Diversification corporate 
strategy 3 
Stimulation of the company's growth by international corporate 
industrial cooperations strategy 3 
Change of the consumer's buying habits marketing 3 
aOne motive influenced more than one innovation process. 
Table 1 shows the most decisive 10 motives of the above comprehensive list. 
(The whole number of motives was 29.) The figures of Table 1 show that the two 
motives stressed by the Hungarian government in the 1980s, namely growth of ex-
ports to Western markets and substitution of imports by home made products, played 
an important role in stimulating innovation processes on company level. Further 
investigation demonstrated that its cause had not been administrative interference, but 
favorable credits and subsidies — i.e. economic regulators of the economic directive 
system. 
Lesser results have been achieved by planning and organizing the innovation 
processes. It is well-known that many special planning and organizing methods are 
available to stimulate and accelerate the process. The sample of our research testified 
that the 28 innovation processes were realized in different organization structure, 
following the data of Table 2. It is convincing from the table that the traditional 
hierarchical structure of a company has been far less successful from the point of 
view of planning and organizing the innovation process: based on the traditional 
hierarchical structure, 6:5 was the rate of successful and unsuccessful innovations. 
All the other non-traditional forms of organization turned out to be more successful 
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than this. But it also emerged that the specific innovation centered organization struc-
tures are applied only in a scattered way by the managements of the investigated com-
panies. This also seems to be a real brake on the efficiency of innovation processes of 
many Hungarian companies, not belonging to the present sample. 
Table 2 
The organization structures of the sample's innovation processes and 
the frequency of their application 
Organization structures 
Frequency 
of their application'1 
in successful in unsuccessful 
innovation processes 
Traditional hierarchical structure of the company 
New innovation unit fit into the traditional structure 
of the company 
Innovation manager in a matrix management system 
Innovation team created by in-company professionals 
Innovation team created by internal and external 
professionals 
Innovation process with the cooperation of external 
institutes, firms, etc. 
Innovation process realized by an independent external 
institute or firm 
Innovation process realized by a newly created 
subsidiary of the company 
Innovation process realized by a newly created 









28 innovation processes in all 
^An innovation process can belong to more than one of the enumerated structures. 
All this supports the idea that organization structures of Hungarian companies are 
too rigid for the international competition of our days. 
The Innovation Chain 
The first topic of the research of innovation chains was the source of innovation, 
namely: in what a percentage did the idea of innovation arise from the innovating 
industrial company itself or from other (external) sources? For that special purpose 
we investigated all innovations of a three-year-period in the 19 enterprises of our 
sample. The results are represented by companies, as a percentage of all sources in 
Table 3. 
Table 3 
Sources of innovations in the innovation chain at the investigated enterprises 
Sources of innovations in percentage (all sources = 100) 
External sources 





































































































A 65 5 5 20 5 35 
В 100 — — — — — — — 
С 100 — — — — — — — 
D 100 — — — — — — — 
E 80 — — — 15 — 5 20 
F 100 - — — — — — — 
G 90 10 — — — — — 10 
H 65 30 — — — — 5 35 
I 100 — — — — — — — 
К 100 — — — — — — — 
L 60 10 5 15 — 5 5 40 
M 50 10 — — 5 35 — 50 
N 100 — — — — — _ — 
0 80 5 — — — 15 — 20 
P 100 — — — — — — — 
R 70 10 — — — 20 — 30 
S 90 — 5 — — 5 — 10 
T 83 5 — 2 — 8 2 17 
U 70 20 — — — — 10 30 
The figures show that most of the Hungarian companies are far too introverted: 
in 8 companies out of 19 all innovation ideas did originate in the company itself and 
in 5 others only less than 20 percent of new ideas from external sources. This points 
also to the information problem: the external information system of the enterprises 
is quite undeveloped yet. And this has not only technical reasons: the economic 
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environment of the firms does not force them to build up a more effective information 
system. In this respect it is clearly a governmental task to change the environment; this 
can be realized only by changing the economic regulators and/or the organization 
structure of the economy, stiffening hereby competition. 
Naturally the integration of the innovation chain is not limited to the input-output 
problems of the information systems of the companies, or, better to say, to the 
communication problems of the professionals and managers working in the 
enterprises of the chain. The other main factor of integration is the interest of the 
companies and individuals. Our research touched upon that question too. The results 
proved the thesis that interest on company level must have by and large the same 
weight at all enteprises of the chain; if one is far less interested in the innovation than 
the others, the innovation can easily be delayed or torpedoed at the weak point of the 
chain. Two consequences follow: 
— It is impossible to create a general system of motivation by central regulators for 
all enterprises of all innovation chains. Therefore the difficulty of different interest 
weights can be overcome only by lifting the too rigid profiles of the enterprises. In 
that case the innovating enterprise can choose the right partners with the same interest 
weight, even if the cooperation entails a new kind of research, production or trade 
activity for the partner. 
— Establishing an integrated innovation chain has to be the task of only one enter-
prise , that of the innovation leader. But to be able to fulfil this role the innovation 
leader must have the possibility to influence the incentive and investment funds of the 
partner enterprises. This means that central regulation has to open up further ways for 
the transfer of interest and investment funds between partner firms of the innovation 
chain. 
Our research has proved in the end that flexibility of profile and fund transfer are 
usually two important conditions of the success of innovations — mainly in smaller 
countries where domestic competition is often limited for reasons of economies 
of scale. 
The Field of Innovation 
The importance of the different factors of the field of innovation has been evaluated 
by the chief executives and middle managers of the enterprises, 240 managers in all. 
They marked the importance of each factor on a 0-5 scale. The votes have been added 
and multiplied by an index number, expressing relative importance. The biggest 10 
results are listed in Table 4, together with a percentage value of importance if the 
value of the most important factor equals 100%. 
It was expected that the inefficient incentives and the lack of financial means for 
investments will be ranked to the two first places. But the high ranking of infrastruc-
tural problems was a real surprise for the research team. (The infrastructure of innova-
tion consists of the information, R+D, financial, legal and educational systems on the 
national economy level.) This supported the idea that government has the duty to 
reassess from the point of view of innovation readiness and ability not only the 
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Table 8 
Weights of importance of the factors influencing the field of innovation 
Factors Weighted importance 
Percentage 
of importance 
if the most 
important 
factor is 100 
Lack of an efficient incentive system at company level 514.8 100 
Lack of financial means for investments at company 
level 492.9 95 
Undeveloped infrastructure of innovations at national 
economy level 417.5 81 
Outdated means of production 379.8 73 
Inefficiency of the economic direction system at 
national economy level (regulators, etc.) 379.4 73 
Insufficient skill and structure of the labour force 368.0 71 
Inefficiency of company management 348.4 67 
Unfavorable market conditions 347.2 67 
Lack of communication including idle runs of the 
information systems 301.0 58 
Inefficiency of tire partner relations in the innovation 
chain 298.2 57 
Table 5 
Efficacy of Punitive and Rewarding Regulators, According to the Opinion 
of 440 Managers 





Efficacy of the 
regulator 
measured on a 




More strict market conditions enforced by the 
government punitive 6.1 
More strict company profit regulation by the 
government punitive 4.0 
More abundant company sources for the better 
exploitation of technological and marketing 
possibilities rewarding 7.0 
More abundant company fond to increase the 
personal incomes of employees rewarding 7.6 
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management system of the economy, the regulators and the organization structure of 
the company level but also the elements of the infrastructure, e.g. whether the 
educational system serves the ability of individuals to innovate well. 
Another part of the research, on problems of the field of innovation, dealt with a 
special question: is the pushing (punitive) or the pulling (rewarding) effect of the 
central regulatory system more effective? The answer can be found in Table 5, where 
the first two regulators are of punitive, the second two of rewarding nature. It is clear 
from the data that - following the opinion of the 240 managers — the rewards are 
more effective: the difference between the two extreme values (4.0 and 7.6) is 3.6 on 
the 0—10 degree scale. The lesson is unambiguous. The Hungarian regulatory system 
has operated till now mainly with pushing regulators of punitive nature; it would be 
more effective to use pulling regulators of rewarding nature in a greater extent — even 
taking into consideration that pulling is more risky than pushing in market conditions 
where demand exceeds supply. 
Some Human Factors 
In the last part of our research we have tried to reveal some characteristics of the 
human factors, influencing the success of the innovation processes of the Hungarian 
enterprises. We started with two opinion polls. First we investigated the opinions of 
220 middle managers: what kind of managerial skills of chief executives do they 
consider the most important to be developed for the increase of the company's innova-
tion readiness and ability? The answers could be marked on a scale where 0 meant no 
importance and 10 the maximum importance of the development of the given skill. 
The average values of the 10 most important skills are presented in the third column 
of Table 6. It can be gleaned from the last column of the table that the lesson drawn 
from the 28 innovation case studies is slightly different from the ranking of the middle 
managers: we ranked the skills of better forecasting and planning (including market 
requirements) in the first place which was followed by the tasks of motivation and 
those of the development of the origanizational skills. 
In the second opinion poll we asked the middle managers of the sample to rank 
the necessity of developing the different incentives to improve the human characte-
ristics of the company's experts and employees and by those the company's innova-
tion readiness and ability. Their opinion is reflected in the first three columns of 
Table 7. Our 28 case studies of innovation processes showed that the human characte-
ristics of experts and employees have to be developed mainly in three groupings: the 
first is connected with quality and work intensity, the second with incentives and the 
third with knowledge and skill. As can be seen in the last column of the table, these 
findings correspond very well with the results of the poll. 
In the last part of the research our aim was to express the latent innovation 
capacity of experts and employees in a rough figure. We have gathered opinions about 
the difference of innovation ability of individuals when they work in their working-
place in usual circumstances, and in one of the forms of "In-House Economic 
Cooperative" (IHEC). (In Hungary top management has the right to permit the 
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Table 8 
The chief executives' managerial skills to be developed in the first place 









Managerial skills the opinions the investiga-
of 220 middle tion of the 28 
managers3 case studies 
1 Increase of the ability of decision-
making 7.1 5 
2 Right choice of collaborators in 
company management 6.9 4 
3 More efficient incentives and motiva-
tion systems 6.9 2a 
4 Better forecasting 6.7 la 
5 More efficient inter-company 
coordination 6.6 7 
6 Development of organization skill 
(coordination within the company) 6.5 3 
7 Better perception of new business 
prospects 6.4 1c 
8 Increase of risk-taking willingness 6.3 6 
9 Forming a better atmosphere for 
creativity at the company 6.3 2b 
10 Better understanding of marketing 
impulses 6.3 lb 
awhere 0 = minimum of importance, 10 = maximum of importance 
voluntary formation of IHECs of about 10-50 people to work overtime with the com-
pany's tools, equipments etc. for the company or directly for the market, under a 
special Company-IHEC contract. In the average the IHEC work of the employees is 
one and a half time more intensive than during the main shift and the hourly earning 
of the IHEC members in IHEC hours is the double of their hourly wage in the 8 hours 
working time.) The 240 top and middle managers of the sample estimated that the 
innovation readiness and ability in the IHEC time is three times as big as in the main 
shift — at least concerning smaller innovations. This means that the latent innovation 
capacity is double of the manifested one, this points to huge human reserves also in 
productivity, inadmissible in the scarce financial conditions and worsening interna-
tional competitiveness of today's Hungary. 
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Table 7 
Necessity of development of different incentives and human characteristics 
of experts and senior employees to increase the company's 





Professionals, and employees, 
characteristics 
Average 







tion of the 28 
case studies 
1 Use of the lively interest of individuals 
in financial incentives 8.2 2a 
2 Increase of the quality oriented 
discipline of individuals 7.9 la 
3 Increase of the information level of 
experts 7.9 3b 
4 Development of expert skills 7.8 3c 
5 Increase of work intensity 7.5 lb 
6 Better knowledge of market 
requirements 7.3 3a 
7 Increase of independence on different 
levels of the organization 7.1 2b 
8 Increase of the employees' owners-
-consciousness 7.0 2c 
9 Increase of the employees' inter-
disciplinary skills 6.9 3d 
10 Systematic exchange of expert 
experience at home and abroad 6.9 3e 
aWhere 0 = minimum of importance, 10 = maximum of importance 
Conclusions 
The main results of our research revealed some general lessons for the direction of the 
economy as well as for the management of the enterprises: 
• There are large possibilities to increase nationwide innovation readiness and 
ability — and by that the quality, productivity and efficiency level — by means of the 
"human factors" which do not require large investments or other financial expenses. 
• The directive system of the economy has to give way — even under the present 
unfavorable external conditions — to further decentralization and to more effective 
stimulation by incentives. 
• The economic regulators have to promote easier transfer of capital, profits and 
interest funds between enterprises to facilitate the integration of the innovation chains. 
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• Company management has to create — in the possession of the necessary risk 
funds — bolder innovation strategies, based on more complex forecasting and planning 
techniques and has to control the innovation process more efficiently, using special 
management methods for the speeding up the process. If present managements are un-
suited for the task, they have to be replaced — this means probably a quite strong 
reshuffling of top management. 
• The social status, income and level of independence of experts and senior 
employees have to be raised at the enterprises to increase their creativity — but in the 
same time status, income and independence have to be linked tightly with their 
current achievements: this means, greater personal mobility is needed in the whole of 
industry. 
The realization of the above requirements may help to put an end to shortage 
phenomena, to develop domestic competition also for higher competitiveness on world 
market level - two marks of a suitable field of innovation and two conditions for a 
healthy economic climate. 

INFORMATION - DECISION - INNOVATION 
JUDIT KARSAI 
One of the researches carried out by the Research Institute of Industrial Economics of 
the Hungarian Academy of Sciences in the course of 1983-84 was aimed at the 
analysis of the competitiveness of enterprises examining the factors influencing their 
willingness and ability to innovate. In revealing such factors research activity was 
concentrated first of all on the internal, enterprise components of competitiveness, 
since relations of economic management, political and social conditions had already 
been analyzed by several other investigations. The decisive results of these investiga-
tions are summarized in a study by Gábor Hovdnyi also published in this volume. 
One of the most important research fields was to examine how the use of informa-
tion influences the innovation ability of Hungarian industrial enterprises and how 
this effect could be improved. It was a common experience of international and 
Hungarian research, examining the conditions of innovation at enterprise level, that 
the success of innovation actions was largely depending on the information available 
for economic units undertaking innovation. 
The relationship between innovation and the enterprise information system was 
relatively little examined, however, up to now. First of all the revealing of the fact 
was missing as to what pieces of information as conditional factors do further and 
impede, respectively, the successful implementation of innovation. 
The present article summarizes the results of investigations made by the author. 
Data are based on the results of interviews and questionnaires made with and filled 
in, respectively, by 85 leaders of five Hungarian industrial enterprises with a staff 
of 2-13 thousand, each selected by random sampling and working in various fields 
and ranks. The correctness of the most important conclusions was confirmed also by 
a consultation with five other enterprises. 
The research examined the information activity of enterprise leaders, interviewed 
in three dimensions, supposing that their information tasks are differing not only 
according to functional units and hierarchical management levels, but are modified 
also in time adjusted to the individual phases of the realization of the innovation 
process. Accordingly, the three directions of investigation were horizontal informa-
tion -flows between organizational units of the enterprises, vertical ones between mana-




It was an important lesson to be drawn from the investigation that all enterprises had 
been in a difficult situation prior to undertaking innovation. The main problem 
resulted first of all from lacking possibilities to export for convertible currencies, due 
partly to the obsoleteness of their products and partly to the depression of some 
branch or the fact that some plant, previously exporting, had to discontinue this 
virtue of a high-level decision. Since the separation from Western markets took place 
precisely at the time when the economic policy of the state strongly stimulated 
convertible export, enterprises had to reckon with the disadvantageous consequences 
of regulation. 
However, the measures that could have prevented the critical situations had not 
been taken. Concerning information this meant that the information system of the 
enterprises did not forecast the changes occurring even in those cases where this could 
have been possible. 
Thus enterprises in question were forced to take certain measures, i.e. the innova-
tion process was started neither when it would have been most topical, nor by the 
selection of the optimal solution but by seizing the — eventually single — possibility 
arising at the time of an unavoidable change. 
"Selection" was made much more difficult by the deficient functioning of the 
information systems. Since there was no systematic observation of information enabl-
ing the recognition of economic, market and technical trends, the knowledge of stra-
tegies of the competitors, as well as the finding of gaps on the markets that could have 
been exploited, the information systems delivered no information that would have 
inspired innovation and a development of new concepts. 
In case of all innovations examined the proposal starting innovation came from out-
side of the enterprise, that is the recognition of an actual possibility was due first of 
all to proposals of future cooperation partners and some potential buyers respectively. 
Enterprises had to decide mostly on the single idea raised, accepting it or not 
undertaking innovation at all. 
Therefore real alternatives were missing. Enterprise departments, participating in 
the realization of actions resulting in innovation, generally do not even exactly know 
what kind of information they ought to ensure for themselves and other organizational 
units of the enterprise, respectively, as it turned out in the course of the investigation. 
The reason for this is that those organizational units and persons, respectively, who 
have a proper view on information processes are missing from the enterprises. 
Within enterprises the various departments participating in development actions, 
acquisition of new markets, etc. are not uniformly informed either. This is confirmed 
by opinions of 62 leaders of the enterprises, drawn into the aforementioned investiga-
tion, working in various fields and jobs on the information available for development, 
trade, economic and production management departments, as well as for enterprise 
centre and factories. (For the sake of quantification we asked them to assess the 
information by grading it as usual in the school system.) 
Data of the table below indicate that the level of information available to the 
production lines falls considerably behind that of other fields. 
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Average marks referring to the level of information available 
for various enterprise fields broken down according to those interviewed 
Qualified enterprise fields 
interviewed Tech- Pro- Eco- Trade Centre Factories 
nical duction nomic 
Technical leaders 3.2 2.9 3.2 3.2 4.2 3.4 
Production leaders 3.2 2.6 3.4 3.4 3.8 2.9 
Economic leaders 3.5 2.9 3.6 3.2 4.0 3.2 
Trade leaders 3.2 3.1 3.3 3.9 3.9 3.1 
Those working in 
the centre 3.5 3.1 3.4 3.5 4.1 3.3 
Those working at 
factories 2.3 2.5 2.9 29 3.7 2.8 
AH interviewed 3.3 2.9 3.4 3.4 4.0 3.2 
On the basis of interviews it may be added that specialists, dealing with production 
at the end of the production process, are under-informed. This is a joint consequence 
of the low level of mechanization of production management, of frequent forced sub-
stitution as well as of the deviating motivation in organizational units, carrying out va-
rious activities built on each other. 
It may be seen from the table that, concerning their own information, leaders work-
ing in the field of trade have the best knowledge. This is, however, in a strong 
contradiction to the fact that — as it turned out during interviews made with co-
workers of other departments — commercial departments are often failing to give 
appropriate information on market situation, the development of prices, competitors, 
future intentions of buyers or on circumstances bringing about the success or failure 
on the market. 
The information level of economic fields, also favourably valuating their own 
information level, was often criticized, too. Namely, leaders working in other fields 
do not feel the information obtained from them on the efficiency of realized deals, 
expected profitability of planned development projects as well as on accounting of 
producing units within the enterprise sufficient. 
The information level of enterprise centres, being the highest according to the table, 
is not only better than that of the individual factories, but exceeds the level of all 
functional fields, too. The marks given are likely to mean the relatively better informa-
tion level of top leaders of enterprises as well as the powerful concentration of inform-
ation. 
During the examination of definite cases it turned out that the consideration of 
enterprises was influenced first of all by technical problems and the standpoint of 
government agencies found out in advance. 
Top leaders controlling initial information were working usually in technical fields 
and paid relatively less attention to determining market demands and expected needs. 
They did not analyze the supposed market situation and sales possibilities to be ex-
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pected with the running-in of production — by means of forecasts — and in most cases 
information, required for this, was not gathered. 
Information on market segments formed by expected buyers, consumption circum-
stances and habits, on existing standards as well as on the expected price of the pro-
duct was very often missing. 
Just as in case of the market aspects enterprises paid similarly little attention to 
decide whether they are capable at all to carry out the planned innovation. This ques-
tion was examined anyway in many places by the future cooperation partner and 
buyer, respectively, when submitting respective innovation proposals. 
In the course of the preparation for the decision-making process relatively little 
emphasis was given to the profitability of the new activity for the enterprise beside 
the points of view outlined above. Since enterprises wished to "renew" first of all 
not in the interest of greater profitability or more efficient functioning, they were 
not too keen on obtaining information of an economic character. 
Pieces of information obtained and assessed at the initial stage indicate that enter-
prises wished to appraise the risk undertaken by their innovation only to a small 
extent. Their attention was much more engaged by obtaining central development 
sources, achieving excessive export, utilizing unused capacities as well as professional 
success, therefore, the finding out of the standpoint of government agencies as well 
as knowledge enabling the realization of innovation in the technical sense were the 
most valuable pieces of information for them. 
The period of preparation for decision-making is characterized by — with the 
enterprises examined — beside the onesidedness of the points of view taken into 
consideration also by the fact that only a relatively limited number of leaders, work-
ing first of all in technical fields and placed at the top of the hierarchy, participated 
in the process of gathering information, while representatives of other fields without 
adequate information and possibilities to interfere in the decision-making, were less 
capable of influencing those decisions mostly determining the outcome of innovation. 
Since the reconciliation of pieces of information resulting from various sources and 
representing deviating interests was not solved, decision-making could not ensure the 
correctness of decisions corresponding to all-enterprise interests. 
The Organization of the Innovation Process 
For most of the enterprises the period of gathering initial information coincided un-
noticed with the beginning of preparations for innovation. This happened without hav-
ing evaluated and institutionally discussed the information obtained in the meantime. 
The majority of enterprises did not even fix information obtained during initial 
surveys connected to the innovation. Neither the results expected from innovation nor 
the conditions to be ensured for their achievement were summarized. Reasons for 
undertaking innovation, expected difficulties and possible tools to overcome them 
were not summarized. 
With the above summarization missing, the information basis that could have served 
as a basis of comparison in the course of carrying out the innovation and of the evalua-
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tion of changes occurring in the meantime, respectively, was available only in the 
minds, what is more, sometimes only in the mind of one person in most of the enter-
prises. 
Behind the amalgamation of gathering information and the beginning of innovation 
there are practically decisions made much earlier which determine the outcome of 
innovations in practice. That is, the judgements were made prior to the detailed 
analysis, more or less at the time when the idea of innovation was raised. 
The negative effect of decisions, made in an informal way and at a very early 
stage, appeared not only in the lack of proper foundation. Namely, early decision-mak-
ing also meant that the most important supporters of innovation within the enterprise 
were given a determinant, occasionally even exclusive role in decision-making due to 
their better information. This, however, impeded the control of the truthfulness of 
information, the clarification of differring opinions and decision-making with the 
enforcement of "collective wisdom" as well. 
In case of no enterprise, among those examined, there was a project made which 
would have controlled the entire process of innovation. In this way missing plans could 
not determine tasks to be carried out for those participating in and controlling innova-
tion, nor was any schedule for the individual stages of innovation set up adjusted to 
the final date of completion. 
Orders of managing directors, practically replacing detailed plans and determining 
the range and tasks of participants as well as closing dates of the completion of various 
works, very briefly gave very little information to all those concerned and provided no 
basis for making subsequent decisions either. 
While the realization of innovation within the enterprise including development, 
production and sales went on with each firm in the traditional organization — i.e. in a 
hierarchical organizational form, following enterprise functions — independent orga-
nizations were set up in order to further the control and management of tasks in two 
factories. 
Setting up these organizations reflected in both cases the intention that problems 
connected with innovation should be given special importance. That is, with these two 
enterprises — where innovation was handled as a "system" — departments responsible 
for coordination starting with material purchase through the programming of produc-
tion and ending with sales made a considerable contribution to the relatively smooth 
realization of innovations. 
Independently of the selection of concrete management solutions the outcome of 
innovations was considerably influenced also by the enterprise leader who had the 
top control over innovation. 
The person of the main coordinator was with each enterprise choosen from among 
the top leaders since this post was fulfilled generally by the managing director or the 
deputy managing director, the technical director or the leader of some factory. When 
getting acquainted with the history of innovations it turned out to be justified to have 
one of the top leaders as the leader of innovation since without their authority and 
various connections the realization of innovation would have presumably come to a 
deadlock several times. 
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Information Concerning Devebpment 
When following up the outcome of innovations, it turned out that the phase when new 
concepts had taken some concrete form, that is, appeared in the form of a prototype, 
sample or organizational proposal, had been the most critical. Namely, in this period 
problems generally concomitant with the beginning of any new activity arose simul-
taneously with difficulties resulting from the inadequate preparation, thougthless start 
of innovation, wrong decisions made previously as well as based on unexpected 
changes. 
Since the majority of innovations examined consisted of development projects 
taken over in the form of licence or know-how, developers gathered the decisive part 
of their information from technical and fashion knowledge purchased in the interest 
of innovation and could rely on their own information system only to a smaller ex-
tent. However, the process was slowed down several times by the fact that technical 
documentation, to be delivered according to agreements, arrived only with great 
delay and sometimes did not even correspond to the specification given in the 
contracts. In case of two factories more extensive own development was required than 
planned because the technical documentation obtained did not refer to an elaborate 
and tested equipment and, respectively, the construction concept taken over had to be 
made suitable for mass production by the adapting enterprise. This, of course, caused 
special problems. 
Altogether one enterprise of the light industry was satisfied with the information 
obtained since it obtained the West-European specification of the latest fashion in due 
time and according to contract, therefore its own designing work on concrete models 
could begin. 
Beside the above information, forming the basis of innovation, the exact know-
ledge of needs and ideas of consumers as well as the expected conditions of applica-
tion were required for development. 
To ensure all this information traditional information channels were not sufficient 
either, as it turned out. In almost each case solutions deviating from usual ones had to 
be applied, based mainly on cooperation with users, specialized foreign trading com-
panies and cooperation partners going far beyond normal business relations. 
Among solutions unusual in the practice of enterprises such ones can be found as, 
for example, the "leasing" of developers of future users, special advising activity of a 
representative of the cooperation partner staying permanently on the suite, further-
more the continuous control and opinion by one of the most important potential 
buyers concerning already elaborated, detailed plans. 
Beside difficulties of ensuring adequate information the development period of 
innovations became much longer than planned also by the circumstance that factories 
when planning innovation, usually underestimated the capacity required and 
occasionally not the most suitable departments were made responsible for 
development, there was no comprehensive appraisal concerning the special knowledge 
required, the stimulation of those participating in development was not solved, 
furthermore it occurred too, that the work of various fields collaborating in develop-
ment could not be properly coordinated. 
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In overcoming these problems managing directors and technical directors, controll-
ing innovation from the top, were given a very important role taking part in the solu-
tion of even the smallest details since they considered the success of innovation as a 
personal matter. 
The technical director of a factory — as he mentioned it - worked personally a lot 
on the new design, filed the sample also at home in order to find out what was wrong 
with it. The managing director of another factory, controlling innovation, personally 
checked the preparation of each collection and took an important part in the entire 
process including materials purchasing and the delivery of finished products, too. 
In general, even the designs to be manufactured were selected in his presence. 
Beside work going on in the development phase decisions on the individual ques-
tions of realization, continuation, and eventual modification or stopping of innova-
tion had considerable information requirements, too. 
Issues discussed at a wider forum in the course of development referred — as con-
firmed by minutes - first of all to the way of realization of innovation and to detailed 
questions, in general. Accordingly, the information founding decisions were mainly of 
a technical character just as determined by the order of business and the decisions 
made with the participation of the prescribed persons only rarely affected fields other 
than technical ones. 
Similarly to decisions made in previous phases of innovation, information connect-
ed with the market and demands was delivered usually by planning and developing 
and not by commercial or marketing departments. Representatives of economic and 
commercial fields had no real part even here due to the lack of information available, 
therefore their participation in decision-making was only formal. Due to this circum-
stance no real exchange of information, ensuring the verification of information and 
the complexity of viewpoints to be taken into consideration, took place in connection 
with decisions. 
It is especially striking that the agencies and bodies mentioned above did not 
analyze thoroughly enough the effects of major changes in the environment or within 
the enterprises on the given innovation, nor the modification of conditions, taken into 
account at the beginning of innovation. 
Thus it was neglected that the price of one of the most important basic materials 
increased, estimated market demand decreased, the specification required changed, 
calculation did not remain topical because of the longer time of implementation, new 
competitors appeared on the market with products similar to those under develop-
ment. That is, corporate decisions provided little basis for the eventual modification 
or stopping of innovation despite the fact that very important changes had occurred 
in initial conditions in the meantime. 
Enterprises were informed about changes, outlined above, that had already occurr-
ed, from technical papers, at exhibitons, through their service network or commercial 
partners. For being able to take steps preventing negative effects of these changes, 
however, a certain foresight would have been required, that is, also signals referring to 
the expected occurrence of events ought to have been followed with attention. For 
this, however, enterprise infonnation systems providing information enabling first of 
all operative orientation were not suitable. According to the documents examined not 
even the effects of changes perceived were analyzed. 
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In the lack of viewpoints, expectations and conditions, properly cleared and 
summarized when starting innovation, the question of considering whether changes or 
modifications occurred would not query the expedience of the continuation of innova-
tion was not raised anywhere. 
Information on Production 
While in the phase of development it was mainly the novelty of the topic that caused 
difficulties for the enterprises examined, in case of manufacturing problems resulted 
first of all from the ensuring of production factors in time as well as from the speed 
of manufacturing required. Namely, delays occurring in the phase of development had 
to be compensated usually by the shortening of the period of production preparation, 
since the final date of realization could not be changed or if so, only with disadvanta-
geous consequences. 
Due to the accelerated rate, resulting from the nature of innovation as well as from 
backwardness, tasks connected with innovation had in most cases to be solved 
separately from other activities of the enterprise and much more rapidly than the usual 
"normal" working rate. 
Since the quality, reliability and price of finished products depended in a deter-
minant way on the material, spare parts and accessories used and built in, respectively, 
also in case of innovation the real control of materials purchase was taken over by 
those controlling innovation from specialized functional departments either officially 
or tacitly. Since a considerable part of material could be obtained only from import, 
changes affected also the competent foreign trading company in several cases. 
In case of two enterprises the foreign trading company, having traditional relations 
with the factories, proved to be incapable of obtaining the necessary materials since 
the time to be spent on purchasing was much shorter than previously or usual in case 
of other products. Namely, export and import departments of generally big foreign 
trading companies, working separately from each other, could not keep abreast of the 
accelerated rate. In one case, for example, such a special office was created with the 
traditional foreign trading company that dealt exclusively with import and export 
connected with the given innovation and where also the commercial department of the 
manufacturing firm was represented. 
In the exploration of sources for material, accessories and part units to be purchas-
ed the selleres of licences, the cooperation partners and the future users did all help 
and this proved to be very useful especially at the time of the first attempts. 
Starting continuous production required a more intensive exchange of information 
and much closer cooperation than usual by the designing, developing and manufactur-
ing departments of the factories affected because of the novelty of products and the 
production technology applied, respectively. According to enterprise leaders com-
munication, pointing far beyond official relations, was very frequently required be-
tween those working in various special fields in the interest of successful production. 
In one factory the development of closer than normal relations was justified by the 
emergency situation arising because of a very fast turnover time. The so-called experi-
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mental manufacturing, started on the basis of incomplete documentation, had to result 
in excellent quality since the customer judged the acceptability of the product on this 
basis, making the participation of developers in the process of production indispens-
able. 
More circumspection than usual was required also by the preparation of production 
programmes in general. When programming production, especially the lack of compu-
ter could be strongly felt. The registration of parameters affecting production, as well 
as the operational order had to be made and set up, respectively, manually. Where 
attempts were made to computerize the preparation of manufacturing it turned out 
that the very numerous interim changes, appearing because of the low level of organiz-
ation, could not be followed up by computer, therefore data had to be recorded also 
manually beside the tables. Regrouping having become necessary of problems in ma-
terials purchasing, faulty products as well as programme modifications in partner fac-
tories and the evaluation of changes in design, resulting from the modification of 
buyer's demands, would have required the registration of at least 50—60 changes per 
day and the processing of consequences from computerized programming. 
Difficulties of programming could be overcome only by holding a great number of 
coordination meetings, intervention at the managerial level and by means of a special 
department established for this purpose. Even with this a lot of daily intervention had 
been required in direct production management. Just as in previous phases of innova-
tion also in that of manufacturing the overwhelming part of decisions and measures 
were taken at top level, that is: control and management were largely centralized. 
Market Appearance 
For the first moment of the market appearance of their innovation — i.e. for declaring 
their products as finished — the enterprises examined obtained considerable help from 
their future customers and foreign cooperation partners participating in sales, respecti-
vely. 
With one enterprise, for example, the product inspector of the foreign cooperation 
partner, staying on the spot, and with another one "test sales" on the domestic 
market ensured information indispensable at the start. 
Yet, none of the enterprises examined was in possession of a marketing plan at the 
time of appearing on the market that would have contained guidelines, scheduling and 
those responsible for various tasks, becoming actually necessary. A properly elaborated 
marketing plan would have provided the guarantee for sales promotion, i.e. for 
influencing the market through communication, planning of the initial price, develop-
ment of an organization carrying out after-sale services as well as the selection of sales 
channels to be made in due time and on the basis of identical principles. 
The elaboration of marketing plans was largely impeded by that a considerable part 
of information required for the preparation of a programme was not available and this 
was a consequence first of all of the deficient information, obtained when selecting 
and planning innovation, as well as in the course of market research made prior to the 
manufacturing phase. 
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Appearing on the market with the product declared as finished included - and this 
was an important element — also the information provided for potential buyers on the 
innovation. Little attention was paid to the preparation of this by the enterprises 
entering independently into the market, in general. 
The fact that the publicity given to products was usually not thought over properly, 
made not in due time and without aiming at potential buyers was a direct consequence 
of that market viewpoints had always been pushed into background over the entire 
process of innovation. 
The lack of elaborating an appropriate market policy to be followed up as well as 
of market research founding this influenced also the fixing of the prices of products. 
For example, the price fixed at tire beginning of market introduction had to be 
reduced to less than half on the basis of market signals in case of an innovation. 
Namely, the top leader, deciding the price, offered the price without asking the foreign 
trading company or the commercial department of his own factory, though he had no 
inkling about market prices of products similar to the new product of the factory. 
The situation of another factory, appearing with a product being novelty even on 
the world market, was made more difficult by the lack of experience in determining 
prices, since they had always been in a price-following position previously. 
Since at the enterprises examined no system feeding back news on the market 
reception to those participating in realization has been established in general, those 
controlling innovation at top level had relatively the most information on results and 
failures of individual innovation projects. However, an analysis comparing original 
ideas and objectives with the real situation did not take place even at the level of top 
leaders. Thus no complex evaluation of innovation took place in general that could 
have furthered later innovation processes and the further development of individual 
innovation projects, respectively, with the enterprise. The lack of exact recalculation 
had also considerably delayed the judgement on profitability with several enterprises 
and just also the mapping of strong and weak points of manufacturing. 
Forced Accommodation 
Summarizing the experience of research it turns out that in the Hungarian industrial 
enterprises examined the level of their information systems did not ensure the in-
formation required for the realization of innovation through the running of these 
systems. Accordingly, enterprises organized the gathering of a considerable part of 
information regarded necessary mainly by "manual control", i.e. individually. 
Individual solutions and special measures applied by the enterprises which, after 
all, enabled the obtaining and utilization of the most important pieces of informa-
tion in case of realized — and thus successful — innovation processes clearly indicate 
the forced accommodation of innovation to the underdevelopment of the informa-
tion system. 
Forced accommodation manifests itself already in that enterprises can choose 
mainly only such types of innovation which may ensure otherwise missing informa-
tion for them — for example in the form of licence purchases or cooperation agree-
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ments. By choosing innovation enabling also the purchase of information, however, 
only a certain part of information and knowledge required may be obtained. Pieces 
of information taken over may be utilized mainly in the course of realization of 
innovation but they provide no adequate help in the preparation of decisions further-
ing the selection and interim modification of innovation. This fact is well demonstrat-
ed by several innovation projects, started with delay from the very beginning as a 
forced measure and without any alternative in their majority. 
It may be considered also as an accomodation to the underdeveloped information 
systems that enterprises solve the organization of exchange of information in case of 
innovation often in a way deviating from otherwise usual channels. Namely, the 
organization of innovation and the control of its information process is cared for 
generally not by traditional hierarchical order of the functioning enterprises but by a 
coordination of control and within this an exchange of information in the hands of 
the top leader, looking after innovation and of this apparatus, respectively. 
In case of innovation projects, realized in practice, the task of ensuring the most 
important pieces of information had to be fulfilled exclusively by highly ranked 
leaders sponsoring the innovation. However, a considerable part of information and 
knowledge required for them was not delivered by the individual special enterprise 
fields and by their medium-level leaders, respectively, but was gathered by top leaders 
controlling innovation directly, through their extensive external relations and 
influence within the enterprise. Thus, however, the enterprises with a relatively larger 
staff examined failed to utilize precisely those advantages resulting from their size, 
mainly excessive knowledge that could have been ensured by their specialized de-
partments. 
The large-scale concentration of information in the hands of one of the top leaders 
makes the verification of information more difficult and increases the possibility of 
errors on the part of such leaders. Since they have the most information on innova-
tion, the overwhelming part of decisions concerning innovation is made within their 
sphere of authority, even if decision-making happens through various bodies in many 
cases, but only formally. 
The information of other leaders, working in various special fields but not parti-
cipating in the realization of innovation directly, is endured only to a small extent by 
the above solution of supplying information for innovation. Orientation and clear-
sightedness are made difficult apart from the above also by that the process of innova-
tion is only rarely or not at all interrupted by an evaluation, comparing objectives to 
the results achieved and deciding on continuation. 
As a consequence of all this the method of orientation and decision-making applied 
in the case of innovation does not ensure the correctness and correspondence to all-
enterprise interests of enterprise decisions connected with innovation. Too much 
depends on the person,his motivation and possibilities, abilities and attitudes controll-
ing innovation. 
In the field of supplying information for innovation a considerable change may be 
imagined only if the economic mechanism, developed further in a complex way, raises 
new requirements toward enterprises, that is, if the further development of the re-
form strengthens the pressures bearing on the information systems of enterprises. 
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Parallel to this the internal motivation and decision-making system of enter-
prises has to be rendered capable of meeting increased information demands. Chang-
ing internal motivation of enterprises in a direction that economic units will be 
judged according to the useful performance made in the interest of the enterprise 
will automatically raise the rank of information required for a given performance and 
increase the claim to obtain information. 
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ON THE EFFICIENCY OF THE PURCHASE AND APPLICATION 
OF LICENCES 
MAGDOLNA GARAMI 
The acceleration of technological progress belongs to the characteristic features of our 
age. As an effect of this process products and technologies are changing more and 
more rapidly. Products and technologies considered as up-to-date at present may be-
come outdated already by tomorrow. The average lifetime of products is decreasing 
too. At the same time the manufacturing of a modern industrial product or the 
introduction of an up-to-date procedure are often preceded by preparatory, research, 
design, execution and development works lasting for years. Making this process shorter 
is a very important task from the viewpoint of both up-to-dateness and profitability. 
The solution of this task may be served by the take-over and efficient application of 
existing technical knowledge. 
International trade — selling and buying — of technical knowledge is a form of 
international division of labour, having become very important during the last two 
decades. The import of technical knowledge enables selective research activity, the 
concentration of resources, the shortening of the realization time of development pro-
jects, the decrease of differences in technological levels, the acceleration of economic 
growth as well as the increase of the efficiency of social production. 
Favourable effects of development projects realized on the basis of lincences1 are, 
however, often not up to expectations and several unexpected, unfavourable con-
sequences may emerge. In case of a concrete technological development project 
potential benefits of the take-over of certain knowledge may be utilized only if the 
questions "why?", "what?", "from whom?", "when?","who?" and "how?" can be 
answered. 
In the present article I am going to deal with factors determining the efficiency of 
the purchase and application of licences.2 
*The interpretation of the notion of licence and licence agreement, respectively, is not uniform. 
According to certain views any legal relationship involving some mental product is considered 
a licence, while others consider only legal relationships regulating the trade of technical pro-
ducts protected by patents as a licence. By licence and licence agreement we mean a contractual 
relationship on the basis of which the licenser is obliged to ensure an effective and legal situa-
tion for the licensee that the latter may practically realize and utilize a certain technical solu-
tion at a determined level. Three variants of licence agreements are distinguished, namely, those 
referring to patents, exclusively to know-how services and to trade marks, respectively. 
2 The article is based on research going on at the Research Institute of Industrial Economics of the 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences. Conclusions of the research were formulated on the basis of a 
detailed analysis of 23 licence deals. Out of these 23 cases 16 were realized in the machine in-
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The introduction of the domestic production of a new product or technology may 
happen in two ways, firstly based on own research and development, secondly by the 
diffusion of existing technical knowledge. 
The exchange of technical knowledge is more efficient than domestic research and 
development if it brings about greater technical and economic returns (measurable by 
parameters) with identical or less inputs (including also time input). 
The efficiency of development by means of licences can often not be quantified 
— just as it is sometimes the case with own research and development too. At such 
occasions one can speak of benefits and disadvantages of licences. Nevertheless, fac-
tors influencing efficiency may be assessed. 
The factors determining the take-over and efficient application of existing tech-
nical knowledge are the following: 
1. selection of the development objective; 
2. processes preparing the take-over of knowledge, adapting and further develop-
ing them, 
3. personal, material, financial, organizational and other conditions of the realiza-
tion of processes, 
4. terms of realization of the take-over and adaptation of knowledge. 
The main criterion of the purchase and efficient application of licences is the 
harmony and consistency among factors influencing efficiency. 
Factors determining the efficiency of development realized on the basis of licen-
ces are summarized in Table 1. 
Objectives of Licence Purchases 
Hungarian economic policy expected much from development projects to be realized 
by means of licence purchases in the 1970^. Starting from hypotheses of inter-
national licence trade trends, supported also by statistics, resolutions stimulating the 
increase of licence purchases were passed one after the other. 
Following such resolutions the weight of development projects based on licence 
purchases increased in Hungarian enterprises. This is indicated also by Table 2. 
The dynamic growth of the number of products manufactured on the basis of 
licences and of licences used in production and of enterprises using licences may 
be well seen from data of the table. Inspite of this the range of Hungarian products, 
realizable on hard currency markets, did not increase according to expectations. 
The share of product, manufactured on the basis of licences, within total sales 
amounted to 3.7 percent in 1976 and to 5.2 percent in 1982. The share of export sales 
within total sales receipts of licence products amounted to 37.0 percent in 1976 and 
36.1 percent in 1982. The share of non-rouble exports within total export sales 
receipts of licence products amounted to 18.4 percent in 1976 and to 61.5 percent 
in 1982. According to data formed from the above figures sales of products 
(cont. 2.) 
dustry, 6 in chemical industry and 1 in metallurgy. In the course of research work several 
methods were applied. Case studies were made, just as surveys, questionnaires as well as inter-
views. 
Table 1 
Factors determining the efficiency of development realized on the basis of licences 
Factors of the objective system Factors of the process system Factors of the organizational 
system 
Factors of the constraints 
system 
1. Reality of objectives, harmony 
among objectives and tools 
2. Consistency of objectives at 
various (macro- and micro-) 
levels 
3. Development of the entire 
verticaüty (joint development 
of background-, processing-
and further processing in-
dustries) 
4. Development of adaptive 
systems (where the own R+D 
capacity is suitable for adapta-
tion and further development 
of the technology taken oven 
1. Preparation of develop-
ment based on licences 
1.1 Determining the ob-
jectives and way of 
development 
1.2 Research of the licence-
market, comparison of 
offers, selection of the 
favourable variant 
1.3 Obtaining of on-site ex-
perience with the licen-
ser in its reference fac-
tory 
1.4 Conclusion and contents 
of the contract 
2. Adaptation 
2.1 Preparation of adaptatior 
programme 
2.2 Adaptation 
2.3 Coordination of adapta-
tion 
3. Further development 
3.1 Take-over and adapta-
tion of the product 
and/or technology 
further developed by 
the licenser 
3.2 Further domestic de-
velopment of the pro-
duct or technology 
taken over 
1. Integration of elements of 
the innovation chain 
(R+D+P+R)3 within the 
frameworks of the receiving 
enterprise 
2. Strategical, operative and 
informative sub-systems of 
the receiving enterprise 
3. Statistical and dynamical 
organizations of enterprises 





4. Information system 
5. Interestedness 
Terms of realization of the 
development 
aR, D, P and R are abbreviations of the respective words for Research, Development, Production and Realization. 
166 
Table 2 







Number of kinds 
of products 
manufactured on 
the basis of 
licences 
1972 1979 1982 1972 1979 1982 1972 1979 1982 
Mining 1 2 3 1 2 5 1 3 3 
Electric energy industry - 1 2 — 16 11 - - -
Metallurgy 3 14 11 5 31 32 8 33 15 
Machine industry 50 85 79 95 200 227 106 302 285 
Building material industry 2 9 7 3 18 27 9 21 31 
Chemical industry 17 26 26 42 124 156 74 219 284 
Light industry 9 33 32 10 40 47 15 66 97 
Other industries 1 2 5 5 2 5 5 5 11 
Food industry 6 9 8 7 9 8 7 20 37 
Socialist industry altogether 89 181 173 168 442 518 225 669 763 
manufactured on the basis of licences amounted to 0.25 percent of total sales on 
dollar markets in 1976 and to 1.15 percent in 1982. This means that developments 
based on licence purchases brought about no considerable improvement in market po-
sitions in convertible relations. Exports of licence products in this relation are usually 
not profitable for the Hungarian party. 
Licence purchases of Hungarian enterprises were often motivated in recent years 
by the assumption according to which development by means of the adaptation of 
licences would result in faster technological progress and the products manufactured 
ensure better market positions than products of own research and development. 
Practice has often contravened both assumptions. 
Although the import of technical knowledge potentially enables also a considerable 
decrease in the technical gap, the difference between most advanced and domestic 
technological levels, this possibility has remained only a potential one in the majority 
of cases. Why? Which are the facts that converted assumptions into unrealistic objec-
tives and potential possibilities into unexploitable situations? 
1. Firms representing the world level are usually not willing to sell their most 
advanced technology, ensuring extraprofits, but offer in most cases those products 
and technologies for sale which are to some extent already outdated and do not 
represent most advanced technology any more. If the products or technology offered 
show more favourable parameters than those to be attained by own research and 
development or the existing ones then Hungarian enterprises buy them. Its unam-
biguous result will be that dynamical world level being in permanent motion it may 
never be attained by the simple adaptation of licences. Not even in the ideal case when 
the licenser sells the know-how of its most advanced product, because the product 
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and/or technology taken over in this way become usually outdated during the long 
time required for domestic adaptation. 
2. A simple adaptation is not enough even for following world level. A parallel 
progress of domestic and world level may be ensured only by the continuous further 
development of technologies taken over which may, in some exceptional cases, ensure 
attaining of world level. For further development however, a creative flexible research 
and development staff is required, interested in their work and properly knowing 
local particularities. Due to organizational, motivational and other factors attempts 
aimed at the further development of technologies taken over were not among the 
most emphasized tasks of Hungarian researchers and development specialists. 
3. There are two factors, in general, acting against the improvement of market po-
sitions in the dollar relation of products manufactured on the basis of licences. One 
is a subjective while the other an objective factor. Let us perhaps begin with the 
subjective factor. The export of products manufactured on the basis of licences is 
usually strongly limited by the licenser. Direct and unlimited export possibilities are 
granted only very rarely. In a part of the cases the licenser buys finished products 
back but only at prices often unfavourable to us. The objective factor is the technol-
ogical level of products. During the process of adaptation for Hungarian circumstances 
lasting in a favourable case for three but usually for five to six years, products become 
outdated and they are often not purchased even in markets of developing countries. 
Taking the aforementioned factors into consideration it may be stated that with 
development by means of licences world level may be followed in favourable cases 
parallel but only if the rate of further domestic development may keep up with the 
increase in world level. 
In Hungary development projects based on licence purchases are usually not 
followed by further real development after adaptation, therefore the lag behind the 
most advanced products of the world becomes greater again. According to the above 
the efficiency of the technology taken over may be well characterized by the 
difference between world and domestic technological levels and the rate of decrease 
of the technological gap. With a view to this the only appropriate solution is to buy 
technologies representing world level at present and intensively develop them further, 
following adaptation taking economic potential of macro- and micro-level economic 
units, the available assets and conditions, the contemporary technological level at 
home, the development level of scientific-technological basis, technical traditions and 
real development perspectives into consideration. 
Another precondition of the efficiency of development by means of licences is that 
this development should affect not only the enterprises issuing final products, but also 
the industries manufacturing spare parts and units — called background industry in 
Hungary - because the level of a given product or technology is determined not only 
by its own technical and economic parameters but also by the level of the background 
industry. Concrete cases prove that existing differences between technological levels 
of the receiving enterprise and its background industry respectively affect the entire 
outcome of the take-over of technical knowledge. Products of the domestic back-
ground industry, the quality of basic materials, intermediary products and fittings do 
not meet requirements raised by the more advanced technology, to be adapted. There-
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fore, adapting enterprises are not fond of buying such technologies which would 
require large background industry involvement. The background industry — because of 
various limits on available assets — cannot, and eventually (due to diverging interests) 
does not even wish to develop its own level and products according to demands of 
further processing enterprises. The development of the technical level of certain 
special branches manufacturing final products or of certain products by means of the 
take-over of technical knowledge may be realized only with a simultaneous, develop-
ment of the background industry. 
In an opposite case problems of the background industry being the most frequent 
impeding factors of the success of licence development projects nowadays will remain 
also further on. A more considerable technological progress may only be achieved by 
the complex development of the entire production vertically. Without a developed 
background industry the increase of basic material and spare parts imports is un-
avoidable. The effect of imports on the currency balance is not compensated by 
exports, strongly delimited by licensers. 
Hungarian enterprises are usually buying licences when their own research-develop-
ment background is missing or not appropriate. In 50 percent of the cases examined 
own research and development - as an alternative possibility — were not even taken 
into account, while in the other 50 percent of cases buying licences was decided be-
cause of the inadequate level of existing research and development activity. Of course, 
it would have been unrealistic to aim at attaining world level or at least follow it 
parallel in these cases, because a basic precondition of being able to realize such an aim 
is the further development of the technology taken over which, however, cannot be 
imagined without an appropriate own research and development basis. Own research 
and development may be regarded as a decisive criterion of adaptability. 
The task of domestic research and development is the greater in the process of 
adaption and further development the greater the difference between domestic level 
and the level to be adapted. Domestic research and development should bridge or at 
least considerably decrease differences between world level and domestic technical 
level. Development based on licences will not be efficient if it is realized for the sub-
stitution of domestic research and development. 
The lack of own research and development background confronts adaptors with 
seemingly insolvable tasks. A developed research and development basis, capable of 
learning something new, may obtain such knowledge when taking over a new 
technology that may be made good use of even "exponentially" in the process of 
adaptation and further development, in parallel or subsequent research and develop-
ment work. 
Factors Determining Efficiency in the Process of Take-Over of Knowledge 
The success of adaptation is largely influenced by the fact to what extent and to what 
depth those controlling development "comprehend" the entire process of the takeover 
of knowledge and how much they are capable of formulating partial tasks exactly. 
169 
The process of take-over of technical knowledge may be divided into three partial 
processes. The partial processes include the following groups of tasks: 
Partial process 1: preparation of development 
— determining the objective and method of development; 
— market research concerning licences, comparison of offers, selection of the fa-
vourable variant; 
— obtaining of on-site experience with the licenser; 
— preparation and conclusion of contract. 
Partial process 2: adaptation 
— preparation of an adaptation programme; 
— adaptation; 
— coordination of adaptation; 
Partial process 3: running-in of production, further development of the product 
and/or technology 
— take-over and adaptation of results of further development by the licenser; 
— further domestic development of the product or technology taken over. 
In the following I am going to draw attention to those factors within the groups 
of tasks which increase or decrease the efficiency of licence actions. 
Determining both the objective and the way and method of development may be 
well founded only following an appropriate decision preparation. Various development 
possibilities (advantages and disadvantages of domestic research and development as 
compared to those of a take-over of technical knowledge already applied in foreign 
countries) may be compared according to possibilities and restrictions of development 
only then. The preparation of decisions and finally the decision-making process are 
tasks of the receiving enterprise and it is not expedient to cede decision-making and 
the related responsibility to other agencies — legally separated from the enterprise. 
In 50 percent of cases own or domestic research and development as a development 
alternative were not even taken into account. In these cases take-over of knowledge 
was aimed at making up for the lack of domestic research and development. In the 
majority of cases it turned out after all that receiving enterprises were ready but 
hardly able to adapt the new technology, taken over, efficiently, even less to develop 
it further because a relatively developed domestic research and development activity 
is an indispensable precondition of the take-over of knowledge and the decisive 
criterion of adaptability, respectively. 
The next task following the decision in principle referring to the purchase of a 
licence is the research into the licence-market. Then the enterprise invites poten-
tial licensers to bidding. Following (or piror to) such invitations personal consulta-
tions take place. Such talks end in failure when experts on technical development or 
researchers best knowing the subject are not present. Personal consultations of inform-
ation character are aimed at selecting potential bidders. At such negotiations the part-
ners whom negotiations should begin with on the merits may be decided. It is a fre-
quent problem that only top leaders are participating at preliminary talks. Real 
technical experts of the given field get acquainted with local and manufacturing 
experience only following the signing of the contract when there remains no 
possibility to enforce observations — e.g. modification of technology, selecting appro-
priate sales representatives for machines, instruments and other equipment, etc. 
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The comparison of offers and the selection of the most favourable variant are made 
practically on the basis of two decision-making criteria. Previously meeting domestic 
market demands and the convertibility of existing machines and equipment had been 
the primary viewpoint while at present sales possibility in the dollar relation and the 
convertibility of existing equipment are the two basic criteria. With the conversion of 
existing equipment and purchases requiring no or hardly any investment adaptors may 
adapt licences often only at the expense of technological level. Following this 
comparison on the basis of the above two criteria there remain offers to be evaluated, 
only then will technical criteria (technical parameters of the product and technology) 
take some part as factors influencing decision-making. 
If it is possible the adaptor gathers production experience on the site in reference 
works of the licenser prior to signing the licence agreement which is an indispensable 
precondition of the technical foundation of a proper decision. The exchange of 
experience provides an excellent possibility to get convinced about the elaborateness 
of the technology, the seriousness and production relations of the seller. Experience 
obtained from the manufacturer and also from users is always necessary for a success-
ful adaptation. 
Tasks directly preceding the signing of the licence agreement are the preparation of 
the contract, data supply and proposals for the formulation of the next of the 
contract. The circumspect formulation of the contract text may eliminate eventual 
later inconvenience or in the worst case the breaking of the contract. Interests of the 
licenser and the licensee are after all reconciled in the contract. The contract is the 
basic document on which the entire action is relying. Obligations undertaken in the 
contract are the key-points of the outcome of the entire action. 
The most important task following the signing of the contract is the preparation 
of the adaptation programme. With this the second partial process of the take-over of 
technical knowledge, adaptation begins. 
A properly elaborated and thoroughly thought-over programme is an indispensable 
condition of the success of adaptation. Adaptation programmes are varying, sometimes 
they are line schedules, while in other cases regularly actualized net diagrams of CPM-
PERT type. 
The fulfilment of tasks determined in the adaptation programme is the process of 
adaptation beginning with the study of production technologies and documentation 
with the enterprise selling the licence (or in a reference factory). Experience obtained 
on the site enables a considerable shortening of the period required for adaptation, 
commissioning and running-in as well as the attainment of appropriate product quality 
and productivity as soon as possible. All these result in considerable material and 
energy savings, aid the proper use of machines in several cases and thus have a 
favourable effect also on the lifetime of equipment. 
The elaboration of adapted production technologies and the learning of technolo-
gies may be promoted by reproduction experiments and experimental production. 
However, this may be done only rarely. Non-convertible enterprise machinery, the 
lack of pilot plants and procedures requiring completely new production technique 
with the enterprise sometimes raise barriers to such reproduction experiments which 
cannot be surmounted. 
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A considerable share of technologies imported from abroad comes from capitalist 
countries. It is a natural consequence of this fact that also materials to be used for 
production are purchased on capitalist markets when starting production. It is an 
important task of domestic research and development to substitute raw and basic ma-
terials imported from the capitalist countries for domestic materials or those to be 
obtained from other socialist countries. But this is not an easy task. Licensers are 
often making the reservation that they undertake the warranty for the technology 
only when using materials indicated by them. Should this not be the case 
development specialists are faced with qualitative problems or the shortage of ma-
terials and spare parts to be obtained on domestic markets or on those of other 
socialist countries. This is why convertible currency burdens on current production 
are considerable even after several years of production. 
The majority of licence actions have some investment involvement, too. One of 
the most frequent reasons for the non-completion of investment projects on time is 
the inadequate level of the organization of effectuation. Namely, contractors should 
also have an active part in this beside the one giving the technology, the investor and 
the designer — which may all be within one enterprise but also various institutions 
legally separated from each other — practically from the very beginning of the invest-
ment project. In the case of several contractors — which is almost always characteris-
tic of major investment projects — contractors are entering the project at various 
stages of implementation while the entire sphere of contractors is not known at the 
beginning of the investment project. 
The process of adaptation, full of tasks and lasting often for several years, should 
be coordinated. This is a well-known statement, nevertheless only a few enterprises 
ensure the organizational conditions of the fulfilment of this important work. 
Stages of the running-in of production and the further development of the pro-
duct and/or technology are demand, possibilities of reducing production costs, reveal-
ing of reserves of the technology, improving quality of products meeting nearly identi-
cal needs, draw attention to the possibility and necessity of further development, al-
ready at the time of adaptation or the running-in of production. There are three ways 
of further developing the adapted product and/or technology. One is the take-over of 
results of further development granted by the licenser, the second is own research and 
development, while the third one is the introduction of the latest results of the 
licenser's completed with own research and development. 
Licencers usually further develop technologies already handed over and frequently 
participate — by contract — in handing over also the results of further development 
to buyers. It is the task of domestic research and development to take over and adapt 
results of further development from the licenser. In all the cases examined licenser 
further developed the technologies handed over. In ten cases buyers took the develop-
ed variants over. In seven cases licencers manufactured considerably more advanced 
products or used much more advanced technologies within the same product group 
following the signing of the contract. Results of such considerably more advanced 
procedures were not taken over but in one case. 
Another way of further development is own research and development. This is a 
more risky venture. Licensers may restrict further development in the contract by 
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guaranteeing for the technology or undertaking the buying back of products only 
with the technical and production parameters stipulated in the contract. 
The third way of further development is the introduction of the latest results of 
the licenser completed with own research and development. Enterprise experiences 
prove that the majority of successful further developments is the fruit of cooperation 
between the technical and manual staff of the manufacturing departments as well as 
co-workers of technical development, technological, production and investment 
departments of the enterprise. 
A comprehensive further development of foreign technical knowledge has taken 
place only seldom in Hungary. 
Organizational, Personal, Material and Financial Conditions 
of the Implementation of Development Projects Based on Licences 
Organizations — either legally separated from the adapting enterprise or those work-
ing within its framework — involved in the development projects have an important 
part in the efficiency of development projects based on the take-over of technical 
knowledge. 
The interestedness of different external economic organizations participating in 
development but legally separated from the adapting enterprise (e.g. research 
institutes, development and planning enterprises, domestic and foreign trade com-
panies, etc.) is considerably deviating from one another. 
If a participating organization — e.g. a research institute — is not interested in the 
successful, economical implementation of the entire process but only in a more-or-less 
well defined partial activity, even in this often only to the extent that this activity be 
displayed with as much "profits" as possible, then its own interests will be confronted 
with those of the adapting enterprise. 
Conflicting interests may influence unfavourably the efficiency of the take-over 
of technical knowledge. This is why I consider the maximum possible integration of 
the elements of the innovation chain (research, development, production and sale) 
into the producing enterprise as very important. 
It has already been mentioned that development based on the take-over of 
knowledge can be more efficient if the enterprise has its own research and develop-
ment basis. Namely, a problem may best be perceived — if at all — at the place where it 
arises. Deficiencies may appear for example in the increase of unsold stocks, quality 
complaints and production costs. The effect of secondary perceptions is weaker. Mul-
tiple information-transmission may lead to the deformation of the problem. The 
deformation of problems and their decreased perception often lead to solution other 
than expected. This is the case also when the task of research and development reaches 
the contractor through the hierarchy of institutions (e.g. adapting enterprise, external 
research institute). 
Certainly, a problem may be deformed within the organization of the adapting 
enterprise also when the process of the take-over of technical knowledge was attached 
to rigid frameworks of statical organizations. In the majority of cases enterprise 
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organizations participating in the process are functional units working in hierarchically 
bound (depending on enterprise size) rigid frameworks of group-section-department-
directorate. These static organizations have to fulfil first of all routine tasks and 
display operative activities connected to current production independently of the 
given development project, they are called to account for the "past and present" 
and not for the "future", therefore tasks connected with the take-over of know-
ledge become secondary as against daily activity. 
There are, however, also such enterprises — though their number is insignificant as 
yet — whose organization is time-oriented. A time-oriented enterprise organization is 
suitable to prepare itself for the future, too, since in its framework the strategic, 
operative and informative units may be found where a division of tasks connected 
with the future, present and past is enforced. 
The efficiency of the take-over of technical knowledge was improved by teams 
oriented to concrete development projects. 
A factor deteriorating the efficiency of development based on licences is after all 
the organizational separation of various conditions when interests of organizations are 
often contradictory and point by no means unambiguously to the direction of the 
economical realization of development within the shortest possible time. 
Mental resources are concentrated basically in sectoral institutes of research and 
development despite the fact that producing enterprises develop their own research 
and development basis also within their own organization. 
Material conditions of the adaptation of new technology (raw and basic materials, 
buildings, machines, equipment, etc.) are within the frameworks of the adaptating 
enterprise partly given in case of convertible systems of new investment required for 
development that may be implemented there. Therefore, material conditions of 
adaptation can partly or fully be ensured in the organization of the producing enter-
prise.3 
Financial resources aimed at covering adaptation and further development activities 
are formed primarily with the enterprises then a part of them are centralized and 
redistributed. 
An important condition of the successful take-over of technical knowledge is that 
the cover needed to finance costs be available in due time. In the cases examined enter-
prises could only partly finance the costs from own sources (enterprise funds of 
technical and general development). Another part of costs was covered by central 
funds of technical development concentrated with the OMFB (National Committee for 
Technical Development) and the sectoral ministries. 
Credits granted by the National Bank of Hungary or the National Development 
Bank and state allowances not to be repaid mean important resources of financing. 
Licence actions were characterized by the multi-channel system of mixed financing. 
3Aimcd at establishing closer connections between research, development and production, 
organizational changes have recently taken place in Hungary. Some of the previously indepen-
dent research institutes have become the joint institute of several producing enterprises while 
others have been reorganized into independent development (engineering) companies. Only a 
few industrial research institutes have maintained their previous status and line of activity. 
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Various types of costs (licence fee, costs of adaptation, construction, machine pur-
chase) were financed by several sources — occasionally one type was financed by four 
sources. For the financing of various costs of one action enterprises sometimes 
obtained allowances not to be repaid even from several places. 
Multi-channel financing and the ways of its realization are dissiparing central re-
sources. The variety of subsidies draws important assets away from fields whose 
development should be given more emphasis, to. 
The most favourable way of financing costs is the utilization of own enterprise 
resources, completed by credit. The utilization of own resources induces those 
involved in development to proper consideration and decreases the share of unfounded 
actions. The system of state subsidization may be expedient in case of major invest-
ment projects, requiring high expenditure and risks, affecting several sectors and thus 
raising national interest. 
Information conditions of development (technological level, foreign and domestic 
market relations, prices, price forecasts, etc.) are available for the producing 
enterprises mostly only indirectly by means of secondary information. 
A direct contact with foreign markets is possible only for a few enterprises (hav-
ing their own right to export). Export sales are realized through foreign trading com-
panies. Even in case of domestic sales only a very small part of them is direct. Only a 
few enterprises have their own shop network. Enterprises have no direct contact with 
consumers but their products reach users through the network of wholesale and retail 
trade. Thus, information pieces of the market reach the producers through trans-
missions often delayed and sometimes deformed. 
Problems resulting from the separation of personal, material, information and 
financial factors of development (lack of proper information, practical experience, 
etc.) are aggravated by conflicting interests due to organizational separation. 
Beside deviation of interests of economic organizations, legally separated from the 
adapting enterprise, the situation of adapting enterprises does also unfavourably 
influence the efficiency of the take-over and application of technical knowledge. 
Enterprises have been stimulated by industrial management through economic 
regulators to increase their profits to an extent well predictable to meet domestic 
demands and to increase their export. If one of these may be achieved by development 
based on licence then there will be some interest in doing so. On the other hand, 
however, the achievement of objectives was not forced by economic effects since un-
favourable effects were compensated for by the state in the form of various subsidies. 
Therefore, enterprises refrained from innovation processes aimed at the introduction 
of either domestic or foreign knowledge involving considerable risks and responsibility. 
Without coercive economic effects enterprises undertook no risk voluntarily. 
The individual interestedness of those participating in processes of the take-over of 
knowledge is very contradictory, too. Research and development people are, for 
example, stimulated First of all by the possibility of achieving "own" results 
especially if these may be used also as patents. Researchers and developers have hardly 
recognized the possibility, yet, that procedures to be patented or inventions can be 
made also in the stage of further development of adapted technology. 
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Conclusions 
The potential possibility lying in development by means of licences is no warranty for 
the gradual approach to world level not even for its parallel follow-up. 
The import of technical knowledge will be an efficient tool of technological 
development only if production and sales structure develops favourably as a result and 
the difference between the most advanced technological level and that of Hungary 
decreases. Several conditions have to be ensured to attain the favourable effects. 
Internal and external, personal, material, financial, organizational, information and 
interestedness conditions do jointly control the process of the take-over of knowledge 
toward the direction of the aim set or to a deviating direction. 
Providing for one or two factors is not enough for the take-over of knowledge 
to be successful. The joint provision for all conditions of an efficient licence applica-
tion will guarantee the real efficiency. 
The precondition for a producing enterprise to receive and develop the imported 
technology further is first of all that it disposes of conditions of research and develop-
ment within its own organization. If the enterprise adapting the new technology 
cannot ensure the research and development capacity required for the further develop-
ment of the technology taken over, if material, financial and interestedness conditions 
of adaptation and further development are not available then the willingness of the 
enterprise to buy a licence will be in vain and it will not be possible to import technol-
ogy efficiently. The existence of the own research and development staff is a decisive 
criterion of adaptability. 
Can development by means of licences be a tactical tool? The answer to this ques-
tion is: generally no. A licence action is only very rarely favourable in the short run 
from both technical and economic points of view. 
The buying of a licence with the aim of import-substitution may be favourable also 
in the short run if the time required for its introduction is short, non-recurrent and 
continuous foreign exchange demand is low, there is no need for imported machines 
and equipment, domestic raw-, basic- and auxiliary materials may be used for the 
production. 
In the majority of licence-developments the licence fee, non-recurrent and con-
tinuous foreign exchange expenditure spoil the foreign exchange balance in the short 
run but it is not sure either that this will improve even in the long run. Negative effects 
on the dollar balance may restrict sales in the rouble relation in the short run. This 
restrictive effect, however, impedes the running-in of production and the utilization 
of production capacities invested. 
Development projects carried out by means of licences have perspectives. In case 
of such a development project adapting enterprises may obtain such technical know-
ledge, organizational and production experience which may be made good use of in 
own research and development. Such a multiplying positive effect may of course be 
expected only with an enterprise where an adaptive and creative research and develop-
ment basis is available. 
Licence-development may strengthen but not substitute for own research and 
development. 
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The experiences obtained in the course of investigations do not deviate from the 
conclusions of analyses carried out with other institutions nearly at the same time or 
little later, nor from statements of the latest study of a working group of the National 
Committee for Technical Development made in 1984 and summarizing the "Experien-
ces of the Take-Over and Application of Foreign Licences". In this way all what has 
been mentioned in this article reflect the overall Hungarian picture. 
SIGNS OF MARKET CHANGES1 IN THE HUNGARIAN 
MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY 
ÉVA NÁDOR 
The shocks of the world economy in the 1970s affected also the Hungarian economy 
with elementary power. The negative effects, while growing persistent, brough a series 
of existing problems of economic management to the surface. By the end of the past 
decade — in opposition to certain earlier views — it became clear that the fundamental 
question of Hungarian economic development is how it can adjust to the changing 
conditions of the world market. 
The research of foreign markets conducted in the Research Institute of Industrial 
Economics of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences has been concentrated on the ques-
tion how the enterprises adapt themselves to world economy and how the success of 
this adaptation can be increased in the future. 
One of the researches restricted its survey to export orientation and, within this, 
to the orientation to the capitalist markets. In the past years both the scientific and 
the practicing experts analysed the export activity of the Hungarian industrial com-
panies approaching it from several aspests but did not deal with it expressly in view 
of the enterprise policies in relation to different markets. The research we are going 
to present in its main lines in the following deals with export orientation primarily 
from this point of view. 
Under the current economic conditions it is our vital interest to increase the 
exports to capitalist markets. In want of other conditions of growth this must un-
equivocally lead to a changing proportion in the selling markets. The shift in these 
proportions can be achieved on the one hand by restricting domestic consumption 
and, on the other hand, by transferring a part of the exports directed to socialist 
countries to capitalist markets. 
In the course of our survey we examined whether the endeavours of economic 
policy asserted themselves in the export activities, i.e., in the formation of the pro-
portions between the export markets of the enterprises of the Hungarian manufactur-
ing industry. 
By the aid of processing statistical data and empirical survey we wished to find out 
whether the development of the exports of the enterprises reflected their adaptation 
or the efforts of adaptation to the foreign markets. Our statistical analysis was based 
on the foreign trade data of 442 manufacturing industrial enterprises. The analysis was 
promoted by personal consultations with experts of the enterprises. 
' In the socialist countries, so in Hungary as well, the proportion between the selling markets is an 
important characteristic of foreign trade. This means the proportion between the exports paid 
for in Rbl and non-Rbl currency. 
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For the analysis the time period between 1978-1982 had been selected. During 
that time the effects of the changes in the world economy sharpened and the necessity 
of adjustment to the forcing markets became widely obvious. 
Viewpoints to the Evaluation of the Changes Experienced 
Before evaluating the market ratios characterizing the exports of the enterprises of the 
Hungarian manufacturing industry, attention has to be called to the fact that in 
respect of the micro-spheres of motion there are essential differences between the 
regulated socialist market and the so-called market economies. 
In principle, in an economy regulated by market automatisms the proportions of 
markets within the total exports experess the comptetitiveness and marketability by 
market categories. Formulating it on micro level, these populations are basically 
developed on the joint effects of the internal endowments of the interprises, of 
economic efficiency computations and of objective external market factors. In addi-
tion to all these, of course, a series of other — political or economic — factors also 
exert their effects. 
In turn, in our economic mechanism the rank order of the factors which determine 
the distribution of export deliveries by markets — as it has been proven by our sur-
vey — differs from that presented above. 
The liberty of decisions made by the enterprises or, rather by enterprise mana-
gement regarding the policy of selecting the export markets is restricted primarily by 
the volume of sales to the socialist countries fixed by inter-governmental agreements. 
Of course, not all enterprises are affected thereby to the same degree. It is true, how-
ever, that the share of exports to socialist markets based on inter-governmental agree-
ments is the highest with the companies which are the greatest exporters. Obviously 
a really flexible market orientation policy cannot be expected from these enterprises. 
In our experience the decisions on exports of the Hungarian enterprises are 
influenced to a great extent by expectations formulated on various levels of socialist 
leadership and economic management. By all means, changes in the policy of market 
orientation should be motivated by economic regulation and not by subjective 
influences. 
The way the exports of the enterprises are divided among the markets is 
highly influenced by economic management even under our circumstances, through 
the export incentives, the exchange rate policy, the tax system, the regulation of 
imports, etc. It is obvious that the liberty of the enterprises'leaders in their decisions 
can be restricted by over-regulation, tire contradictions and frequent changes of the 
regulators. 
The autonomy of a Hungarian industrial company in respect of its decisions regard-
ing the policy of directing its exports is determined by the above described framework. 
We deem it a serious deficiency that some basic objective factors, destined to define 
the policy of export markets, such as market demand on the one hand, technology 
and capacity of the enterprise on the other, or the view of export profitability, are 
thrust into the background, as compared to the preceding ones. 
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A much greater importance ought to be attributed to the objective market condi-
tions than at present. A decline in domestic demand or on behalf of the socialist 
buying market may be an important motivating factor of the efforts made in order 
to increase the sales in capitalist markets. At the same time restrictions in the capi-
talist market should stimulate to introduce changes in the opposite direction. The 
world-wide economic recession affected all branches of the manufacturing industry 
heavily, some revival can only be experienced in a few sectors. In the depressed situa-
tion of demand the lack of international competitiveness makes it impossible to 
increase exports to the capitalist markets. At the same time in certain sectors — like 
e.g. the manufacture of medical instruments — the improving conditions in the market 
might be a stimulation to increase the exports to capitalist countries. 
Alike to the market conditions, attention ought to be paid to the technological 
standards and capacity of the enterprises, too. Prior to the decisions on changing the 
market pattern, it is needed to study to what extent this is made feasible in reality by 
the technology available in the enterprises. 
In case the objective circumstances mentioned above do not find expression in the 
formation of the enterprises• exports by markets, a policy of determining the direc-
tions of exports can only be spoken of in a very restricted sense. It must be seen that 
in developing the policy on export markets, it is necessary to weight the influencing 
factors in a way quite different from that used today. 
The Development of the Proportions of the Markets in the Exports 
of the Hungarian Manufacturing Industry 
The share of the exports to capitalist markets2 within the total exports of the ma-
nufacturing industry exceeded 50 percent in 1982. Orientation to capitalist markets 
was especially high in tire chemical and in the smaller other branches of industry. In 
the exports of the engineering industry the share of the capitalist markets did not 
reach one-third of the total, and the share of the exports to capitalist markets 
approached 50 percent only in the industry of electric machinery and appliances and 
in that of metalwares. 
In examining the development of the share of exports delivered to capitalist 
markets by the enterprises of the manufacturing industry within the total exports we 
grouped the enterprises into three categories in order to facilitate the analysis. The 
enterprises where this share was below one third were classified as those with a low 
share, those where it was between one and two thirds as having a medium share, and 
the enterprises where it was higher than two thirds were considered as having a 
high share. 
On the basis of this certainly arbitrary classification approaching it from the view 
of the industrial branches, it can be said that in the engineering industry the share of 
the enterprises showing a low ratio of exports to capitalist markets is higher than the 




Characteristics of export activities pursued by the enterprises 
of the manufacturing industry in 1978—1982 
Characteristics Value of total exports 
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total 142.222.666 211.498.448 43.7 51.6 
Source: Statistical Handbooks 
Table 2 
Distribution of the enterprises by the ratio of exports 
to capitalist markets within exports (in percent)3 














Low 50 24 19 23 22 21 32 
Medium 24 28 36 31 8 _ 25 
High 26 48 45 46 70 79 43 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
aComputations by the author. 
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average. In a more detailed breakdown the ratio of the exports to capitalist countries 
is lower than average in the branch of the machines and equipment, in that of trans-
port equipment and in precision engineering. In the sphere of the enterprises belonging 
to the metalwares industry it is higher than the average. 
The tendencies in the ratio of exports to capitalist markets between the years 
1978-1982 interested us — as mentioned before - in order to see to what extent the 
enterprises' economic results come up to the requirements on national economic level 
and to the implementation of the objectives set in our exports. 
When examining the changes in the ratio of capitalist markets within the total of 
exports we had to draw the border line between changing and stagnation. Only 
deviations at a degree higher than 3 percent were considered as changes, since even 
the demands considered permanent may show such degrees of modification. 
Table 3 
Distribution of enterprises by the changes in the ratio of exports 
to capitalist markets within total export3 (in percent) 
Industrial 
-^branches 




































Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Computations by the author. 
In the period analysed changing markets were characteristic of the manufacturing 
industry. In 70 percent of the enterprises which exported products to capitalist 
markets certain shift occurred in the market proportions. 
In their majority — 40 percent — the changes were characterized by shifts towards 
the capitalist markets. Between 1978-1982 132 of the 443 enterprises of the 
manufacturing industry increased the share of capitalist markets within their total 
exports. In view of increasing the orientation to the capitalist markets a favourable 
picture was shown by the engineering industry. The degree of extending the share was 
of course not equal for all the enterprises. In more than two-thirds of those increasing 
the share of their capitalist export markets the growth was less than 20 percent, and 
a quarter of them achieved an increase between 20—25 percent. The development was 
most dynamic in the engineering industry. 
In spite of the goals set by economic policy, in almost a third of the manufacturing 
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companies the changes in the examined period meant a decline in the share of the 
capitalist markets. In their orientation towards capitalist markets the building 
materials and the chemical industry were the most unsuccessful. 
Interdependence between the Main Factors of Changes in the Export Markets 
We investigated the trends of market changes in the function of several factors. Here 
we emphasize two correlations which we are going to discuss in more detail: we shall 
evaluate the changes on the one hand from the aspect of the extent of exports to 
capitalist markets, and on the other, from that of profitability. 
The Relationship between Market Changes and the Extent of Exports 
to Capitalist Markets 
By studying the changes as function of the extent of exports to capitalist markets it 
could be found that changing the markets was most characteristic of those enter-
prises which perform medium-size (Ft 50—500 million) exports to capitalist 
markets; these are the most flexible. In the companies having very small or very 
high quantities of such exports this activity belongs to the marginal ones, so they 
lay no special stress on increasing their exports to capitalist markets. Presumably 
their poor apparatus in the foreign markets also hinders them in doing so. It is 
probable that in the case of such enterprises the opportunity to change could be 
created by a better marketing and business policy, exploring and utilizing the gaps in 
the market. It is still a general feature of Hungarian economic management and 
economic regulation that they are mostly concentrating on volumes and - despite 
the positive examples of capitalist practice, — are unfortunately rather not concerned 
about "small items". As we see, the situation is different with the enterprises trans-
acting large volumes of exports to capitalist countries. Here the orientation to 
capitalist markets is relatively high. But it rests usually on traditional relations, or in 
some cases on inter-governmental agreements, therefore they have a narrower sphere 
of motion in their policy of directing the trade by markets. 
The correlation appearing between the changes in the volume of the exports to 
capitalist markets and in the share of them in total exports is also noteworthy. Accord-
ing to our survey's results, of the 132 enterprises which increased the ratio of exports 
to capitalist countries, 119 achieved this with an increasing volume of such exports, 
and only 13 were found where parallel to a growing ratio the volume declined. 
Several enterprises were found where, even for maintaining the ratio of the 
capitalist markets, the exports directed to them had to be increased, while with 27 
enterprises despite increasing their volume, the ratio of exports to capitalist markets 
decreased within the total exports. The trends of price formation were currently 
omitted. According to the information given by the enterprises, throughout the 
analysed period no significant price changes occurred. 
183 
The Relationship between Market Changes and 
Profitability of the Exports to Capitalist Markets 
When investigating the results attained by export activities in capitalist markets 
their profitability cannot be immaterial. This subject has recently come to the fore-
ground of the experts' interest. We wish only to indicate what trends of export 
profitability accompanied the changes that emerged in the period 1978—1982. 
We have determined the profitability of exports to capitalist markets by indicators 
showing the cost of earning foreign currency on the level of the production costs of 
the commodities. The enterprises increasing the ratio of exports to capitalist markets 
within the total of exports were classified by the calculated indicators. Taking into 
account that in 1982 the average rate of exchange of the dollar fluctuated between 
34.4 - 39.4 Ft/$ we considered the enterprises showing an indicator below 35 Ft/$ as 
having good export profitability, those were the indicator was between 35—40 Ft/$ as 
medium ones and the enterprises which earned a $ by more than Ft 40 as those with 
poor profitability. Though this classification may be qualified as rather severe, it must 
provoke consideration that not more than two-fifths of the enterprises have shown 
good profitability. This demonstrates that, in order to meet the central intentions, or, 
owing to some other reasons the views of profitability were often pushed to the back-
ground. The profitability of exports is less favourable in the enterprises largely orient-
ed to capitalist markets, i.e., large exports to capitalist countries are not accompanied 
by higher economic efficiency. This seems to underline the finding of many who 
stated that there is an inverse correlation between the volume and profitability of 
exports; with growing volume profitability declines. This follows from the low effic-
iency of the enterprises. The regulation system is unable to bridge this, foreign 
currency must often be earned by uneconomic means. 
A positive correlation has shown up between the ratio of exports to capitalist mar-
kets within total exports and profitability; this means that profitability is an unequi-
vocal motivation to increase that ratio. Namely, the enterprises which increased the 
share of exports to capitalist countries transacted to a large extent (over 50 percent) 
the export with good profitability at a higher than average rate. 
For the purpose of deeper analysis of the relationship between profitability of ex-
ports to capitalist markets and its proportion within total exports we determined, by 
enterprises, the increase of exports falling to a unit of the increasing ratio of the ex-
port to capitalist markets.3 The indicator shows the change of total value of exports 
resulting from 1 percent growth in the ratio of exports to capitalist markets. This is 
also a yardstick of correct policy of market orientation, showing whether the changing 
proportions of markets contributed to the increase of returns from exports. The ob-
jective is, of course, — as was mentioned above — to increase not merely the exports 
but the value of profitable exports. Only 61 were found among the 132 enterprises 
where — EQ = total exports, 
- E. = exports to capitalist markets 
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Table 4 
The changing ratio of the exports to capitalist markets 
of the manufacturing industrial enterprises, 
in function of export profitability in 1982 3 
Extent of growth 
in exports to 
capitalist markets 
Economic efficiency 



















growth or export ratio 










Computations by the author 
increasing the share of exports to capitalist markets where the calculation resulted in 
the indicator r> l , i.e., where the market changes entailed the growth of total exports. 
It is only natural that the development of the returns from exports is influenced by a 
great number of factors and directing the exports towards certain markets is only one 
of them. In our opinion such a — perhaps new — approach may, by all means, be 
instructive. 
The picture outlined on the basis of reviewing the orientation of the manufacturing 
industry to capitalist export markets shows that though it can be sensed that in the 
external market activities of the enterprises positive changes have taken place, adjust-
ment fo foreign markets is still not a vital interest to them. Despite the various re-
solutions, statements, requirements formulated by the national economy, 60 percent 
of the enterprises of the manufacturing industry (the exports of which accounted for 
67 percent of total exports in 1982) did not increase their export share to capitalist 
markets. What is more, in one third of them the ratio of exports to capitalist markets 
declined within the total. In addition to the fact that the enterprises were unable 
to increase the volume of exports to capitalist markets simultaneously with meeting 
the requirement of porfitability meant a serious problem. There are a number of rea-
sons why the enterprises could not fulfil the requirements raised so far. The most 
important of these may be that still no sufficiently effective incentive exists prompting 
the enterprises to profitable exports to capitalist markets. Several surveys have indicat-
ed that the profitability of the large exporters usually lies behind that of the other 
enterprises of the same branch. Looking at it from another aspect, the low degree of 
exportability reflects the lack of international competitiveness. For the purpose of 
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export oriented development of the manufacturing industry in the future any 
possible means have to be resorted to by the enterprises. Our aim furthered by our 




OF THE HUNGARIAN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY 
MÁRTA KIEFER 
The products of the Hungarian manufacturing industry reach the consumer through 
several channels. According to the experience gained by our survey, a large number of 
directing, regulating and interest-creating factors exist and act in practice which signi-
ficantly restrict the possibility to develop more differentiated distribution channels. 
Today the majority of the products reach both the domestic and foreign consumer 
through channels longer and more articulated than necessary. 
Unilateral Channels of Domestic Sales and Exports 
It is proven by domestic and foreign theoretical surveys and practical experience that 
means of production, durable and non-durable consumer goods require distribution 
channels differing in length and articulation (1,2,8). In knowledge of this it is justified 
to presume that in the Hungarian manufacturing industry — where all of the three 
product groups represent significant shares — the distribution channels are appro-
priately structured. However, the analysis of the statistical data as well as the results 
of our survey, conducted in 12 enterprises by questionnaires, convinced us in many 
respects of the improper articulation of the channels in the domestic and foreign sales 
and the serious lack of differentiation required by the various groups of products. This 
is indicated first of aU by the fact that in the domestic sales of the industrial com-
panies the direct sales to the population and to retail shops amounted to only very 
small shares in all of the industrial branches. Beyond this, the predominance of direct 
turnover in industry and other sectors as well as of the sales to wholesaling organiza-
tions is conspicuous (Table 1). We deem this to be a problem mainly in such branches 
— e. g. in the light industry — where most of the output consists of consumer goods 
which would require shorter channels of selling, i.e., a larger share of selling directly 
to the population and to retailing organizations. 
Improper vertical articulation of the distribution channels, as well as the pre-
dominance — often entirely in contrast to the requirements of the products — of 
some definite type of a particular commercial partner, are a frequent characteristics 
found in the exports of the industrial enterprises, too. First of all, the ample role 
played by the foreign trade companies has to be mentioned as a general phenomenon 
{Table 2). This applies especially to the building materials, the chemical, the engineer-
ing and the light industry. In the latter two branches the equipment for production 
and consumer goods which would require much more direct contacts with the users 
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Table I 
The distribution of sales channels of the manufacturing industry 
in 1982 by main branches of industry in 1982 (in percent)3 
Distribution of sales by channels, in percent 
Main branches Whole- Retail Direct Direct Other Total 
of industry sales trade trade sales to sales to channels0 sales 
population industry 
Engineering 
industry 10.6 3.9 1.7 38.3 45.5 100 
Building ma-
terials 
industry 7.2 27.1 0.7 22.7 42.3 100 
Chemical 
industry 7.9 2.2 1.3 25.2 63.4 100 
Light industry 35.9 9.8 0.7 31.7 21.9 100 
Food industry 24.2 42.2 1.4 20.9 11.3 100 
Manufacturing 
industry, 
totalb 14.5 12.5 1.8 36.6 34.6 100 
a
 At domestic selling prices of own production - on the basis of internal records of the Central 
Statistical Office. 
13
 Including metallurgy. 
c
 Total sales to agriculture, communication, services, etc. 
and consumers, represent a considerable ratio. The foreign trade companies, in an 
opposite way, lengthen this route by increasing the number of steps between the 
producer and the consumer. Therefore, in the case of several products, it would be 
more expedient to extend the rights to transact direct exports, of course, under the 
condition that the industrial enterprises improve their marketing activities 
appropriately to an up-to-date level. Here we think, within the engineering industry, 
mainly of the equipment of communication and vacuum technology, instruments, 
various machines and mechanical equipment. In these branches of manufacturing the 
share of the exports transacted through foreign trading companies is especially high. 
Within the sphere of the light industry the role of the foreign trade companies 
is somewhat more differentiated. While e.g. in the products of the cotton, knitwear 
and the silk industry, postulating shorter distribution channels, the exports transacted 
through foreign trade companies amounts to almost hundred percent, in several other 
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Table 2 
Exports of the manufacturing industry in 1982 distributed to direct exports 
and exports transacted through foreign trade companies, by main branches of industry 
(in percent)3 
Distribution and dynamics of exports 
by sales channels (percent) 
Main branches 





























totalb 19.8 802 100.0 
11
 At domestic selling prices of own production - on the basis of internal records of the Central 
Office. 
h
 Including metallurgy. 
fields — e.g. in the manufacture of furniture and other products of the woodworking 
industry — the licences of direct exportation represent a much higher share.1 
The Different Structures of the Purchasing and the Selling Markets of the Enterprises 
Although the right to transact their exports directly and several other factors have 
recently increased the possibility for the enterprises to select appropriate trading 
partners, still there are several circumstances which hinder the industrial enterprises 
in doing so. 
According to our experience, the fact that in several cases the structure of the 
enterprises is different from that of markets of sales and purchase, delimits their 
1
 Up to 1968 the Hungarian industrial enterprises were restricted to export their products 
exclusively through the foreign trade companies. Thus, they had only indirect contacts with the 
foreign users and consumers. Currently the situation is different. After 1968 a part of the 
industrial companies received the right to transact their own exports and so they could make 
direct contacts with their foreign partners, by leaving out the foreign trade companies. 
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possibilities to select developing distribution channels that suite the various types of 
markets and commodities more appropriately. 
Our survey has shown that the oligopolistic or atomized character of their purchas-
ing market made it difficult for the enterprises to meet the demands of a monopolistic 
selling market. We have found the same with industrial enterprises investigated, where 
the factories had to buy the components and semifinished products generally from a 
large number of enterprises, whereas sales were effected only through a few wholesale 
and one or two foreign trade companies. Strong monopoly character of the selling 
market in itself restricts the enterprise's possibilities of selection and, in our ex-
perience, this is only aggravated by the atomized purchasing channels — which are 
anyway difficult to treat, owing to the various problems of cooperation, etc. The 
tension caused hereby may be increased at the same time by the fact that even this 
atomized purchasing market consists often of producers who in respect of the given 
components, etc., are in monopoly position, hence the possibilities of selection have 
been further restricted for the surveyed enterprises. 
The differing structure of the purchasing and selling markets is a characteristic 
feature not only in one type of enterprises, e.g. the industrial enterprises. Differences 
can also be found depending on the kind (function) of the enterprise dealt with. The 
differences between the purchasing and selling market have varying features with 
each of the industrial, internal trading, or foreign trading companies. In the case of 
the enterprises of domestic trade, the structure of the purchasing market is — in op-
position to industry — mostly monopolistic, while the selling market is atomized or 
oligopolistic. Similar findings were also experienced in respect of the exports paid in 
convertible currencies of the foreign trade companies. 
The monopoly character of the purchasing market of internal and foreign trading 
companies often follows from the autocratic position of the industrial enterprises 
— especially in the case of import restrictions.2 This can be seen from our finding that 
in the case of six out of the twelve enterprises surveyed the primary view in selecting 
the purchase channel was that the product was a monopoly commodity and could be 
bought only from a given enterprise. In knowledge of this it is not surprising that, in 
the fulfilment of the delivery contracts of the internal trade enterprises, shortfalls are 
experienced almost without any exception. In most cases the industrial enterprises 
accepted lower quantities than were demanded by the internal trade companies al-
ready when concluding the contracts. Considerable underfulfilment can be seen at 
the same time between the orders accepted in the contracts and the actual deliveries. 
Stronger"Seller's" and Weaker "Buyer's" Position 
Owing to the different characters of the purchasing and selling markets, the position 
of an enterprise considerably varies depending on whether it participates in trading as 
a seller or a buyer. In general its position as a buyer is usually less favourable, owing 
2 The sphere of products subject to import restriction in Hungary increased especially in the past 
years - as a result of economic recession. 
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to the monopoly character of the supply. As a seller, however, it usually enjoys su-
periority, among other things because of the atomized or oligopolistic demand. 
The superiority of the seller's position is reflected by the distribution of the turn-
over based on contracts of the internal trading enterprises by types of contracts, or, 
resp., the differences linked to them, depending on whether a buying or selling 
contract is concerned. In purchasing, annual delivery contracts are predominant with 
the internal trading enterprises, while in selling quarterly contracts play a greater part. 
The stronger position of selling is also indicated by the experience gained through 
the research into the contacts between industry and the foreign trade companies. In 
the relationships with the foreign trade companies the interests of industry are asserted 
especially in the cases of large industrial enterprises in monopoly position. The 
reasons why some important offers of the investigated foreign trade companies failed, 
allow for this conclusion. It is conspicuous that in the analysed years the failure of 
tenders was in all foreign trade companies due to the high prices quoted. To under-
stand this it must be known that the foreign trade enterprises are still interested in 
selling as large quantities as possible. (The commission contracts applied in broad 
spheres stimulate them in this direction, but, according to recent experience, even the 
increasingly spreading agreements of the pool type, or joint ventures do not eliminate 
this entirely.) The industrial enterprises are, on the contrary, interested in setting the 
offered prices as high as possible. They are propmpted to do so by the continuously 
growing costs of raw materials, etc., the pressure to make exports profitable, the 
"constraint" to increase the income in convertible currencies, and so on. And, in our 
experience, a further factor also acts to this effect, namely, the missing information 
about the position of their products in the market, more precisely, the differing 
opinion of industry and foreign trade in this respect. We have, in several cases, found 
considerable differences between the value judgement of industrial and foreign trade 
companies regarding the characteristics of both the markets and the products. The 
differences are most conspicuous in respect of standards of technology and the equip-
ment working in production. While the foreign trade companies deemed the quality, 
marketability, or serviceability of the products to be on average level — mainly from 
the view of the markets, — some of the industrial enterprises were convinced of.their 
high level in all these respects. 
High Ratio of Centralized Decisions - Outdated 
Marketing Organization 
Pursuant to our experience the selection possibilities of the producers — regarding 
changes of the distribution channels - are further restricted by the fact that in 
both the domestic and foreign trade enterprises the proportion of centralized decisions 
is too high. The leaders, in general, reserve too many decisions for themselves and this 
circumstance — especially in the case of large organizations — often questions their 
correctness. (The larger an organization, the more difficult it is for one person to 
comprehend a number of issues in their entire depth.) 
Very likely the wish to resolve this problem contributed to the fact that in the 
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operative activities of the trading enterprises a verticality of five steps had been 
developed: sales clerks — head of section — head of department — sales manager — 
general manager. At the same time in the fulfilment of several tasks both the trading 
and the functional departments take part. At first sight these vertical transmissions 
seem to mitigate the disadvantages stemming from the great number of centralized 
decisions but practical experience shows that this is not at all as unequivocal as that. 
To make a decision and implement it often takes an unduely long time. A good 
example of this is the work of the foreign trade enterprises in tendering their offers. 
Our experience proves that in 1982 the preparation of the offers, even those most 
important for the firms, took 12 — 20 days — depending on the type of product — 
instead of the 4-5 days necessary according to the opinion of their experts. 
There are many who think that the existing problems call for an urgent reduction 
of the vertical articulation. In our opinion, however, the difficulties are caused not 
only by the number of steps and the following slow decision process, but also by the 
cumbersome business administration that follows the decision. 
Owing just to these circumstances, it would also be necessary to decentralize some 
of the decisions and this could be facilitated by a certain reorganization, too. Namely, 
the current commercial enterprise organizations, built partly on marketing and partly 
on functional departments, do not promote the decentralization of decisions. Our 
idea is on the one hand to create teams which would integrate the business transac-
tions, including market research, correspondence and forwarding formalities (within 
these, one person could manage several tasks, specialized e.g. to certain products). 
On the other hand, the activities requiring special knowledge, — finances, foreign 
exchange, shipping, insurance, accounting, etc. — might remain centralized further on. 
Where such modification of the internal organization of the trading companies could 
be introduced, it would be possible to decentralize a part of the decisions and to make 
adjustment more flexible. Last but not least it is also an important point that the 
possibilities of the industrial enterprises in choosing their trading partners could be 
extended. 
Shifts between the Phases of Specialization and Diversification 
of the Wholesaling and the Retail Trading Enterprises 
The experiences of our survey made us to conclude that a relatively strong wholesal-
ing concentration of the products of the industrial enterprises and the eventual efforts 
of modification linked to this are strongly restricted as yet by the fact that a consider-
able phase shift can be seen between the specialization and diversification of the 
wholesaling and retailing companies. 
As mentioned in the preceding chapter, the special lines of the internal trading 
companies had been developed essentially on the basis of distribution of products in 
industry. But while in wholesale trade this can be considered characteristic even 
today, the lines of commodities in retail trade have considerably changed in the past 
ten years. Some networks of shops selling a broad scale of commodities have come 
into being, — retail trade became diversified. Simultaneously, however, specialized 
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commercial units, selling only a few related types of commodities, have also subsisted. 
This process shows that — if with a delay of a few years - changing the commodity 
lines in retail trade followed in many respects the diversification and specialization 
which took place in the network of retail trade of the advanced capitalist countries. 
However, the phase shift that occurred between the commodity range of the 
wholesale and that of the retail trading companies caused increasing problems for the 
retail shops and the consumers. For instance, the purchasing problems of the shops 
which sell a broad spectrum of commodities are multiplied by the fact that it is not 
possible to contact one or two wholesale enterprises engaged in selling the broad scale 
of products in harmony with those marketed by the retailing enterprises. In our ex-
perience the result is that these firms have to keep contacts with 50-70 companies 
in order to provide the choice of products according to the lines of their sales. 
Even the specialized retail shops are not in a better position, merely the character 
of their problems is different. Although in principle the specialized nature of whole-
sales trade would entail smooth purchasing, in adequate assortment, by the specialized 
retail and intermediary trading companies, the monopoly position of the former makes 
this not always possible. Namely, in the opinion of practising experts — owing, among 
other things, to the lack of interest that is due to their monopoly positon, — a comp-
lete selection of the product groups in question is often not available. 
In our experience this is one of the decisive reasons why the assortment of the 
shops in type and quantity often differs considerably from those ordered or from the 
supply of the factories. This disharmony also contributes to the claim of the retail 
trade for the permission to place their orders directly with the producers. This claim 
remains mostly unfulfilled, because of the above mentioned more favourable position 
of the wholesole trade. 
The shift between the specialization and diversification of wholesale and retail 
trade, beside causing troubles in meeting the demand of the customers, also puts a 
brake on the modernization of the marketing channels of the industrial enterprises. 
It stabilizes the current situation, i.e., the high ratio of wholesale trade and the secon-
dary role of the retail enterprises in the sales to the consumers. All this strongly 
hinders the development of more differentiated channels for the industrial enterprises 
for marketing their products. 
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